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Abstract 
 
SAMANDRAG - NORSK 
Denne masteroppgåva spør kva for konsekvensar det vil ha for vår oppfatning av viktige spørsmål 
innan litteraturvitskapen dersom dei sjåast frå eit pragmatistisk perspektiv. Den undersøkjer kva dette 
vil sei for vårt syn på litteraturteori, på metodeomgrepet og for vårt syn på sjølve omgrepet litteratur. 
Richard Rorty, ein pragmatist som har hatt særleg stor påverknadskraft innanfor feltet, vert brukt som 
vårt døme på pragmatistiske synspunkt, òg når det gjeld litteraturvitskapelege vurderingar. Hans 
synspunkt vert, kombinert med ei innføring i klassisk pragmatistisk filosofi, nytta som grunnlag for å 
dra nokre generelle konklusjonar i høve til kva det vil innebere å innta ein pragmatistisk posisjon i 
denne konteksten.  
 
Oppgåva finn at omgrepet “litteratur” vert gjennomgripande kontekstuelt definert, og sett som eit 
konseptuelt verktøy. Den forklarar kvifor ein pragmatistisk ståstad impliserer ei endring i fokus frå 
ontologiske spørsmål til praktiske spørsmål og erfaring, og korleis dette medfører at ein i staden for å 
spørje kva litteratur er vil spørje kva litteratur kan gjere. Svaret på kva litteraturen kan gjere finn ein å 
vere at den kan gje oss ressursar til å definer bade vår eigen identitet og vårt samfunn sin identitet, og 
denne prosessen vert samstundes sett som drivkrafta bak vår moralske utvikling og framgang. Oppgåva 
ser korleis pragmatismen sin innebygde anti-essensialisme og motstand mot filosofiske forsøk på å 
definere aksiomatiske, grunnleggande prinsipp som kunnskap og sanning kan byggast på ikkje berre 
fører til eit fullstendig brot med tradisjonelle oppfatningar av litterær kunst, men òg med vanlege 
oppfatningar av teori og teoretiske målsetjingar. Rorty si avvising av muligheita for ein generell 
tolkingsteori vert nytta for å illustrere dette. Teori vert forklart frå ein pragmatistisk ståstad som støtte 
for intelligent praksis. Dette plasserer teoretiske vurderingar som noko som skjer etter praksis, det vil i 
denne konteksten sei etter lesing og tolking, og det vert vist korleis dette gjer at fokus vert flytta frå 
teoretisk strukturdanning til litteraturkritikk og eit spel med vokabular. Eit slikt spel vert sett som ein 
kreativ prosess, og det vert ikkje sett som nyttig å forsøke å formulere generelle metodar eller 
metodeverk for dette. Den underliggande årsaka til pragmatismen som ståstad, eller potensielt den 
endelege konsekvensen av å innta ein slik posisjon, vert forklart som ei endring i haldning – ei haldning 
som verkar å likne den vi har til litteraturen si verd.       
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ABSTRACT – ENGLISH 
This master’s thesis conducts an investigation into what adopting a pragmatist position within literary 
studies would entail. It examines the consequences of pragmatism on the conception of literature, on 
literary theory, and it relates this to the methodical considerations of literary studies. The influential 
pragmatist Richard Rorty is used as its pragmatist exemplar, and his brand of pragmatism, including 
his views on literature, is used to illustrate matters pertaining to literary studies. It is also used as a 
basis for extrapolation: combined with a thorough introduction to classical pragmatism this allows the 
deduction of some general conclusions about what adopting a pragmatist point of view would imply in 
this context.  
 
This thesis finds that “literature” is seen as thoroughly contextual and conceived as a conceptual tool. 
It explains how pragmatism implies a shift in focus from ontological to practical questions and 
experience, and how this implies a shift from asking what literature is to what it does. The answer to 
what it does is found to be that it provides us with the means to define our identities both as individuals 
and as a society, and that it drives our moral progress. The inherent anti-essentialism and 
anti-foundationalism of pragmatism is seen to not only break completely with traditional perceptions of 
literary art, but also with common perceptions of what the objective of theorising is, and Rorty’s 
rejection of a general theory of interpretation is used to illuminate this matter. The goal of theory is 
explained in pragmatist terms as support for intelligent practice, which places theory as a subsequent 
activity to interpretation and moves the main emphasis to reading; to critical activity as a play of 
vocabularies. This is seen as a creative activity which will differ depending on purpose, context and 
individual critic, and as such it is not seen as useful to describe a general method or methodology for 
the activities of literary studies. The underlying reason for pragmatism, and potentially the ultimate 
consequence of adopting the key insights of pragmatism, is seen as a change in attitude – an attitude 
which closely resembles that with which we normally approach literature.  
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Part 1- INTRODUCTION   
 
ER: […] I would say pragmatism is useful because it is anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist, 
and recommends this holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. Are there any other ways in 
which you might conceive pragmatism being useful to literary study? 
 
RR: No.
1
 
 
 
The above quote might appear to be a detrimental starting point for a thesis asking the very 
question of how pragmatism can be useful for literary studies. Before our inquiry has even 
commenced the matter seems to be concluded in an orderly fashion: a few key words of 
pragmatism are listed, end of story. The question we are left with however is why these key 
words supposedly sum it up so neatly. Is it really as straightforward as this statement makes it 
seem? Another immediate concern is how exactly such an anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist 
and holistic pragmatic approach would influence a student of literature or a literary critic? How 
and why would, or should, it influence him, and on what level? Would it have methodological 
effects, or consequences for his theoretical perspectives? Would it perhaps even influence the 
very experience of reading great literature? 
Keeping the quote above in mente throughout, this thesis will attempt to investigate 
what pragmatism is and how pragmatism can be useful for literary studies. It will try to ask how 
a pragmatist would view central questions within our field of study by examining the basic 
positions of Richard Rorty on these issues. Rorty was perhaps the most prominent pragmatist 
intellectual of the past four decades (as well as an analytic-philosopher-come-professor-of 
literature). Although he was a controversial figure, even amongst some pragmatists, he clearly 
works in the pragmatist tradition, and it defines his work on literature as well. To clarify his 
views on the matter we start by outlining a few key ideas of classical pragmatism before 
                                                 
 
 
1
 E.P Ragg Ragg and Richard Rorty, "Worlds or Words Apart? The consequences of Pragmatism for Literary 
Studies: An interview with Richard Rorty," Philosophy and Literature 26, no. 2 (2002): 390-391. 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
2 
 
presenting an overview of Rortian pragmatism. Then Rorty’s vies on literature are examined, 
and their theoretical and practical consequences for literary studies investigated. The 
explorations carried out in this thesis will aim to enable a better understanding of why the very 
concise answer above could be argued to neatly describe this large and complicated topic of 
investigation.  
Topic of thesis 
The topic of this thesis is aligned along two axes. One is pragmatism and its philosophical 
bases: to have a firm grasp on its conceptual framework is necessary to understand its 
consequences for literary studies. The other is the concept of literature itself and the study of 
literature. The locus of this thesis is to be found where these two axes intersect. It aims at 
describing the fallout from looking at standard concepts, and theoretical and methodological 
approaches within literary studies, through pragmatist lenses. 
The issues that enter into play are well known to those working in this field. Basic 
questions come into consideration, such as what do we actually mean by the term “literature”? 
How is it distinguished from other types of texts? Can we tell good literature from bad? How 
should we read and interpret? Do we have a duty to respect “the literary work” in and of itself, 
and if so, what entitles it to be treated in this way? What happens if it is not only placed in a 
historical and biographical context, but if we let such extra-textual information inform all 
aspects of our interpretation of it? Fundamentally: how should we perform our studies, and how 
should we place ourselves and “the real world” in relation to our object of study? 
 
The philosophical tradition of pragmatism is perhaps not equally familiar to literary scholars. 
Pragmatism starts by looking at practices, at what we are doing rather than attempting to define 
what everything is. Its focus is on how practical outcomes matter to our experiences, rather than 
on the ontological status of our ideas, even when it comes to matters like truth, justice and the 
good. It holds, as can be seen in the introductory quote, an anti-foundationalist and 
anti-essentialist position, and uses this to question a lot of ideas that are often taken for granted 
within philosophy and literary studies. It believes that ideas are tools, shared practices, ways of 
thinking and talking about the concrete world and our experiences in it. These tools can be 
revised, reworked and wrought by entirely new words, if need be, and hence all knowledge is 
seen an open ended description of the world – a body of thought which can be made better or 
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different as we add or subtract and gain new perspectives. Pragmatism also sees all beliefs and 
the concepts we express them through as interrelated and interpenetrative, and that what we 
come to see as true or morally right is dependent on our whole web of beliefs. It holds that what 
is deemed to be good is entirely contingent on our moment in history, on cultural context, and 
on subjective experiences and predispositions.  
Pragmatism also holds that this does not imply that all interpretations, opinions, or 
statements are equally justified or useful. It maintains that context and practices have a 
regulatory effect on intellectual discourse without requiring predetermined ontological 
definitions. Keeping to questions concerning literature this means that, on Rorty’s account, 
pragmatism says both that the idea that there is something a text “really is about”, and that a text 
can tell you what it wants, is simply “more occultism”,2 and that “…[this] doesn’t mean that 
every view is as good as every other. It doesn’t mean that everything now is arbitrary, or a 
matter of the will to power, or something like that.”3 
In regards to the concept of literature, Rorty also says that literature is “…whatever the 
literary critics criticize…”4 and that it covers “…just about every sort of book which might 
conceivably have moral relevance – might conceivably alter one’s sense of what is possible and 
important.”5 Yet some books are chosen by literary critics and others are not. The question of 
“what is literature?” does not seem to have a completely arbitrary answer. How, for instance, do 
we arrive at these choices? How do we determine which books have “relevance” and the 
capacity to “alter”? In other words: why is it seemingly more justified to give some texts the 
label “literature” and others not?  
 
Asking such questions about literature leads us into the realm normally reserve for literary 
theory. Pragmatism is sometimes suspected of being anti-theoretical, and even anti-intellectual. 
                                                 
 
 
2
 See Umberto Eco and Stefan Collini, Interpretation and overinterpretation  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 102, 103. 
3
 Ragg and Rorty, "Worlds or Words Apart? Interview with Richard Rorty," 375. 
4
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity  (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
1989; repr., 12 (1999)). 81. 
5
 Ibid., 82. 
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Rorty provocatively states things like: “There is no point in… setting up factitious kinds called 
‘literature’ or ‘art’ or ‘writing’; nor is there any point in trying to synthesize them. There is 
nothing called… ‘the aim of theorizing’”6 and further that literary criticism does not require 
taking such “gawky topics” seriously.7 If pragmatism displays an “anti-theoretical” attitude 
where does that leave the works commonly referred to as literary theory? Are they not to be 
read or included in discussions? Do they not still offer great insights? Should we abandon 
writing anything about literature bar how we subjectively feel about a literary work? These 
reflections are closely tied to the question of method: Are we not to apply theoretical insights 
when reading literature? If not, how can interpretive findings be objectively legitimated? 
 
To sum this all up, and to be very specific, what I would like to investigate is: given a Rortian 
pragmatist outlook, what is literature? What roles do the texts we normally refer to as “theory” 
play? And further: does taking a pragmatist stance entail a certain way of approaching a text? In 
summary: what are the consequences of pragmatism on literary theory, methodology and on the 
conception of literature? 
Motivation for thesis 
Before we move on to the tasks of attempting to answer these questions, it is useful to clarify 
why it matters to ask them in the first place. Why should we take an interest in pragmatism, and 
in Richard Rorty’s point of view in particular? 
  
Pragmatism, often referred to as American pragmatism, has long roots reaching back to the late 
nineteenth century. It emerges as a philosophical school in the wake of several events which 
created turmoil, not only in the lives of people but in the ideas they had about their lives and the 
world they lived in. As Rorty puts it “[a]bout two hundred years ago, the idea that truth was 
made rather than found began to take hold of the imagination…”.8 This insight gave room for 
new ideas to flourish, both in regards to how our societies work, as well as in regards to art and 
                                                 
 
 
6
 Ibid., 145. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid., 3. 
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science. In Europe revolutions took place which were as much political and social as they were 
intellectual. In America the upheaval of the civil war destroyed old certainties and brought 
questions like “what is a man?” and “are ideas worth dying for?” into public, political and 
intellectual debate. Combined with the challenges which Darwinism general progress within 
the sciences posed to received ideas about truth and knowledge, a way of thinking about ideas 
as useful concepts to cope with this uncertain world arose. This line of thought saw our ideas as 
social and relational products fulfilling human needs and hence to be evaluated by how useful 
they were to their purposes, rather than by how true they were to absolute quantities.
9
 
Pragmatism came to shape American thinking for a century and a half, and continues to have a 
significant influence in the world of philosophy today. That, in itself, should make it a topic 
worth being acquainted with. 
 
Pragmatism was perhaps not at the forefront of philosophical discussion in the first half of the 
twentieth century but has had a major revival since. In the 1970s Richard Rorty emerged as its 
new front figure, creating his own brand of pragmatism. Rorty’s thinking has since had a great 
impact, well beyond the limits of academic philosophy, and he has been hailed by many voices 
as one of the most influential thinker of the last thirty years. His defining work Philosophy and 
the mirror of nature was published in 1979, and he died twenty eight years later in 2007. Harold 
Bloom, a name familiar to all literary scholars, called Rorty “the most interesting philosopher in 
the world today”.10 Christopher Voparil notes in his introduction to The Rorty Reader that “an 
annotated bibliography of the secondary literature on Rorty in 2002 lists over 1,200 entries” and 
that it is a body of work “beyond the limits of a single human being to master.”11 
The whole corpus might be beyond what a single person could master, but this is 
precisely the reason why I believe we should make an effort at understanding and shaping our 
piece of the puzzle. Literary studies are not on the fringes of this matter: Rorty started out as a 
                                                 
 
 
9
 For a highly readable and informative account of all of this I strongly recommend Louis Menand’s Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book The Metaphysical Club – A Story of Ideas in America. 
(Louis Menand, The metaphysical club  (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001).) 
10
 Quoted on the back cover of Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity. 
11
 Christopher J. Voparil and Richard J. Bernstein, The Rorty reader  (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 1. 
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student of analytic philosophy but ended up as Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford. 
His development as a thinker starts off in the analytical and the argumentative and ends up in 
the descriptive, dialogical and narrative. Rorty focused increasingly on the role and use of 
narration, and wrote significant pieces on several authors. He also contributed to the debates on 
core issues in literary studies, for instance on the concept of literature, the limits of 
interpretation, the status of fictional discourse and more. See for instance Contingency, irony 
and solidarity
12
 for a general introduction to the philosophy of the mature Rorty, and for his 
most important work on literature. Interpretation and Overinterpretation
13
 presents an 
enlightening debate on the limits (or lack of such) on interpretations of literary works. The 
essays “Is there a problem about fictional discourse?” and “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and 
Twentieth-Century Textualism” in Consequences of Pragmatism14 contain interesting 
discussions of several questions relating to literary studies, and “The inspirational value of great 
works of literature” in Achieving our country15 give an insight into Rorty’s appreciation of the 
effects great literature can have on us.  
 
Another matter pertaining to the relevance of this thesis is the current debate within academic 
literary circles here in Norway. When I chose this topic for my thesis I could not foresee that 
some of the issues I would be focusing on would be the topic of a most interesting debate, 
engaging an audience well beyond the purely academic circles, at the very time I was due to 
finish my thesis. The fact that this is the situation today speaks itself of the relevance of my 
choice of subject matter, and on the importance of getting some clarity on what exactly 
pragmatism entails.
16
  
                                                 
 
 
12
 Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity. 
13
 Eco and Collini, Interpretation and overinterpretation. 
14
 Richard Rorty, Consequences of pragmatism: (essays: 1972-1980)  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1982). 
15
 Richard Rorty, Achieving our country: leftist thought in twentieth-century America  (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1998). 
16
 I have, however, consciously refrained from directly entering into this debate. An explication of my views on 
what both Per Buvik and Erik Bjerck Hagen (and others) have expressed in the course of this debate does not 
belong in the context of this thesis. Some of the issues raised by this debate might, however, be illuminated by 
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Personally, I first read Contingency, irony and solidarity several years ago. At that time I cannot 
say that I fully understood it. Even though I was immediately sympathetic both to the voice 
shining through and the sort of thinking it advocated, it seemed to me to jeopardise something I 
cared about very much: literature itself. When I picked it up after we studied the arguments in 
Interpretation and Overinterpretation as part of the master’s programme, it started to make 
more sense and inspired me to keep on investigating what this all meant – what were the 
consequences of adopting a pragmatist stance in literary studies? Hence my motivation has also 
been made up of a large portion of personal intellectual curiosity, and the work, though very 
challenging indeed, has been nothing but rewarding. 
Methodological and theoretical approach  
My approach to this work has followed the lines of what could perhaps be said to be the only 
general method in literary studies: to read, and read with attention and awareness. I have tried to 
read both broadly and deeply, starting with trying to understand pragmatism in general before 
moving on to Rorty in particular. I have attempted to get a thorough understanding of his 
project through works ranging from the non-technical and more easily absorbed arguments in 
Contingency, irony and solidarity, to the technical details of analytic philosophy of language in 
essays like “Is there a problem about fictional discourse?”. While reading I have tried to answer 
the questions I wanted to ask from the perspective of literary studies and attempted to re-state 
everything I have learned in my own words as much as possible, simplifying as much as it can 
be simplified to help convey what I have learned and reflect my own understanding of these 
matters. 
As my topic itself is of a theoretical nature I am not employing another overall 
theoretical framework to illuminate the matter. My aim has been to aid the general 
comprehension of the complex issues encountered by contrasting and comparing to familiar 
theoretical positions within literary studies as we move along.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
considering the presentation and discussion of Rortian pragmatism that is given herein. It seems sufficient to let 
that speak for itself.  
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Limitations 
As already noted there is enough material by and on Rorty to spend more than a lifetime 
researching. I believe that I have managed to get a good grasp on a large part of the original 
works by Rorty which deal directly with issues pertaining to literary studies. I also believe that 
I have a thorough understanding of a substantial amount of secondary material on these issues. 
However, given time and page number restrictions, this thesis can only give a basic introduction 
to all of the questions, concepts and arguments at hand. 
Another limitation is the fact that I do not have the opportunity to delve deeply into the 
whole pragmatist tradition. Hence the very choice made to focus on Rorty is in itself a 
limitation. The constraints on this project do not allow me to play various pragmatist 
philosophers up against one another. I would, for instance, liked to have spent more time on 
Dewey and his well-known aesthetics of “art as experience”. Other very relevant thinkers in 
regards to my topic, like Shusterman, Posner, Margolis, Nussbaum, Fish and more, have had to 
be deliberately excluded from the picture for the same reasons.  
Outline of thesis 
To present this rather challenging and multi-faceted material in a systematic and 
comprehensible manner my method of presentation has been to divide the thesis into four parts. 
This first part gives a general introduction to the thesis. Part two gives a brief introduction to the 
key concepts of pragmatism as well as in introduction to Richard Rorty and his brand of 
pragmatist thought. Following this, part three enters more deeply into Rorty’s writings on 
matters pertaining to literary studies, and discusses these matters from a pragmatist point of 
view. This part contains three sections, which examine the consequences of pragmatism on the 
conception of literature, on literary theory and on methodology respectively. For each of these 
parts some general conclusions regarding the adoption of a pragmatist point of view are drawn. 
In part four these findings are very briefly summarised and the matter concluded. 
  
It might be helpful to provide a more detailed outline, beginning with part two. We begin by 
presenting pragmatism as a school of thought, and how pragmatism views all our efforts in the 
light of human needs and interests, as well as defined by our limitations. We proceed by 
explaining the pragmatist method and its application to the concept of truth. We also outline 
some key insights of pragmatism: its primacy of practice, its anti-scepticism, and how it views 
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all knowledge as fallibilistic and holistic. An explanation for Rorty’s views on language, truth 
and knowledge is then followed by a brief outline of his political visions.  
 Part three moves on to the concept of literature seen from a pragmatist point of view. It 
finds that this concept is seen as thoroughly contextual, and that there is no such thing as “the 
literary” in and of itself on pragmatist terms. Through discussing this perception of literature in 
the light of more familiar points of view, such as Russian formalism and New Critical ideas, we 
relate this closely to the pragmatist tenet of anti-essentialism, and show how the pragmatist 
view entails a complete break with the idea of the autonomous work of art. Following this we 
move on to Rorty’s particular views on literature in more detail. We find that he assigns 
literature a highly important and defining role as providing us with means for identity-creation, 
both on the private and the public scale. His pragmatist principles are demonstrated to be the 
reasons for why art is seen as intrinsic to moral considerations, and we show why Rorty 
privileges art and literature as tools to drive change and moral progress. In order to show why 
he sees literature as such an effective tool we investigate how non-rational means of persuasion 
are seen as the most effective tools for such purposes. 
 This leads on to the question of purposes. We find that pragmatism heightens our 
awareness of the fact that we are always acting in relation to our needs and desires: our 
purposes. Hence scholars of literature, and the discipline of literary studies itself, would, if a 
pragmatist stance was adopted, become more interested in defining itself in terms of purposes 
and uses of texts. We examine Rorty’s purposes, and point to areas where the purposes of 
literary studies align with his, and where they do not align: where literary studies would have 
grounds or needs to define diverging purposes. This is done by looking at objectives we already 
are familiar with, such as defining literature, applying theoretical paradigms in our studies, 
evaluating literary merit, and investigating the relationship between form and content.   
 
Moving on from this, part three continues by investigating consequences of pragmatism on 
literary theory. The inherent anti-foundationalism of pragmatism means that it rejects any 
theoretical attempts at formulating founding and universalising theories, and an exchange 
between Rorty and Umberto Eco is used to demonstrate the kind of theory pragmatism rejects. 
To gain a deeper understanding of this matter we move on to consider Jonathan Culler’s 
objections to Rorty within the same debate, and his concerns are addressed from a pragmatist 
point of view. After describing the conception of theory pragmatism rejects we move on to 
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outlining the kind of theory it encourages, and finds that pragmatism does not impede our use of 
our critical and logical thinking but changes how we perceive what we do when we engage in 
these kinds of activities. Pragmatism sees theory as a subsequent activity to practice, and we see 
how this implies a shift towards literary criticism and towards “inspired” instead of 
“methodical” readings.  
 
The last section of part three examines pragmatism in relation to methodology. It finds that 
rather than a change in what we do, the defining change lies in a changed attitude towards what 
we do. It also examines the reasons why a pragmatist conception of method will always outline 
approaches that are eclectic, historicist, nominalistic, aware of contingency, and interested in a 
play of multiple vocabularies.  
 
Our conclusion in part four discusses this change in attitude a little further and finds it to be akin 
to the attitude of the “imaginary realm of the novel”, before it summarises our entire 
investigation by relating it back to the introductory quote.  
 
To arrive there, however, we need to begin by getting a thorough understating of what 
pragmatism itself is. We turn to this next.  
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Part 2 – PRAGMATISM  
Our introductory quote states three basic characteristics of pragmatism: that it is 
anti-foundationalist, anti-essentialist, and has a holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. To 
understand why Rorty thinks this sums up pragmatism’s usefulness for literary studies, we need 
to understand what is meant by these ideas and the concept of pragmatism itself.  
Classical pragmatism 
“Pragmatism” is a collective term for a school of thought working within a tradition founded 
(though not in any coherent and organised manner) by Charles Sanders Pierce, William James 
and John Dewey in the late nineteenth century. They shared an opposition to the 
correspondence theory of truth and knowledge but otherwise diverged somewhat in their 
primary interests and convictions. Their stance towards the idea of “truth” and epistemological 
thought lead James and Dewey to have an equally critical eye towards positivism as they did in 
regards to metaphysical explanations. This left them open to attack from two sides, despite the 
fact that a large part of their motivation was a desire to develop a way to incorporate the best of 
both worlds, and across disciplinary bounds.
17
 Hence both James and Dewey worked in a 
multitude of areas writing on issues like religion, ethics, humanism, education and political 
thought, as well as on the philosophy of science, its discoveries and its implications.  
Hilary Putnam, perhaps the most well-known of contemporary pragmatist thinkers, has 
praised the classical pragmatists for their refusal to “distinguish ‘the world as it is in itself’ from 
the world as it appears in the light of human needs and interests”, as well as for their insistence 
on an “agent point of view”.18 The human perspective is central to pragmatism still: an 
awareness of the embodiment of thought, and that our reasons for action and change, our 
knowledge of anything, is shaped and coloured by the simple fact that we are humans with 
intentions and limitations.  
                                                 
 
 
17
 Even now pragmatism gets criticised for not being rigorous enough; not presenting a clear and constructive 
system of thought, as well as for “disenchanting”, and dismissing the human need to feel part of something larger 
than themselves. 
18
 Putnam is quoted in Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Craig 
(London: Routledge, 1998,2004), url: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N046, accessed December 03,2012. 
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William James presents pragmatism as a method; an approach to settling metaphysical 
disputes. He suggests that unless there are actual practical consequences of settling such a 
dispute, one way or another, the dispute should be abandoned. He sees this as a way of 
rendering idle a lot of unnecessary disputes in philosophy, dissolving them as actual 
problems.
19
 The result of applying this method to the concept of truth became perhaps what 
pragmatism is most known for, but pragmatism offers many other insights as well. Although a 
full historical introduction to pragmatism and a full coverage of the philosophical implications 
of its ideas is well beyond the scope of this thesis, we need to take a closer look at a few of these 
key insights.  
The key ideas of pragmatism 
Putnam sums up the pragmatist way of thinking in a famous maxim: “That one can be both 
fallibilistic and antisceptical is perhaps the basic insight of American Pragmatism.”20 Concise 
and eminently put as it is, a more exhaustive explanation is in order, so let us look at the 
premises he infers this conclusion from and attempt to explain why this is “the insight” of 
American Pragmatism. 
Consider the practical consequences 
As we saw above, James launched pragmatism as an approach to identify which problems we 
should be spending our energies on attempting to solve – those where the outcome would have 
practical implications. Focusing on metaphysical disputes, which might always be 
interminable, seemed to him to be of little difference. He aims to clarify our thinking, tidying up 
in our ideas, so to speak, by putting aside those which we can do nothing to either debunk or 
confirm. He follows Pierce in seeing beliefs as “rules for action”21 and pragmatism as 
representing “the empiricist attitude” – an attitude where the pragmatist: 
…turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, 
                                                 
 
 
19
 See "What pragmatism means" in William James, Pragmatism : a new name for some old ways of thinking  
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949). 45. 
20
 Hilary Putnam, Pragmatism : an open question  (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 21. Putnam's italics. 
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 James, Pragmatism : a new name for some old ways of thinking: 46. 
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from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power… It means the open 
air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth.
22
 
 
In the same breath, James reminds us that pragmatism does not “stand for any special 
result” but is a method for performing inquiries in order to be able to act more efficiently. If 
beliefs are rules for action – guidelines for how we should undertake a task or behave in a 
certain situation – then we have to consider our beliefs very carefully and continuously as our 
situation, our knowledge and experiences changes ceaselessly. We need to have informed 
practices. Hence our capacity for theorising, formulating ideas, making systematic distinctions 
and so on simply become another aspect of practical investigations – a way of supporting and 
ensuring what Dewey called “intelligent practice”. Theory becomes a tool in the service of 
practice, equally much an activity, to be performed in order to ensure that we take the best 
possible action at any given time.  
The world is “out there” 
Being concerned with action and practical consequences pragmatists take the world at “face 
value”. Our observations of our environment and its events cause and shape our beliefs. Putnam 
explains that pragmatists have a “…strong strain of what philosophers used to call direct 
realism, that is, the doctrine that perception is (normally) of objects and events ‘out there’, and 
not of private ‘sense data’.”23 Pragmatists see no reason to start our inquiries from a position of 
doubt, and maintain that doubt in these matters requires convincing arguments of the same 
order as assertions do. 
In his own words James was a radical empiricist. He describes this as being 
materialistic, starting from the particular parts, and as someone who believes that his senses 
perceive objects that exist outside of him. He also classifies himself as “non-dogmatic” (as 
opposed to the idealistic rationalists who starts from ideas, pre-formed rules and dogmas) and 
open to discuss his beliefs and perceptions of the world.
24
 James regards himself as a sceptic. It 
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 Ibid., 51. 
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 Putnam, Pragmatism : an open question: 7. 
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 James, Pragmatism : a new name for some old ways of thinking: 11-12. 
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is important to be able to distinguish James’ notion of a sceptic and our current notion of 
philosophical scepticism. James defines the sceptic as someone prepared to question and 
discuss their beliefs about the world – in other words it entails a commitment to the fallibilistic 
nature of knowledge. Philosophical scepticism, on the other hand, questions our trust in our 
senses, questions our ability to know anything about the world. In its most extreme sense it 
denies that we can have any knowledge at all, leaving us not even able to assert that there is a 
world outside of our own minds, ending in solipsism. Hence James’ declaration of being a 
“sceptic” is easily paired with the pragmatist commitment to anti-scepticism in terms of 
whether we can know anything of the world around us.  
The fallibilistic nature of knowledge 
It is tempting to describe the pragmatist commitment to the fallibilistic nature of knowledge 
through a well-known line by Alexander Pope: “to err is human”. This sums up both the fact 
that pragmatism proceeds from what Putnam calls an “agent point of view” and that the limited 
capabilities of the human mind, our inability to see the universe from God’s perspective, 
necessarily leaves our beliefs and knowledge open to errors. Our own acceptance of this fact 
instated the principle of fallibilism at the very heart of the modern scientific method, which also 
demonstrates the close link between a scientific and a pragmatic approach to the world. Both 
hold that even though we have justified beliefs about something we can still be wrong in 
holding those beliefs. (The classic example is of course how pre-Copernican astronomy had 
perfectly justified, observation-based theories explaining how the Earth stood at the centre of 
the cosmos). This is not a controversial attitude towards knowledge. Why, then, is Putnam 
calling the combination of being both fallibilistic and anti-sceptical the basic insight of 
American pragmatism? 
First of all fallibilism has had another hundred years since James to become ingrained 
into our thinking. Secondly it is still not necessarily easily seen as a natural combination. On the 
one hand it maintains that we have direct access to the world around us – that we can determine 
its ontological status without requiring introspection and incorrigibility. On the other hand it 
requires everything you come to know, based on this direct access to the world, to be 
questionable. It certainly can, at first glance, look like a contradiction in terms. 
Putnam points to two aspects that can help sort this out. Fallibilism does not require us 
to doubt everything: “The fact that perception is sometimes erroneous does not show that even 
non-erroneous perception is really perception of ‘appearances’.” It also helps if we keep in 
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mind that “…access to common reality does not require access to something preconceptual. It 
requires, rather, that we be able to form shared conceptions.” 25 The main reason why this 
combined insight is so vital to pragmatism is that it forms a very important premise under which 
pragmatists attack foundationalism: it undermines the notion of noninferential knowledge 
while keeping us from reverting to scepticism. 
Usually, a strong anti-sceptical stance correlates with an undercurrent of scientism: a 
belief in the methods of the empirical sciences as being able to provide us with information 
about this world which is more true; information that represents a genuine revelation of 
essential and inherent properties of objects in the world and the world itself. The pragmatist will 
however insist on the fallibilistic nature of all knowledge, and does not believe that we can ever 
know how things “really are”. To understand why, we need to take a closer look at the 
pragmatist notion of truth and its conception of knowledge.  
The whole truth 
Even at the time of James pragmatism had already also come to mean “in a still wider sense… a 
certain theory of truth.”26 Three important aspects of the pragmatist theory of truth will be our 
focus here: the first is an appreciation of the holistic nature of truth, the next is a consideration 
of how we come to see something as true, and the third is an understanding of the pragmatist 
conviction that truth is not something that is “out there”. 
 
Consider what happens when an idea is proposed to you as true. You already have a framework 
of ideas which helps you make sense of the world and your place in it. If the new idea goes 
against everything you already believe to be true the proposition will naturally be discarded as 
false. James was acutely aware of this: “…ideas (which themselves are but parts of our 
experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other 
parts of our experience…”.27 What we will acknowledge as true has to fit in with the whole 
body of what we already know: truth is considered holistically. 
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James points out that we are all “extreme conservatives” when it comes to our ideas – 
we like to keep our view of the world from changing. It is worth quoting James at some length 
here, as his explanations are both easily readable and succinct: 
This new idea… preserves the older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them 
just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case 
leaves possible. An outrée explanation, violating all our preconceptions, would never pass for a true 
account of novelty. We should scratch round industriously till we found something less excentric. 
The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order standing. […] 
New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact 
so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity.
28
 
 
The old set of ideas constrains the possible set of propositions which could be adopted as 
candidates for new truths. Being aware of the holistic nature of truth, seeing them as a web of 
interrelated beliefs, makes us appreciate the built-in restrictions in the process that leads to the 
acceptance or rejection of an idea as true. 
 
The next step considers how we come to see something as true in greater detail. How do we 
come to see an idea as being worth the effort of “stretching” our current set of ideas to 
accommodate it? We obviously have to consider it to have merit; it has to be a credible 
proposition. Such merit is bestowed through a process of justification. Simply put, we “stretch” 
to accommodate a new truth when we believe we have good reason to do so. If you propose a 
statement as true I will agree if I consider your justification of its propositional content to be 
adequate. 
The above account may seem to be stating the obvious but, although there are some 
subtleties left out, it does sum up the pragmatist way of looking at it: truth is a matter of 
persuasion and agreement – it depends on justification and credibility. James holds that “[t]rue 
ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that 
we can not. […] Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events.”29 Dewey 
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says that true statements are simply “warranted assertions”.30 The grounds for justification, 
how we warrant these assertions, can vary greatly depending on context. If we are dealing with 
mathematical questions, for instance, we will require a very different set of rigorous 
justifications for a claim to be accepted as true than when we point out that “the sunset is 
beautiful”. The ease of reaching agreement, and the conventional or institutional requirements 
for calling something a truth or a fact, play a part. Rorty explains that all warranted assertions 
are “…all true in exactly the same sense. The differences between them are revealed by 
sociological study of the way in which people would justify each assertion – but not by 
semantics.”31 
 
The last aspect we will consider here is the pragmatist conviction that truth is not something 
that is “out there”. Accounts of the pragmatist notion of truth often focus on the fact that it 
rejects the correspondence theory of truth. It seems to me that it is perhaps easier to understand 
why if we keep in mind the holistic nature of truth as a web of warranted assertions, dependent 
on justification through persuasive argument. 
As we saw above, pragmatism is quite clear in its conviction that the world is “out 
there”. It is equally clear on the matter that truth is not. By talking about a world “out there” we 
usually simply mean our environment as physical, material, tangible, external to your body et 
cetera. We do not, however, usually include in this ideas like The Good, The Beautiful or The 
Just, God, The Absolute, and pragmatism holds that no such concepts at all are “out there”: not 
Reason, Mind, Human Nature, Logic, Numbers. These are all human ideas, concepts for coping 
with the world as we see it. Pragmatism is anti-metaphysical, so on the same token that it rejects 
the thought that such ideas have physical counterparts, it rejects any account based on seeing 
ideas as having some intangible, metaphysically conceived “essence”. It rejects the notion that 
concepts can belong to a sphere of existence beyond the physical realm which lets us consider 
them to “be” something: assigning them a special ontological status beyond ordinary concepts 
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such as “friendship”, “the smile”, or “the family”. Pragmatism says that all of these words are 
simply parts of the communicative tool of language, and the same goes for truth. Truth clearly 
does not possess a physical counterpart in the world of objects, nor does it have an essentialistic 
counterpart in some other, extra-physical realm. It does not correspond to anything; it is not 
“out there”. 
Truth is instead what we say about something. It is a word we attach to ideas we 
consider justified: it indicates that we have assigned them a certain value. We will see that 
Rorty has more to say about the pragmatist notion of truth in relation to the concept of language, 
we do, however, not risk getting ahead of ourselves by letting him help us explain the above 
distinction:  
To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say, with common sense, that most 
things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. To say 
that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that 
sentences are elements of human languages, and that human languages are human creations.
32
 
 
On this view there is no contradiction in being anti-sceptical (“the world is out there”) and 
rejecting the correspondence theory: saying that there is word-world relationship. 
 
These three aspects are highly important to understand in order to appreciate the pragmatist 
notion of truth. However, as pragmatism never loses sight of the practical side of things, and we 
should also be aware that on pragmatist terms what is true is also what works: that which when 
taken as true lets us cope with the world in a better way. Also pragmatists sort and abstract, 
classify and label the objects in their world and their experiences. Being aware of the 
contingency of categorical labels does not hinder us in using them as conceptual tools to cope 
with our surroundings, use them to formulate predictions for instance. This is why truth on 
pragmatist terms is also defined as “a class-name for all sorts of definite working-values in 
experience”.33  
 Truth as a work in progress, seen holistically and combined with the continual 
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awareness of the “agent point of view”, moves the question of truth from a matter of finding, of 
discovery and disclosure, to a matter of making. It is a shift from a question of verification of 
correspondences to a process of agreement on interpretations. Truth is, in other words, moved 
into the realm of hermeneutics. This is the realisation that “we cannot understand the parts of a 
strange culture, practice, theory, language, or whatever, unless we know something about how 
the whole thing works, whereas we cannot get a grasp on how the whole works until we have 
some understanding of its parts.”34 There is no part of this which we can leave to a different 
type of reasoning that allows us direct access to what is true, what is right, and hence no part or 
procedure that can take precedence over any other. There are only interpretations and our 
conversational agreement or disagreement on these. 
 
The above is obviously a point which is highly relevant to literary studies, a discipline built 
around interpretive practices and theories. We will return to the application of these insights to 
the practice of literary interpretation in the course of outlining Rorty’s views on literary theory. 
However, before moving on to Rorty, we should note that this hermeneutic attitude is also 
closely related to another characteristic attitude of pragmatism: a desire for opening up rather 
than closing. Speaking against the correspondence theory of truth James faults it for being “an 
inert static relation. When you’ve got your true idea of anything, there’s an end of the matter. 
You’re in possession; you know… Epistemologically you are in stable equilibrium.”35 
Pragmatism, on the other hand, takes a truth proposition as its departure point and asks “what 
are the consequences of seeing it this way?”  
James also likens the search for theories revealing how things “really are” to a primitive 
belief in magic: that naming things subjects them to our will. The “words that names the 
universe’s principle”, like God, Reason or the Absolute, are names you can “rest in”. He urges 
us to not rest: to use the pragmatic method to “…bring out of each word its practical cash-value, 
set it at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a 
program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing 
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realities may be changed.”36 Pragmatism is always interested in opening up, in keeping a space 
for the yet un-thought of. A “facing forward” as James calls it.37  
This might be part of why the appeal of this intellectual tradition has prevailed. As 
mentioned in the introduction, pragmatism lost some of its momentum in the first half of the 
twentieth century, but since the 1970s it has attracted influential thinkers such as Putnam, 
Robert Brandom, Nicholas Rescher, Jürgen Habermas and Susan Haack. These 
neo-pragmatists (as opposed to classical pragmatists like James and Dewey) use and develop 
traditional pragmatist ideas, albeit seemingly somewhat selectively. They develop new views 
on key philosophical problems, the core of which arise from their take on concepts like truth, 
knowledge and meaning. This is how pragmatism can questions some of the basic principles 
underlying classical solutions to philosophical problems, and its focus on practical application, 
use and usefulness has led it to influence a wide range of fields outside of academic philosophy. 
Most notably it has had consequences within law, education, politics, sociology, psychology, 
and, also, within literary criticism.
38
 Richard Rorty had a prominent and influential voice in this 
group, and we will now turn to him and outline his brand of pragmatism. 
Contingency, irony and solidarity: Richard Rorty’s pragmatism 
Rorty ended his career as Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford University and his 
interest in literature is, as mentioned, precisely why I chose to focus on him. The earlier part of 
his career is orientated towards the technicalities of analytic philosophy, but gradually he comes 
to associate himself more clearly and outspokenly with the pragmatist tradition. He makes this 
tradition fully his own by redescribing it in terms emanating from the “linguistic turn” in 
philosophy (as well as resulting from his objections to philosophical consequences drawn from 
                                                 
 
 
36
 Ibid., 52-53. 
37
 Ibid., 225-227. 
38
 See Christopher Hookway, "Pragmatism" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(Online: Standford University, 2010), url: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/pragmatism/, 
accessed December 3,2012.  
and also Douglas McDermid, "Pragmatism" in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. (Canada: Trent 
University, 2006), url: http://www.iep.utm.edu/pragmati/, accessed December 3, 2012.  
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
21 
 
this), and holds, with Wilfrid Sellars, that all meaningful awareness “is a linguistic affair”.39 
Since I am not, however, a scholar of philosophy the Rortian pragmatism presented in 
this thesis is leaning most heavily on the writings of the mature Rorty: on a handful of essays 
published after his major and defining work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) and on 
his more accessible, though in many ways also defining, Contingency, irony and solidarity 
(1989). In this latter work many of the questions Rorty leaves us with at the end of Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature have been answered. This is also the single work with the greatest 
focus on literature and narrative power, and naturally serves as a lens for a student of literature 
to view his pragmatism through. 
By the time of his death, Rorty was infamous in some circles and celebrated and highly 
admired in others. He had decidedly been one of the most important voices in philosophy in the 
past three decades. To some, his project of dissolution and destabilisation of old and trusted 
truths seemed very provocative, but regardless of which way the reception swung the result was 
a massive response and a still growing body of secondary literature. A significant portion of this 
response was also support for the kind of tower-toppling Rorty engaged in. The towers that fell 
under his attack (at least if you thought him successful) were no smaller pillars of our 
intellectual history than Truth, Reality, Language, Mind, Knowledge, not to mention 
Philosophy itself. He wanted to show how the philosophical tradition from Plato to today was 
built on sand because the foundations that supported it were not real. Needless to say this was 
provocative, especially when the attack came from within the fold. Rorty was a specialised 
philosopher himself who had an impressive talent for expressing his thoughts in a persuasive 
way, writing in a voice that, despite its almost casual and seemingly offhand style, naturally 
demanded the attention of others.  
Our ideas about ideas 
Rorty wanted to change our ideas about ideas, which places him firmly within the American 
pragmatist tradition. Louis Menand eloquently sums up Holmes, James, Pierce and Dewey’s 
“idea about ideas”, and he might as well have added Rorty to his list of names: 
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They all believed that ideas are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but are tools – like forks and 
knives and microchips – that people devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves. 
They believed that ideas are produced not by individuals, but by groups of individuals – that ideas 
are social. …their survival depends not on their immutability but on their adaptability.
40
 
 
This is classic pragmatist anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism. What Rorty does 
is to use these insights to recount the history of our ideas – to tell an epic story about 
philosophy, like no pragmatist before him. He traces its history and systematically undermines 
any metaphysical tendencies, constructing his “diagnostic narrative”41about how we came to 
believe what we believe. He also cements his antirepresentialist views, rejecting the idea of 
mind or language as a mirror of nature, in favour of what he terms epistemological 
behaviourism (see below). Rorty ends his epic tale by sketching the future of philosophy as one 
of “hermeneutic” philosophy: therapeutic and edifying. His line of arguments against analytic 
philosophy ends in a turn towards narrative and dialogue.  
Language, truth and knowledge 
It is hopefully clear by now what is meant by “anti-foundationalism” and “anti-essentialism”. 
The third key characteristic of pragmatism mentioned in the introductory quote, “a holistic 
interest in multiple vocabularies”, is not yet as clearly defined. We know that holism is a tenet 
of pragmatist thought, but to fully understand what is meant by “multiple vocabularies” we 
need to expound Rorty’s view of language and the manner in which he redescribes pragmatism 
through an extension of the vocabulary of the philosophy of language. 
One of the characteristics of so called “neopragmatism” is precisely its specific 
linguistic priority.
42
 Contemporary pragmatism does not start by asking about the nature of 
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objects or their ontological status, but by asking what we are doing when we employ these types 
of vocabularies.
43
 The vocabulary of philosophy, for instance, includes words like 
“ontological”, “epistemological”, and “object”. Linguistically orientated pragmatism then asks: 
what are we doing when we apply a word like “ontological” and say “the mind has an 
ontological status different to that of the brain”? What does our application of words do to our 
thinking, to our attitudes and beliefs? 
 
In regards to language, as in regards to concepts like truth and knowledge, Rorty attempts to 
take a step back and look at it from a “third person standpoint”. He sees language as a 
communicative tool and knowledge as a result of argument and discussion.
44
 Language is 
something we do in order to “… [grab] hold of causal forces and making them do what we want, 
altering ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations.”45 Note that Rorty is in no way 
denying that the world around us exerts its physical forces upon us, nor that we can do the same 
upon the world. We are in a material, causal relationship with our surroundings, and our 
environment and our experiences can cause us to hold beliefs. As a pragmatist, however, Rorty 
is an anti-sceptic, and also rejects the idea that there is a correspondence relationship between 
the words we use to talk about the world and objects in the world. And truth is not a notion 
which bridges the “gap” between the world and the word. 
Rorty simply observes that language lets us talk about things, and that correspondence 
is not required for identification. We can use Rorty’s way of examining the classic philosophy 
of language-example of “the cat is on the mat” to understand this. The statement is seemingly 
easy to break it into pieces which correspond to objects in the world. But what about “the cat is 
not on the mat”?  
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 Richard Rorty, "Texts and Lumps,"  New Literary History 17, no. 1 (1985), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/468973. 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
24 
 
Pragmatists say that the traditional notion that “truth is correspondence to reality” is an uncashable 
and outworn metaphor. Some true statements – like “the cat is on the mat” – can be paired off with 
other chunks of reality so as to associate parts of the statement with parts of the chosen chunk. Most 
true statements – like “the cat is not on the mat” and “there are transfinite numbers” and “pleasure is 
better than pain” – cannot.
46
 
 
The question that this raises is: are there different mechanisms at work when the cat is present 
and when he is absent? Different ways of determining something as true when there is 
correspondence between parts of statements and “chunks of reality”? Is the absentee cat then 
non-existent? Is he fictional? 
Rorty holds that there is no difference in the mechanisms at work in the two cases. That 
problems of existence resulting from presuming the ability to directly refer to something 
(correspondence) and the need for a secondary explanation when this becomes troublesome 
(the cat is absent) result from pointless moves made with metaphysical notions within the 
scheme of philosophy of language. He drops the idea of correspondence altogether: there is no 
need for a Russelian word-world reference theory. “All we need is the commonsensical notion 
of ‘talking about’, where the criterion for what a statement is ‘about’ is just whatever its utterer 
‘has in mind’ – that is, whatever he thinks he’s talking about.”.47 
Rorty’s view of language is thus very practical and mundane, in the original sense of the 
word. He does not separate language from either the world of objects or from human life, 
maintaining a strongly anti-metaphysical view of language. Language is not, and should not be 
permitted to become, another “foundation” or “first philosophy”. This move would not free us 
from material constraints and let us solve old problems by restating them anew as problems of 
and in language (a growing aspiration within philosophy during the twentieth century and 
usually what is meant by the so called “linguistic turn” in philosophy).  
It is important to keep in mind that Rorty’s does not separate language into some sphere 
of its own and make truth a matter of logical inference. Insisting that there is no direct 
correspondence between word and world does not imply a separation between word and world. 
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To Rorty, as a pragmatist, truth is “warranted assertibilty”. Following the later Wittgenstein he 
says: “The question whether to view truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ or as ‘warranted 
assertibility’ is the question of whether to treat language as a picture or as a game.”48Assigning 
a truth value to a proposition happens within this game. Truth is a label, tied up with a sense of 
(use) value, of validity, given to a statement. Classical pragmatism showed us that no 
statements had an unconditional claim to truth – no propositions were self-evident and had 
some universal right to be recognised as valid. Nor did we find ourselves under some 
imperative higher duty to see certain truths as truths.
49
 What Rorty does is to add a specific 
linguistic dimension to the explanations of why this is so. 
 
Rorty’s linguistic priority and general anti-representationalist view of language and mind is 
also evident in his view of epistemology.  
Epistemology only looks attractive if you think that there is a topic called knowledge whose 
nature can be studied… Only someone who thinks that knowledge has foundations located in 
sense perception, or pure reason, or divine revelation, or something, would take the idea of 
studying knowledge, its nature and limits, seriously.
50 
Instead, “…[p]ragmatism views knowledge not as a relation between mind and an object, but, 
roughly, as the ability to get agreement by using persuasion…”: as a continuous human 
endeavour.
51
 
As mentioned above Rorty considers himself to be an “epistemological behaviourist”. 
This is not a reductive view where mental activity is read off in our behaviour, but an 
observation from a “third-person standpoint” of the different (linguistic and other) behavioural 
processes leading us to consider something as “known”. Hence “[a]n epistemological 
behaviourist should rest content with a relaxed linguistic pluralism. Some ways of talking are 
useful for the prediction and control of natural processes. Others are useful for deliberation or 
for thinking of new ways of living. Things can hang together by serving different functions, 
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thus not conflicting.”52 Rorty is not telling us that we cannot know anything. He just urges us to 
be fully aware of the contingency of knowledge and to see it as a way of using language, a 
manner of classifying propositions. As Williams puts it, Rorty is not an epistemological sceptic 
but rather a sceptic about epistemology”.53 
 
The third key characteristic of pragmatism mentioned in the introductory quote, “a holistic 
interest in multiple vocabularies” should now, hopefully, be more well-defined. It implies the 
linguistic pluralism of Rorty’s epistemological stance: that different ways of talking are useful 
for different purposes. It also entails the idea that different purposes, different contexts and 
communities, can produce their preferred vocabularies and their truths through differing 
processes of justification. This is tantamount to saying that defending a new formula in 
chemistry as correct will be very different from defending a reading of Shakespeare as correct, 
but that both, when conforming to the conventional criteria of the two different contexts should 
be considered as equally true. 
Due to the fact that pragmatism rejects the notion that any language is more intrinsically 
related to nature or reality than any other, these “multiple vocabularies” are also interrelated in 
a non-hierarchical manner. The tower-toppling Rorty engaged in levelled the playing field. If 
this tower-toppling, this levelling and blurring of distinctions, is a form of de-construction 
Rorty also has a constructive project. This is where literature starts to play an integral part, built 
into both the goals Rorty hopes to achieve and the means to get there. We turn to this next.  
The constant realisation of a liberal utopia 
Rorty’s goals are, rather naturally as a pragmatist, practical and related to actual lived life. 
Freedom is perhaps the one word that describes his agenda best: working for the freedom of 
every human being to be whomever they choose; freedom to be the best version they can be of 
themselves. For that space to be opened up for each of us working towards increasing our sense 
of solidarity with others, our sensitivity to the suffering and injustices happening to someone 
else, is of paramount importance to Rorty. Fully aware that he has no foundations to ground and 
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build his vision for a better world on he chooses “not to be cruel” as his guiding line, borrowing 
from Judith Shklar’s definition of liberals as: “the people who think that cruelty is the worst 
thing we do.”54 To achieve this kind of freedom on the individual level, only constrained by the 
desire to not be cruel and not to be achieved at the expense of the wellbeing of others, we need 
a society where this can unfold: a “liberal utopia”. 
Before we move on it seems prudent, though possibly unnecessary, to point out the 
difference in the meaning of the word “liberal” in Europe and the U.S. “Liberal” in Europe, and 
here in Norway, is often strongly associated with conservativism, or political parties in the 
centre of the spectrum wanting a minimal degree of legislation in matters of personal and 
economic freedom. In the U.S. it is mainly associated with the political left, or centre-left, as 
Rorty also was. Rorty’s social liberalism is not of any radical sort: he advocates piecemeal 
reforms and changes through open discussion, persuasion and shifts in vocabularies. In the case 
of Rorty we should also note that the picture should perhaps be even more nuanced, as he also 
believes that we need a redescription of liberalism as the hope that culture as a whole can be 
“poeticized”. This would entail a shift in the way we view progress. We would recognise that it 
is driven by metaphoric redescription, and an accept the fact that our conviction of the truth and 
relevance of new descriptions can result from other reasons than rational argument: “That is, we 
need to substitute the hope that chances for fulfilment of idiosyncratic fantasies will be 
equalized for the hope that everyone will replace ‘passion’ or fantasy with ‘reason’.”55 
It is not for us here to delve deeply into the details of all aspects of this utopia, which 
Rorty conceives as a continuation of Dewey’s democratic community, nor to explicate Rorty as 
a political philosopher. We will, however, need to take a look at some important elements 
which have relevance to our inquiry into Rorty’s views on literature. We need to investigate 
what kind of people live in his utopia and what kind of culture they have created. We need to 
know more about how Rorty views progress and how he thinks his utopian vision can be 
achieved. This is where it truly becomes apparent why literature matters so much to Rorty. It 
matters because words, descriptions, narratives – the ability to always tell new stories and 
create new vocabularies to tell these stories in – is where all change, all betterment and progress 
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emanate from. 
  
Rorty selects the goal that this liberal utopia should “minimize cruelty” knowing full well that 
this choice is not defendable against accusations of being arbitrary. Appeals to ethical and 
moral considerations will fail on the grounds that they themselves contingent: the 
anti-metaphysical position of pragmatism also situates these types of concepts firmly within the 
human social sphere. Despite being wholly aware of this Rorty is nevertheless dedicated to his 
cause, believing, regardless, that it is for the greater good. Someone capable of living with this 
kind of intellectual “double standard” is Rorty’s ironist: the kind of person who is “fully aware 
of the contingency of his central beliefs and desires”56 and still pursues his goals and dreams 
with dedication. The hero in Rorty’s story is the liberal ironist, an ironist whose goals are 
liberal: a world where suffering will be diminished and where the humiliation of human beings 
by other human beings may cease.
57
 
This liberal utopia is a society where we have moved beyond our theological, 
metaphysical and rationalistic heritage.
58
 No one would believe in any “order beyond time and 
change which both determines the point of human existence and establishes a hierarchy of 
responsibilities.”59 Everyone would be content to call “true” whatever the upshot of encounters 
between different vocabularies would be, and would not see the need to supply this with 
“philosophical foundations.”60 In other words, ironism would be as universal as liberalism: we 
would collectively work to maximise freedom and minimise cruelty, aware that this process is 
always ongoing – “an endless, proliferating realization of Freedom, rather than a convergence 
toward an already existing Truth.”61 Imagination plays a central role in this endeavour, 
enabling us to empathise and see through the eyes of others as well as letting us envisage how 
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we can realise a better world for everyone. Rorty’s utopia is then not so much a place as a 
creative process. 
Rorty’s definition of progress is relevant to this. Intellectual and moral progress is to 
him a history of increasingly useful metaphors rather than of increasing understanding of how 
things really are.
62
 Language, as a tool, will alter and adapt to better serve the varied purposes 
we put it to. In other words, vocabularies are subject to a form of teleological assessment
63
 of 
their suitability to serve certain communicative needs. The sciences might ask if we can explain 
a phenomenon more precisely, more efficiently and economically by describing its causes 
differently. The vocabulary of Darwinian evolution, for instance, serves the purpose of 
explaining our origins in an economical and convincing manner, but it has changed and 
developed a great deal since Darwin. Most scientists would agree that the current words they 
use serve the purpose of explaining and describing evolution better than the older vocabulary in 
On the Origin of Species. According to Rorty all progress happens as a consequence of such 
redescription in order to convey ideas in a more useful manner, leading to a conception of 
progress as an open ended process of continual description and redescription. 
 
One of the more controversial aspects of Rorty’s argument in Contingency, irony and solidarity 
is that he asks us to have separate visions for the private and the public. In addition he asks us 
not to attempt to unify the quest for what he calls “private perfection – a self-created 
autonomous human life” – and our cause as public persons to make “our institutions and 
practices more just and less cruel”. The closest we can get to realising both these aspects within 
the same framework is a society where we can have the full freedom to pursue our idiosyncratic 
ideas of whatever “private perfection” might be, as long as we are “…causing no harm to others 
and using no resources needed by those less advantaged.” As we’ve discussed above, 
accomplishing this then becomes a practical task, but “there is no way to bring self-creation 
together with justice at the level of theory.”64 These two sides of our lives are not given 
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different weights: Rorty does not emphasise the public over the private – duty over individual 
fulfilment. Nor does he advocate a romantic reversal where individual expression of private 
desire takes a moral precedence over social obligations. The point Rorty is making is that these 
are equal pursuits and have an equal right to be pursued. He does not want us to see these two 
aspects as opposed, but as incommensurable. 
As we will see shortly, this distinction is central to Rorty’s literary criticism. He sees 
different writers as more or less useful on different sides of this split: “Authors like 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Proust, Heidegger, and Nabokov are useful as 
exemplars… of what private perfection…can be like. Authors such as Marx, Mill, Dewey, 
Habermas, and Rawls are fellow citizens rather than exemplars. They are engaged in a shared, 
social effort…”.65 On the one hand we have “writers of autonomy” and on the other “writers of 
justice”. Rorty urges us to see these different writers as only having the same kind of relation as 
two kinds of tools, “as little in need of synthesis as paintbrushes and crowbars”.66 The 
vocabularies used by the two fractions vary because the choice of words depends on the task at 
hand: “The vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited to argument. 
The vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared, a medium for argumentative 
exchange.”67 
The writers on either side might use different words and modes of expression to tell 
stories for diverging purposes, but story-telling, narration, comes to the forefront of how Rorty 
sees us dismantling old traditions and creating new on either side of this split. This is also why 
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Rorty describes his utopia as a society where a “fully literary culture” is realised. In this culture 
we would see creative visions, and telling these kinds of stories about better worlds and other 
lives, as our new “sermon” – a vehicle of moral change and progress. This process would be 
recognised and valued and the act of “telling stories” would be lifted up to do precisely this kind 
of task. “[T]hat recognition would be part of a general turn against theory and toward 
narrative.”68 Instead of theory, in the sense of a philosophical attempt at finding structurally 
unifying principles for ways of thinking or living, we would have “narratives which connect the 
present with the past, on the one hand, and with utopian futures, on the other.”69 
 
Already we are seeing the contours of how these matters could potentially have a bearing on 
issues pertaining to our field of study. So let us turn to this next and start investigating the 
consequences of pragmatism for literary studies.  
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PART 3 – PRAGMATISM AND LITERARY STUDIES 
We began this investigation by asking how and why Rorty believed that an anti-foundationalist, 
anti-essentialist and holistic pragmatic approach would be useful to literary studies. By now it is 
hopefully clear what is meant by these terms, making us ready to delve more deeply into 
Rorty’s views of literature and how he sees these notions as useful to literary studies. We will 
start by outlining what, on this account, literature is, before we move on to examine how 
pragmatism sees literary theory and the practices within literary studies.  
Throughout each of our three sections we will attempt to explain how Rorty’s views on 
these matters arise as consequences of his pragmatist philosophy. We will conclude each 
section by examining the general consequences of taking a pragmatist stance. Even though, as 
previously noted, all contemporary pragmatists differ somewhat in their own interpretation and 
adaptation of the tradition, as long as we remain focussed on the three key characteristics of our 
very first quote – traits Rorty shares with classical pragmatism – the extrapolated results should 
have general applicative value.
70
 
 
While it was useful to spend some time on explaining the key insights of pragmatism in some 
detail it does not seem necessary to rehearse the more familiar questions of literary studies. 
Hence we will not do a similar outline of the key questions within this discipline, but simply 
move on to Rorty’s positions on these issues, and discuss them as we move along.  
 
THE CONCEPT OF LITERATURE 
In our introduction Rorty was quoted as saying that literature is “whatever the literary critics 
criticize” and that it covers ”…just about every sort of book which might conceivably have 
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moral relevance – might conceivably alter one’s sense of what is possible and important.”71 
Given what we now know about pragmatism it should not come as a surprise that it eschews any 
attempt at founding a definition of literature on essentialistic and metaphysical grounds, and 
hence that this is defined contextually. Given, also, what we know about Rorty, it makes sense 
that he focuses on books which expand our view of what is “possible and important”. Yet we 
might still ask why some books chosen by literary critics and others are not? Could this not give 
us a starting point to investigate what makes literature literature? 
As anyone familiar with literary studies knows, this seemingly simple question is harder 
to answer than it appears. It has been a core issue of the debate within our discipline throughout 
the previous century, and it seems to continue in various forms into our own. Although different 
takes on the question exist reasonably peacefully side by side, if asked for a definition of what 
literature is most literary scholars and critics would probably attempt to formulate one, or at 
least attempt to describe it in narrower terms than Rorty’s “whatever the critics criticise”. 
What is literature? 
Intuitively it seems straightforward to make a start on a definition. Given a reasonably sized 
collection of literary works, spread over the centuries and the genres, we could, presumably, 
analyse these representative samples and find the features they have in common. While various 
approaches along comparable lines have been tried there has never been a general and definite 
agreement on what the nature of literature is: its literariness. It is certainly possible to find 
common characteristics of, say, the 19
th
 century novel, or 16
th
 century poetry. Then again it is 
equally possible to find features of each sample that counter any attempt at categorising it. You 
could certainly identify commonalities between different plays for instance, and this is what 
allows us to classify texts (roughly) into genres. However, few will argue that genres are more 
than a set of conventions. Genres are not seen as representing the essence of what literature is: 
it is commonly presumed to be something else, something more. Attempts at encircling this 
“something more” have resulted in a range of different theoretical approaches over the past 
century. We can illustrate this by briefly looking at few schools of thought, who, each in their 
manner, attempted to distil the essence of literature.  
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Literariness and the idea of the autonomous work of art 
Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century the Russian formalist movement arose, with 
Victor Shklovsky and Roman Jacobson amongst its foremost representatives. Their goal was to 
establish the unique character of literature through defining the nature of poetic language itself 
– its literariness as Jacobson termed it. The formalists wanted to reveal the rhetorical and 
linguistic mechanisms behind poetry’s ability to “re-awaken the word”, through 
“estrangement” from ordinary conventions and objects – its capability to deautomatise us by 
defamiliarising us from that which we take for granted.  
Their ambition on behalf of literature – to define its identity at the heart of aesthetic 
experience – continued through the century. Structuralism combined the insights of Jacobson, 
the linguistics of Ferdinand de Sassure, the narratology of Vladimir Propp and more, and turned 
the search for the nature of literature into a linguistic problem. The literary work was seen as an 
objective structure, constituted by various conventions and codes which operated 
independently of its author, its reader, or its real world context. Analysis of these structures and 
mechanisms was aimed at demonstrating how texts themselves produce meaning. Like the 
formalists the structuralists wanted to map out and systematise the properties, functions and 
mechanisms of literature, and both schools understood their efforts as attempts to scientifically 
ground the nature of literature. By working from phenomenological analysis they wanted to 
reveal the underlying organisation; to move from accidence to essence. 
Mid-century New Criticism was also concerned with formal properties. Through 
focusing on the verbal meaning, complexities and ambiguities of poetry, literary works were 
delimited as self-sufficient entities, leaving it unnecessary to consider their origins or their 
effects (doing so was argued to be either an “intentional fallacy” or an “affective fallacy”). To 
the New Critics the poem was an organic unity of content and form: a “well-wrought urn”. 
Through “close reading” they explicated the structures and tensions within this poetic unit by 
describing the poem’s use of metaphor, symbol and imagery, its paradoxes and its irony, and 
showed how this could be seen to find resolution.  
The New Critics believed that there was a correct way to interpret the literary work, and 
the task of the scholar was, through doing this, to reveal what the work really was about. 
Although they did not deny that a literary work had an author or a context, nor that it mattered to 
the life of individuals and played a role in society at large, the autonomous poetic work would 
and should dominate any efforts at understanding and interpreting it. As literary scholars they 
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also saw themselves as working to define their object of study. From an academic point of view 
it was important to delimitate the literary work as an autonomous and self-referential entity that 
could be studied, and their efforts at pinning down the nature of poetry, distilling the essence of 
literature, was part of an effort to establish literary studies as a discipline.
72
 
Adorno and a dialectic between the autonomous work of art and its 
context 
The idea of the autonomous work of art also played a major part in schools of thought who 
otherwise had politics and social conditions at the core of their concerns. An obvious case in 
point is the Frankfurt School, and in particular Theodor W. Adorno. His aesthetic philosophy is 
deeply concerned with the socio-historical significance of art. At the same time he retains the 
Kantian notion of schöne Kunst, characterised by formal autonomy. Adorno combines this with 
a Hegelian emphasis on intellectual import, and a Marxian emphasis on art as embedded in 
society as a whole, and the result is an account of the simultaneous necessity and illusoriness of 
the artwork's autonomy. This becomes the very key to (modern) art's social character: to be “the 
social antithesis of society”.73  
The tension between art as autonomous and art as a social instrument emerges 
according to Adorno as contradictions in our interpretations: as a polarity between the 
categories of import (Gehalt) and function (Funktion). He suggests that we have two ways of 
approaching a work of art with this tension in mind: a hermeneutical approach, which would 
emphasize the artwork's inherent meaning and downplay the artwork's political or economic 
functions, or an empirical approach which would investigate causal connections between the 
work of art and various social factors without asking hermeneutical questions about its meaning 
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or significance.
74
 In other words, the focus is either on the work of art as an autonomous entity, 
or on art as an utterance within our experience.  
At the same time these two categories cannot be understood separately as there is a 
constant dialectic play at work. The import of the work of art is found by considering its internal 
dynamics and the socio-historical totality it belongs in: “[Its] truth content is not a metaphysical 
idea or essence hovering outside the artwork. But neither is it a merely human construct. It is 
historical but not arbitrary; non-propositional, yet calling for propositional claims to be made 
about it; utopian in its reach, yet firmly tied to specific societal conditions…”75 To Adorno, 
what makes art art is that “something more” we talked about above – a wholeness which 
supersedes, and transcends, the mere the sum total of all its parts. It is an enigma that cannot be 
completely resolved, and the remainder is the essence of art. 
Even though Adorno emphasises import, his view of the social function of modern art as 
being without function still puts his view of the autonomous character of the work of art at the 
heart of his aesthetic philosophy. His position could be argued to be representing an attempt at 
seeing the work of art as both having an essence and simultaneously not being defined by it; as 
a middle ground between essentialism and its opposite – a pragmatist anti-essentialist view of 
art. Adorno aims to see the autonomous work of art as inseparable from our human experience, 
while at the same time avoiding a utilitarian and contextual definition of art. We will return to 
how this kind of position looks from a pragmatist position as we conclude this chapter, but next 
we will take a look at accounts that also, as the above, begin with our experience of art but do 
not attempt to make the move from accidence to essence.  
Experiental and institutional accounts of literature 
The above schools of thought could perhaps be summarised under the heading of aesthetic 
accounts of literature. They are related to accounts that range from literature in a wide sense as 
a form of belles lettres on one end, to philosophically weighted definitions attempting to give 
metaphysical, ontological accounts of what “being art” means on the other. Following in the 
Platonic tradition they relate art to ideas of the true and the beautiful, and usually place greater 
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emphasis on aesthetic form than content. The use of the word “autonomous” to describe the 
special ontological status art is seen to have is a derivation from Kant. To Kant the autonomous 
human being is that which governs itself, that which is determined from within. Rorty points 
this out when he likens seeing literature as autonomous to seeing texts as “honorary persons”: 
as bestowing on them the sort of dignity Kant reserved for human beings,
76
 which would also 
tie such perceptions of art closely to Kantian notions of the morally good.
 
 
 As we know, these accounts represent a movement from surface to core, from 
appearance to truth, and from accidence to essence. There is, however, also a class of answers to 
the question “what is literature?” which makes the opposite move. Instead of turning, 
self-referentially towards the textual object they turn to the literary work’s relation to its author, 
its effect on its readers, and to its contextual circumstances in general. Both Hans Georg 
Gadamer and Dewey, for instance, emphasise the experience of art in their definitions of it. In 
Die Aktualität des Schönen. Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest (1977) Gadamer attempts to 
understand the objective preconditions that inform our subjective experience of art. His 
hermeneutical aesthetics aims to “break through the pleasurable distractions of aesthetic 
consciousness in order to disclose the cultural and linguistic realities that manifest themselves 
within it.”77 This requires an involvement with the content and experience of art rather than 
disinterested detachment, because this is where the relevance of art lies and where the real 
subject matters of art reveal themselves. Like Dewey, Gadamer sees art as inseparable from 
reality itself and considers the act of interpretation as where the work is realised as a work of art. 
He also considers art’s ability to break with convention and challenge expectations as vital to 
the ethical significance of art, as “being able to reveal the limitations of fixed cultural 
expectancy and to open the spectator towards the other and the different.”78 
 Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934) is probably the most well-known pragmatist account 
of art. Dewey seeks to re-establish the continuity of art with everyday experience by examining 
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and relating experience, aesthetic experience and the work of art. Dewey distinguishes between 
experience and an experience. Where “experience” is continual “an experience” reaches a 
conclusion: a consummation. It is a unity, a whole which “carries with it its own individualizing 
quality and self-sufficiency.”79 Each experience has its own beginning and end, has its own set 
of episodes and its own structure, and each experience is characterised by a certain quality, 
which in an aesthetic experience is, of course, the aesthetic quality. Dewey sees the aesthetic 
object in continuity both with its production and with our experience of the completed product. 
The physical object, however, in our case the textual object, is not identical to the work of art: 
“A work of art… is actually…a work of art only when it lives in some individualized 
experience… [As] a work of art, it is recreated every time it is aesthetically experienced.”80  
 
Our aesthetic experience of art is, however, only a part of its context. Other attempts at 
encircling what literature is turn to institutional and process analysis, mapping out our 
behaviour in relation to art as well as the rules and conventions that guide this. The work of art 
is seen as classified as art depending on its status and position within a context and a set of 
conventions. The literary work is seen as defined by the entire web of authors, publishing 
houses, its sales channels, its readers and reviewers, and its scholars. Within this wider context 
smaller and more well-defined institutional accounts are described, for instance along the lines 
of what Stanley Fish’s terms “communities of interpreters”. These accounts do not believe that 
there is a right way of interpreting a literary work (though usually, even here, some are seen as 
more right than others within their “interpretive community”), and the idea of the work of art as 
an independent and autonomous entity is no longer possible under these descriptions.  
While it has been inherently problematic to describe and define literature from a purely 
aesthetic or essentialistic point of view: to define the preconditions which allow us to identify   
“literariness”, it seems that quite a few of the non-aesthetic accounts also seem to be left 
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grappling with residual issues. A Rortian pragmatist might point out that often the core issue is 
simply moved, transposed, to the level of “an experience”, the notion of “a work”, to the 
institution, the community or the discourse et cetera: we still end up asking ontological 
questions such as “what is an experience?”, “what is a work versus a text?”, “what is it to be an 
interpreter or an interpretive community?”, “what is the academic institution of comparative 
literary studies?”, “what is a discipline?”, “a Wissenchaft?” 
Rortian pragmatism takes one step further and asks us to abandon these kinds of 
questions altogether, including general definitions of an institutional character. If, on the one 
hand there are aesthetic accounts which, taken to their extreme, will uphold the work of art as 
truly and fully autonomous: governed from within, defined and delimited as a self-referential 
object, and entirely independent of experience, then, on the other hand, and breaking 
completely with this, we have the Rortian account.  
Whatever the critics criticise: The Rortian account of literature 
Despite asking us to abandon the question of what literature is Rorty does talk about “literature” 
all the time. We know that on the pragmatist account our ideas are conceptual tools, and it 
quickly becomes apparent that this is an important tool in Rorty’s intellectual toolbox. What, 
then, does literature function as a tool? What can it do? And perhaps more interestingly, how 
does it do it? Is it not legitimate to ask how literature works, and expect a concrete answer, in the 
same manner as we can ask what a wall-clock does and how it works, and get diagrams, 
examples of its functional parts, explanation of the purposes of these, et cetera, as our reply? By 
extension, is it not perfectly natural to ask if certain texts have qualities which set them apart 
somehow; if they possess a certain style, a rhetorical form which mark them as “literary”, and 
hence qualified to enter into the functional role Rorty assigns to literature, just like cogs and 
wheels have certain shapes and designs which makes them useful as parts of a clockwork? Let 
us restate the question “what is literature?” and ask: “what, on Rortian neopragmatist terms, is 
meant by the concept of ‘literature’”? 
A web of texts 
As we have already gathered, Rorty’s dissolves the very idea of literature the aesthetic schools 
of thought tried to hone in on. To Rorty any text can be seen as literature. There is no such thing 
as “literariness”, no way of separating art from non-art at some fundamental level. There are, 
however, neither any demarcation lines allowing us to separate the discourse on literature into a 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
40 
 
specific “stream”, attuned to a specific set of texts. On the Rortian view what constitutes the 
concept of literature is at any point “thoroughly contextual.”81 It simply is “whatever the 
literary critics criticize”.82 An accusation of this being a tautological definition, a circular 
argument, would, however, be missing a vital point: Rorty is not attempting to give a definition. 
He is making an anthropological, behavioural observation – the observation that a work of 
literature is whatever we deem to be a work of literature, when we need it to be so. Texts 
themselves do not possess any intrinsic properties which necessarily make us select them and 
allow us to categorise them. The choice is ours, and is, on the large scale, a completely arbitrary 
and contingent matter. 
It is, however, very important to simultaneously keep in mind, as the institutional 
accounts do above, that even “thoroughly contextual” does imply a context. On a basic level the 
texts deemed worthy to be labelled literature might be arbitrarily selected, but the matter it is 
not necessarily arbitrary within a specific context. The limitations given by the situation might 
themself be contingent: entities, definitions and methods are dependent on a given place in 
history and thought. Nevertheless this very place in intellectual history is still seen to have a 
determining effect on what will be accepted as literature. The particular context, as we saw in 
the course of our description of the pragmatist view of truth and knowledge, has a regulatory 
effect without requiring ontological definitions.  
Pragmatism, according to Rorty, is precisely the “doctrine that there are no constraints 
on inquiry save conversational ones – no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the 
objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks 
of our fellow-inquirers.”83 This means that any scholar will still have to be convincing in his 
justification of a text as literature to his peer group within the institution of literary studies. He 
will have to explain how the text in question relates to those which are currently constituting 
our concept of literature: he will have to bestow the needed merit on the text in question to 
prompt his fellow-inquirers to be persuaded to include the text in those they label “literature”. 
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The text in question might extend the current notion of which texts can legitimately be 
considered as an object of study, but it will be hard pushed to diametrically oppose the current 
views and still convince anyone of its merit. Hence “whatever the literary critics criticise” will 
always be a body of work with no given boundaries as such, but where new additions will not be 
found to be too far away from the previously included works. This body of works can be seen as 
a gradually moving web of texts, and “literature” as our overall conception of it.   
 
Rortian pragmatism, then, has a very inclusive concept of literature. It is not interested in trying 
to define literature in terms that would impose limits on what it could be. Instead of trying to 
manage the text Rorty would like us to approach any text with an open mind and see if the 
reading experience can do something to us. He does recognise that we are part of a hermeneutic 
circle and cannot help approaching a text with some expectations. However, 
…a lot of the time what you’re hoping for, if only subconsciously, is to have those expectations 
upset. You would like to be swept off your feet. You would like to be plunged into doubt about a lot 
of things which you hadn’t previously doubted. So I would prefer to say that although any reader 
comes to a text out of a background, the good readers are those who try to let the text dominate the 
background rather than vice versa.
84
 
This is how literature as a “web of texts” moves and shifts: it is continually in flux to 
accommodate the latest contribution which altered our expectations and changed our world.  
Literature as a tool for “world-making” 
From the above quotation it is clear that Rorty does see some texts as actually capable of 
sweeping us off our feet. At the same time Rorty’s levelling of the playing field leaves us, as 
we’ve seen, simply with texts: poetry, novels, fiction, visionary political works, philosophical 
explorations of what it means to be in the world, journalistic accounts – every topic and every 
type of text is in Rorty’s library. Those that enter into his canon, however, are precisely those 
that can do useful and important things. The focus of pragmatism itself is of course on practice 
and utility: seeing ideas as tools. If the concept of literature can be seen as a tool, what does it 
do? What uses does it have? 
                                                 
 
 
84
 Ragg and Rorty, "Worlds or Words Apart? Interview with Richard Rorty," 373.  
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
42 
 
  
As we know, Rorty’s goal is to achieve a liberal utopia: to maximise freedom and solidarity 
alike in a fully literary culture where we are all ironists, and where all metaphysical problems 
have been dissolved. This is not something which is done by digging down and clearing away 
until bedrock is reached to give us a stable foundation to build on, nor is it done by finding ways 
of getting around prejudice to allow us to see the common essence of humanity. It is done by 
working towards a new vision: it is a practical task but it is also a task of the imagination. We 
have to imagine the world we want to live in before we can endeavour to realise it, and we have 
to use our imagination to empathise with strangers as “fellow sufferers”. This creative task is:  
…a task not for theory but for genres such as ethnography, the journalist’s report, the comic book, 
the docudrama, and, especially the novel. Fiction like that of Dickens, Olive Schreiner, or Richard 
Wright gives us details about kinds of suffering being endured by people to whom we had previously 
not attended. Fiction like that of Choderlos de Laclos, Henry James, or Nabokov gives us details 
about what sorts of cruelty we ourselves are capable of, and thereby lets us redescribe ourselves. 
This is why the novel, the movie, and the TV program have, gradually but steadily, replaced the 
sermon and the treatise as the principle vehicles of moral change and progress.
85
  
 
Rorty sees literature as capable of making us notice that which we have previously been 
unaware of. It can attune us to suffering, sensitise us, make us empathic enough to want to 
change, and, most importantly, give us the vocabulary we need to redescribe ourselves, and our 
society, in order to accommodate this change. Literature can bring about and aid a metaphoric 
redescription: in other words, it can “be a vehicle of moral change and progress”.86 This change 
begins in the individual, but the parts constitute the whole – if we can become “better people” 
we can hope to shape a better society:  
RR: I think [books] often have made us better people. I can’t see why Poirier thinks it’s an illusion. It 
doesn’t always work, but it isn’t that we have many better tools. So we might as well use the tools we 
have.
87
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As a consequence of metaphoric redescription, whole societies can change their direction: “We 
know of the effect that Dickens, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Orwell, and others, have had on the 
way we think about politics and contemporary social issues. […] a whole lot of people can 
suddenly undergo a gestalt switch as a result of reading a novel.”88  
 
Literature, works of imagination, or exercises of imagination can, in these ways, “extend our 
notion of what might be useful.”89 However, Rorty does not limit the use of literature to the 
task of serving the public and the good of mankind. Equally important is the task of helping us 
lead “autonomous lives”; aiding us in realising our idiosyncratic visions of “private perfection”. 
To Rorty, the self is as contingent and void of “essences” as anything else. There is no 
“human nature” – we are a “centerless web of beliefs”.90 Our identity is constituted by our 
“bundle” of beliefs, which is distinctive to us and based on our particular set of experiences. 
Rorty sees us all as engaged in an effort to define and shape our individuality through selecting, 
refining and describing this bundle – to decide what we see as possible and what we see as 
important. Some do not find this to be much of a struggle, and easily accept and appropriate that 
which seems given. Others constantly question this and attempt to recreate themselves by trying 
to formulate novel and unique answers to the question of who they are. Those people would not 
feel they had an “I” at all if they did not succeed in being distinctive somehow: if they remained 
content with being made up of handed down truths, and were instances of familiar types: “This 
is what Harold Bloom calls ‘the strong poet’s anxiety of influence’, his ‘horror of finding 
himself to be only a copy or a replica’.”91 
Such fear of being a copy is not exclusive to the writing poet. He defines the “poet” in a 
wide sense as someone who “makes things new”. The poet is engaged in creating a new 
vocabulary which, for the first time, will make it possible for him to formulate his own 
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purpose.
92
 He is in search of an identity, and literature can provide a rich material with which to 
weave our private web of beliefs: it can help us create unique and original selves – to make our 
lives into “poems”.93 
The “strong poet” has a more specific sense. Rorty adopts the term from Harold Bloom 
and alters it to serve his purpose: 
[…] people like Plato and Galileo and Marx, people with great imaginations, people who altered the 
vocabularies with which we think about various matters, were no more offering conclusive 
arguments, or indeed anything much in the way of argument at all, for their views than poets. They 
just put their new visions on the table and made it possible for us to occupy a different perspective. 
So I adopted the term strong poet to denote anyone with a lot of imagination who has the courage to 
try to make everything in his or her field new, to change the way we look at things.
94
 
 
Even if Rorty’s strong poet might have a slightly wider definition than Blooms they share the 
defining fear that:  
…one might end one’s days in… a world one never made, an inherited world. The hope of such a 
poet is that what the past tried to do to her she will succeed in doing to the past: to make the past 
itself… bear her impress. Success in that enterprise… is success in what Bloom calls ‘giving birth to 
oneself’.
95
 
 
Rorty’s notion of the strong poet, as well as his emphasis on self-creation and 
redescription of selves and worlds, have clear romantic traits. Rorty is fully aware of this, and 
he admires the romantics for their desire to articulate themselves, to create themselves in their 
own image. He shares their belief in the imagination as a defining capability, because: “What 
the Romantics expressed as the claim that imagination, rather than reason, is the central human 
faculty was the realization that a talent for speaking differently, rather than for arguing well, is 
the chief instrument of cultural change.”96 
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However, unlike the romantics, who felt that their unique nature needed to be expressed 
authentically – true to its essence – Rorty emphasises that human selves are created by the use 
of a vocabulary, and can neither be adequately nor inadequately expressed. Rorty’s strong poet 
is aware of this; aware of his own contingency. This awareness sets him free to create, while his 
ironism leaves him dedicated to his poetic cause. Bloom appreciates Rorty’s insight: “[Rorty] 
makes the crucial observation that only the strong poet… is able to appreciate his own 
contingency, and thus to appropriate it.”97  
 
Our private poetic pursuits are as vital as our public duties, and literature can be used as a tool 
for both these purpose. As already mentioned, the private-public distinction is at the very heart 
of Rorty’s literary criticism. He divides “books” along the same lines, depending on which set 
of purposes they are most useful to: some writers as illustrate what a self-created human life can 
be like, and others are engaged in a shared, social effort.
98
 The “public-private distinction… 
suggests that we distinguish books which help us to become autonomous from books which 
help us become less cruel.”99 
Rorty further subdivides the latter category. Some books demonstrate how our society 
and institutions can be cruel. This is“…typified by books about…slavery, poverty and 
prejudice. These include The Condition of the Working Class in England and the reports of 
muckraking journalists and government commissions, but also novels like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
Les Misérables, Sister Carrie, The Well of Loneliness, and Black Boy.” 100 Other books 
typically exhibit the blindness of a certain kind of person to the pain of another kind of person:  
By identification with Mr. Causabon in Middlemarch or with Mrs. Jellyby in Bleak House, for 
example, we may come to notice what we ourselves have been doing. In particular, such books show 
how our attempts at autonomy, our private obsessions with the achievement of a certain sort of 
perfection, may make us oblivious to the pain and humiliation we are causing. They are the books 
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which dramatize the conflict between duties to self and duties to others.
101
  
 
Rorty also makes an important distinction between books that serve those purposes we 
can fully state and understand within our current, familiar and widely used vocabulary, and a 
significantly smaller set of books which are aimed at creating new private and public 
vocabularies. This can be described as a division between books which are relaxing and those 
that are challenging: those that “supply novel stimuli to action”.102 Günter Leypoldt, professor 
of American Literature and Culture at the Heidelberg Center for American Studies explains the 
core of this distinction in his insightful essay “Uses of Methaphor: Richar Rorty’s Literary 
Criticism and the Poetics of World-Making”:  
Rorty’s departure… becomes clearer if we consider his list of unchallenging works … [which] 
combines complex canonical poetry (Tennyson’s Idylls of the King) and expository prose (Thomas 
Babington Macaulay’s Essays) with more accessible and popular genres (Agatha Christie, Ian 
Fleming) and even with “the works of uncomplicated pornography”… Rorty no doubt appreciates 
Tennyson’s role as a stylistic innovator whose picturesque visuality was praised by 
contemporaries... He still places the Idylls of the King with common pornography because (like 
Emerson before him) he presumably finds Tennyson’s formal innovativeness admirable but not 
productive of metaphors that alter his readers’ sense of “what is possible and important.”
103
 
 
The first class of books lets us rest in what is. The second class has the potential to transform it.  
 
It should be apparent from the above account that far from being a dichotomy of two 
non-overlapping spheres of life Rorty’s private-public distinction describes two interrelated 
modes of acting and prioritising. There is a dialectic play between the two: a constant weighing 
up of values and actions and a constant remaking of private and public worlds, as well as a 
continual re-evaluation and redescription of how we as individuals can and do relate to society. 
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Literature is a useful tool in much the same way on these two different scales: On the private 
level it aids in a process of becoming, of creating identity, by letting us explore other ways of 
being. Paralleling this, literature in the service of the public domain will let us protest “in the 
name of society itself against those aspects of the society which are unfaithful to its own 
self-image.” 104  
Rorty does explain how these spheres interact: how private obsession, like creating 
poetry or writing novels, gets a public dimension. He notes that some private projects, some 
unfamiliar metaphors, “catch on” because they resonate with a public agenda or sentiment: 
We call something ‘fantasy’ rather than ‘poetry’ or ‘philosophy’ when it revolves around metaphors 
which do not catch on with other people – that is, around ways of speaking or acting which the rest of 
us cannot find a use for. […] Conversely, when some private obsession produces a metaphor which 
we can find a use for, we speak of genius rather than of eccentricity or perversity. The difference 
between genius and fantasy is not the difference between impresses which lock on to something 
universal, some antecedent reality out there in the world or deep within the self, and those which do 
not. Rather, it is the difference between idiosyncrasies which just happen to catch on with other 
people – happen because of the contingencies of some historical situation, some particular need 
which a given community happens to have at a given time. To sum up, poetic, artistic, philosophical, 
scientific, or political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with a 
public need.
105
 
 
There is an oscillation between private visions becoming public agendas and public agendas 
rousing individuals to express their private, idiosyncratic descriptions of them.  
 
We started this section by asking “what can literature do?” If we leave out the books which 
merely relax and entertain us: those which stay within the boundaries of what we already are 
familiar with, the short answer, according to Rorty, is that at its best literature can help us make 
and remake our private and public worlds. It can drive the metaphoric redescription which is 
progress. The long answer takes the question of how art relates to life into account, because it 
includes the question: can, or should, literature always serve our private and public purposes?  
                                                 
 
 
104
 Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity: 60. 
105
 Ibid., 37. 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
48 
 
Art and experience - aesthetics and ethics 
Seeing art as integral to ethical and moral considerations is a natural corollary of pragmatism’s 
anti-essentialism, its anti-metaphysical agenda, and first and foremost a consequence of its 
focus on practice: on real life experiences and results. Pragmatists see art as simply another 
product of human life. A notable contemporary pragmatist aesthetician, Joseph Margolis, 
defines art as “physically embodied and culturally emergent entities” which give shape to 
human “utterances”: art does not possess a particular ontological status that separates it from 
other utterance within our activities and our culture in general.
106
 
As we know, art and life as inseparable in pragmatist philosophy goes back to Dewey. 
He wanted to move away from the disinterested and transcendental approach of Kant and relate 
art to our experiences in general. It is important to note that while Rorty clearly agrees with the 
idea that art cannot be separated from lived life he does, however, reject the Deweyan concept 
of “an experience”: he sees this as a quasi-metaphysical, quasi-essentialistic notion. Rorty 
“…follows Dewey’s conception of art as providing ‘imagined alternatives’ to existing 
conditions, but turns away from the idea of ‘experience’ (aesthetic or religious) as a ground of 
inquiry.”107 He rejects what he considers Dewey’s attempt at saying “this is what experience is 
actually like”, or “this is the nature of experience.” Leypoldt explains:  
Rorty considers the concept of “experience” a Bergsonian element in classic pragmatism that is best 
discarded… Rorty’s rejection of Dewey’s concept of experience would also explain why he never, to 
my knowledge, mentions Dewey’s Art as Experience in his considerations of literary criticism, and 
why he has no interest in a pragmatist “aesthetics” as suggested by Richard Shusterman.
108
  
 
Rorty is, however, not turning away from experience in the everyday, commonsensical 
meaning of the word as grounds for inquiry: in the sense of what we live through, feel and are 
subjected to every day. Experiencing art is vital because encountering art can challenge us, 
open up a space for adopting new ways of seeing things; for novel ideas, and new truths.  
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Literature and life are, also to Rorty, inseparable, and so for him, as for pragmatists in general, 
art pertains to real life considerations, like morality, ethics and politics, because art is a real life 
matter. The pragmatist move of uniting art and experience ties aesthetics to ethics.  
 
This insight makes Rorty dismiss the traditional “moral-aesthetic distinction” as not useful. We 
cannot draw a line between works with a clear “moral message” and those that are seen as 
“aesthetic” – as being of a higher form of art. Rorty explains why in terms of his view of the self 
as a changing “bundle of beliefs” and the equality of public and private pursuits:  
Those who draw this moral-aesthetic contrast and give priority to the moral usually distinguish 
between an essential human faculty – conscience – and an optional…”aesthetic taste”. [For those] 
who draw the same contrast to the advantage “the aesthetic”… the center of the self is assumed to be 
the ironist’s desire for autonomy, for a kind of perfection which has nothing to do with his relation to 
other people. This Nietzschean attitude exalts the figure of the “artist”, just as the former exalts those 
who “live for others.” […] We treat both “conscience” and “taste” as bundles of idiosyncratic beliefs 
and desires rather than as “faculties” which have determinate objects. So we will have little use for 
the moral-aesthetic contrast.
109
  
 
Instead the aesthetic, and literature in particular, is vital to our society and its moral capabilities. 
Rorty, for instance, criticises Jürgen Habermas for having an “oversimple view of the relation 
between literature and morality”, derived from this tidy distinction:  
Habermas [takes] literature as a matter of ‘adequacy of the expression of feeling’ and literary 
criticism as a matter of ‘judgements of taste’. These notions simply do not do justice to the role 
which novels, in particular, have come to play in the reform of social institutions, in the moral 
education of the young, and in forming the self-image of the intellectual.
110
  
  
Most literary scholars and critics would probably agree with Rorty’s criticism of 
Habermas but at the same time object to Rorty. Probably along the line Lawrence Buell 
expresses when he says that it “looks suspiciously like old-fashioned value thematics,” a 
“pre-modern” approach that renders “aesthetic sensibility ultimately subservient to the goal of 
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moral improvement.”111 This is arguably not the case, as Rorty’s concept of literature entails an 
act of imagination which could and would enlarge and alter our current set of values: it would 
challenge what we mean by “moral improvement”. Literature is seen as capable of extending 
our concept of “us” – to make us have greater empathic sensitivity to those currently judged and 
excluded by our present idea of the morally good. Following Sellars, Rorty considers morality 
to be a matter of “we-intentions”: that the core of immoral action is that it is something “we 
don’t do”. Instead of the voice of the divine part of ourselves, morality becomes the voice we 
have as members of a community and as speakers of a common language.
112
 For moral change 
to happen we have to start telling new stories of progress and defining the things “we don’t do” 
in new ways – in other words, literature, instead of being subservient to it, drives moral 
progress. 
Another argument against the view expressed by Buell can be derived by noting that the 
challenging books that aid us in our efforts to become self-created and autonomous – to realise 
ourselves, authentically, in keeping with our idea of private perfection, need not be aligned with 
the public agenda and its ideas of the morally good. As Leypoldt says, Rorty draws attention to 
the fact that “people’s self-culture can, intermittently at least, fail to harmonize or clash with or 
have little relevance to their moral and social responsibilities.”113 Within this category of books 
literature serves as many and diverse purposes as there are readers. 
 
If we return to the question we started with, “can, or should, literature always serve our public 
and private purposes?” it becomes apparent that on a pragmatist view the question dissolves. 
When the idea of art existing autonomously and self-referentially no longer can be sustained; 
when it no longer is possible to separate art from experience, art necessarily and always serves 
a function in our lives. Literature becomes a tool for describing our experience of life and the 
beliefs we come to hold about our worlds – private or public. It provides us with the means to 
formulate our purposes within these worlds, what we see as possible and important, and 
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supplies a richer fabric to weave our identity from. If our purposes are, currently, perceived to 
be moral or immoral becomes a different question altogether.   
Change through irrational means: why Rorty privileges literature 
Rorty’s conviction that intellectual and moral progress should be viewed as a history of 
increasingly useful metaphors rather than a history of an increasing understanding of how 
things really are, “… means that philosophy and science are reconceived as literary genres and, 
by the same logic, the literary imagination is elevated to become the main source of our political 
and ethical realities (a world-making power rather than a mere technology of beauty).”114 Rorty 
agrees with the Romanticist claim that the imagination has to break the paths that reason can 
travel.
115
 But why does he see poetry as such an effective tool to make people want to go down 
that path? How does it “work”: why poetry persuasive? 
 
Leypoldt summarises Rorty’s concept of literature like this:  
Rorty’s concept of literature becomes clearer and more coherent if we consider the effects of his 
revisionary moves. First, his blurring of traditional distinctions between cognitive, moral, and 
aesthetic domains dissolves familiar genre classifications, leaving us with a broad category of 
“books.” In a second step, this imaginary library is then reordered with three new sets of distinctions, 
between (1) transformative and conventional metaphors, (2) private versus public ways of 
world-making, and (3) literary exploration of private versus public acts of cruelty.
116
 
 
We have already described (2) and (3) above: They are part of the answer to literature can do. 
(1), however, is part of the answer to how this is done: through metaphors that are able to 
challenge us: those that “supply novel stimuli to action. 
If we return to our introduction to pragmatism and the explanation of truth as holistic we 
see a parallel between this and how new metaphors suggest new truth-candidates to us. New 
truths are brought into our awareness by being articulated. Although this seemingly shares 
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sentiments with ideas of discovery, the prophetic and the revelationary, the process Rorty 
describes is not one of disclosure: truth is always made rather than found. Rorty’s poet, like his 
“edifying philosopher” might want to keep open a space for the “sense of wonder that there is 
something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation of what was 
already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained and can barely be 
described”117, but what is being challenged is our ability to articulate. It is not a matter of 
pointing towards something beyond our grasp; not a matter of pushing the limits of “language 
itself” (which would reflect an essentialist notion of language), and pointing towards something 
outside of language. 
However, because these new metaphors are unfamiliar and novel, the truths they 
propose cannot be justified through rational argument: rational argument always takes place 
within a familiar vocabulary and by adhering to familiar rules and criteria. At the same time we 
know that we will only “stretch” our web of beliefs to accommodate that which we consider to 
have a certain merit. Hence these challenging metaphors have to convince us, makes us bestow 
merit on them, by appealing to other capabilities than reason, for instance through triggering 
our emotions and sensations. 
Support for this way of seeing it can be found if we consider Rorty’s notion of metaphor in 
greater detail. Rorty uses Donald Davidson to put forth that we should not think of metaphorical 
expressions as having meanings distinct from their literal ones: “To have a meaning is to have a 
place in the language game. Metaphors, by definition, do not.”118 Instead:  
Tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to 
make a face, or pulling a photograph out of your pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a feature of 
the surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor’s face, or kissing him. Tossing a metaphor into a text 
is like using italics, or illustrations, or odd punctuation or formats.
119
 
 
In other words, using a metaphor is a way of producing an effect, and not a way of conveying a 
specific message.  
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Metaphor seen as a statement without a fixed place in the language game is metaphor 
seen as a statement which is neither true nor false. Given time it might become a truth, an 
expression we adopt and eventually start to take for granted.
120
 Progress is not simply 
“metaphoric redescription” by itself: it is a process of literalisation of new, more useful, 
metaphors. New metaphors cause progress by expressing something that resonates with some 
greater human need, being adopted as useful for this expressional purpose, and then becoming 
literalised as part of our shared language. For our purposes, what we need to note in particular is 
that they start off on the same level as a gesture or a grimace, and that a metaphor conceived on 
this level will, quite clearly, need something other than rational argument to persuade us to 
adopt it. A kiss is not immediately meaningful to us through a chain of reasonable 
argumentation. It starts off as a gesture, and the feelings, the sensations, the beauty of it, might 
lead us to construct an a posteriori rational justification for what it could mean. Likewise we 
have all probably experienced a poem’s ability to express something that seems genuinely true 
to us, without being able to turn to rational argument to convey why. 
Rorty urges us to drop the split between reason and passion, or at least to be wary of the 
distinction between “rational conviction” and “conviction brought about by causes other than 
reason”. 121 He wants us to “limit the opposition between rational and irrational forms of 
persuasion to the interior of a language game, rather than to try to apply it to interesting and 
important shifts in linguistic behaviour.”122 In other words, he would like us to be open to the 
possibility that persuasion can happen through other means than rational argument, and, 
importantly, that this need not be labelled or interpreted in negative terms as “irrational”. 
Usually, basing a belief on “irrational” grounds out-defines it from being accepted as legitimate 
belief. Rorty wants us to recognise that the adoption of a new truth can come about through for 
instance appeal to sentimental emotions, or beauty, and still hold as much sway as a proposition 
justified through logic.  
It follows from the above that Rorty will emphasise the power of poetry over theoretical 
appeal to the reasonable because only the poetic can start to articulate the new, the not before 
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grasped or thought possible, and only the “ir-rational” means employed by poetry can persuade 
us to adopt an entirely new metaphor: a grimace, or a gesture, or a kiss, as expressing something 
that true despite still being too unfamiliar to be expressed in our familiar, rational language. 
This is why poetry is a powerful tool to make us follow those un-trodden paths the imagination 
breaks for us, and why Rorty privileges poetry over theory as a means to bring about change 
and progress through a process of continual redescription. 
A problem of purposes  
Before moving on to the pragmatist conception of theory it would aid our discussion to take a 
moment to consider what a tool is, or more precisely: the correlation between tools and 
purposes. If we first attempt to understand poetry as a powerful tool the question of what 
purpose it serves seems to quickly follow. This might, however, be a misconstrued order of 
inference: tools are made, ideas and methods conceived, in order to serve human needs. Rorty, 
as we know, sees literature as aiding in our desire for private perfection, as well as in our need 
for a public world that grants everyone the freedom required to actually pursue our private 
goals. He details the functions literature fulfills for us to some greater degree when he says that 
private purposes are defined by a desire for originality, and that public purposes are defined by 
the dual goal of greater liberty and lesser cruelty. Detailing this any further, however, would 
limit our potential range of goals we as individuals, or as civilisations, might see as possible to 
have.  
Nevertheless, on behalf of literary studies as a discipline we might want to consider the 
matter a little more closely. Even if we adhere to the view of literature as a conceptual tool we 
might not necessarily agree with Rorty about what kind of needs gave rise to it. In addition, 
realising its potential as a tool, we might even want to ask if there are other purposes we should, 
as a discipline and as individual critics, formulate and pursue. Instead of asking what literature 
is in general, this is asking what literature is to us. 
 
Rorty distinguishes between two different stances from which we can approach a literary work. 
This distinction is made on the basis of whether you begin with un-defined or pre-defined 
purposes. The former is the manner preferred by Rorty. This is the mode in which we are open 
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to new truths and open to self-transformation: where we allow ourselves to be inspired – to 
“think that there is more to life than we ever imagined” 123. This kind of effect is “typically not 
produced by the operations of a method, a science, a discipline, or a profession”, and the needs 
that the literary work fulfills for us usually only becomes apparent retrospectively.
 124
 
The latter approach starts from a state of “knowingness” where we know what we want 
to get out of the literary work in advance. Rorty sees this mind-set as “immune to Romantic 
enthusiasm”, and geared towards explanation and knowledge rather than hope and 
transformation.
125
 Even though the former of these two approaches might sound like the 
preferable way to read, as academic scholars a stance of “knowingness” seems to be appropriate 
for much of our work. If we are, then, to formulate our own purposes but do so within a 
pragmatist paradigm, which goals could, or should, we pursue? Can we not, for instance, still 
say with Adorno that a function of art is to negatively disclose aspects of the human condition? 
And can we not follow in the footsteps of New Critics and structuralists alike, and explicate the 
complex structures and forms at play in a poem or a novel? If tools come about because of our 
needs and purposes, what are the needs and purposes of literary studies? Let us discuss this by 
considering some familiar objectives for our discipline.  
The objective of defining an object of study 
As previously discussed, the New Critics, for instance, wanted not just to define the literary 
work but to define it as an object of study. For this purpose a clear cut delimitation of literature 
itself, a definition of the literary work as entirely autonomous, was advantageous, and they 
analysed, evaluated and theorised with this in mind. We now know why pragmatism rejects this 
conception of literature, and any attempt at defining the nature of poetic language or of 
“language itself” through similar forms of argument, aiming to explain it as self-contained, only 
shifts the issue to a larger context and is likewise rejected as a possible strategy. Attempting to 
distil an essence, either of literature or language itself, in order to define an object of study is a 
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metaphysical endeavour which pragmatism rejects. 
A consequence of adopting a pragmatist stance in literary studies would be to say that 
we should drop this quest in favour of, as we saw in the quotation introducing this thesis, a 
holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. We begin our chapter on theory below by asking what 
changes if we do this, and end it by investigating why pragmatism does not see the need for an 
objective definition as a need for literary studies.  
The objective of applying theoretical paradigms  
Predefined purposes arise from existing beliefs. Established theoretical paradigms can be seen 
as systematic collections of such beliefs. In literary studies, a common approach is to apply a 
framework of philosophical ideas to an interpretation. For instance, we could apply Marxist 
literary theory to the novels of Émile Zola, and find that “Zola's concept of the class struggle is 
largely Marxian”, and that it can be demonstrated that he uses Marist theory to "transform 
historic dialectic into historic myth and resolves three major western literary archetypes by 
means of it.”126 Rorty, however, holds that theory, or philosophy, cannot tell us how to 
interpret, or give us criteria for how to evaluate, nonphilosophy.
127
 He also maintains that 
“…when we read literary texts, typically we don’t know in advance what we want. So we’re not 
in a good position to bring criteria to bear on the text. We read in order to enlarge ourselves by 
enlarging our sensitivity and our imaginations. For that purpose applying criteria isn’t really a 
relevant technique.”128 
Rorty fears that “theory became popular for the wrong reasons:  
It became fashionable because it looked like an easy way to write literary criticism. You mastered 
the theory and then you applied it. New Criticism was the obvious example...You read Eliot and 
Cleanth Brooks and Allen Tate and imitated them; and thereby produced a publishable work of 
academic criticism. When people got bored with New Criticism, they turned to other things. But the 
idea was always to, first, master a set of principles and then to apply them. This is a terrible way to be 
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a critic, as people are now, perhaps, beginning to realize. 
129
 
 
Rorty also suspects the motivation behind constructing and purporting “theories”. He believes 
that having a “theory” to adhere to sometimes can simply be a way of dressing up your initial 
attitude to make it look respectable: “You get into literary criticism because you have certain 
favourite poets, and certain poets you can’t see the point of… if you’re sufficiently gullible you 
will look around for philosophical reasons for saying that these are good poets and others aren’t. 
[The better critics] don’t bother with this attempt to put a philosophical frosting on their elective 
affinities.”130 
In other words, Rorty does not see the need for deliberately approaching literature from 
a state of “knowingness”. As scholars, however, we might still like to consider how the poets 
we study fit into other areas of discourse. Instead of fitting them into a predetermined grid, 
Rorty argues, “the way they should do it is to say: ‘If you like this poet, you might like this 
philosopher.’ Maybe even to say that certain philosophers go with certain texts, or go with other 
philosophers or poets. But you can say that without ever thinking that it’s the philosophy that 
makes the difference.”131 This latter statement is the most important in regards to determining 
our purposes as literary scholars. Seeing pre-determined philosophical foundations, theories, as 
“making the difference” – attempting to apply foundationalist theories to legitimate our 
interpretive activities – would be contrary to key pragmatist principles. As a consequence of 
taking up a pragmatist stance in literary studies, of becoming anti-foundationalists, we would 
become wary of legitimating anything in any other manner than pragmatically, and we would 
become very wary of attempting to construct foundationalist theories to be applied as such.   
The objective of evaluating literary merit 
The idea of literary quality is tied to an idea of literary merit: to a set of properties or 
characteristics shared by those texts that possess a certain aesthetic value. In addition to 
traditional ideas of literary quality, concepts like “beauty”, “form” or “style”, and more specific 
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technical qualities such as the musicality of rhythm and rhyme, assonance or alliteration; 
harmonious metre, elegance of expression and more, criteria also arise from different schools of 
thought. We might, for instance, adopt ideas of “defamiliarisation” and “making strange” from 
Russian formalism, or New Critical concepts for the considerations of complexity, irony, and 
paradox; we might take up the deconstructive view that great literature demonstrates its own 
aporia, or Adornian views of its ability to negatively show socio-historical conditions or render 
familiar words altered.  
If we attempt to relate the Rortian account of literature to considerations of quality we 
might note that in order to be challenging literature has to take us outside our comfort zone and 
unsettle us, shake up the equilibrium of our web of beliefs. This cannot happen if the 
vocabulary used is perfectly familiar, or if the metaphors utilised are already verging on the 
literal. Hence newness, originality, and unfamiliarity seem to be key traits to what he perceives 
to be great literature, regardless of whether it is for private or public purposes. We have also 
seen that Rorty believes that a capability to induce emotions or trigger our aesthetic responses is 
useful. He does, however, say very little about how this is done, a question and an activity that 
has been defining for literary studies. How does Rorty view the matter of the relation between 
form and content?  
Form and content 
Where the Russian formalists attempted to isolate the properties of poetic language itself at the 
expense of considerations of content, pragmatism has been accused of going too far in the other 
direction and simply ignoring the importance of form and style. Rorty certainly does seem to 
separate evaluative criticism of literary works from considerations that are normally taken to be 
intrinsic to this: “[for literary criticism] the aim is to understand, not to judge. The hope is that if 
one understands enough poems, enough religions, enough societies, enough philosophies, one 
will have made oneself into something worth one’s own understanding.”132 Literary criticism 
should be a hermeneutic exercise, and not be constrained by criteria-based judgements, and it 
might seem that the mechanisms through which we come to understand are of minor 
importance. 
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At the same time Rorty holds that the moral-aesthetic distinction is impossible. As we 
know, on pragmatist grounds he sees life and art as integral to each other, and he maintains that 
the construction of an opposition between “art and morality” or “style versus substance” is 
“factitious and shopworn”.133 When critics “accuse him of neglecting the intricacies of literary 
form” he avoids entrenching this dichotomy further:  
 
Christoph Demmerling, for instance, speaks of a tendency to “translate” complex literary artworks 
into “propositional” theses (reducing Proust to the thematics of self-creation, or Nabokov and 
Orwell to elucidations of human cruelty) – Rorty rejoins that it is unhelpful to distinguish between 
philosophical texts as content based and literary ones as aesthetically pleasing. “I am not sure,” he 
says in a reply to Demmerling, “whether the Phenomenology of Spirit is innovative because of its 
content or its form,” and “the same uncertainty plagues me with regard to Nabokov’s Pale Fire.”
134
 
  
Beauty and the creation of “participative emotion” might aid the process of understanding. 
Likewise the content itself might heighten the beauty and elegance of its form.  
 Rorty is often compared to the philosopher Martha Nussbaum. They “share the 
conviction that the novel’s thick description of human particularities offers richer explorations 
of ethical complexities than the theoretical treatise.”135 Both Nussbaum and Rorty believe that 
literature has a major role to play in “the reform of social institutions, in the moral education of 
the young, and in forming the self-image of the intellectual.”136 However, whereas Nussbaum 
maintains that what gives “ethical writing about literature a bad name” is partly the “neglect of 
literary form” by some of its practitioners, and that “…a successful ethical turn in literary 
theory needs to pay attention to how ‘form and content shape one another’...” 137 Rorty does 
not.  
Nussbaum holds that “…Henry James’s superior narrative skills contribute to the moral 
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depth of his vision, which depth makes him all the more literary…”.138 Rorty sees “superior 
narrative skills”, or a talent for arranging words in such a way that they are particularly 
aesthetically pleasing to us, as poetic tools and our preference for such tools will vary with 
period, culture and tastes and the particular work in question. He clearly also sees some people 
as having a greater talent for triggering our aesthetic response and give us what he refers to as 
“tingles between the shoulder blades”.139 His quarrel with the view expressed by Nussbaum 
starts, however, when moral sensitivity is taken as a defining characteristic of the literary 
nature. From and content might shape each other, but a “successful ethical turn” should not 
depend on legitimating itself through a particular attention to form.  
To Rorty form and content cannot be separated and defined in general terms. To him, 
these processes are too complex, to holistic and idiosyncratic to study and capture, for the very 
same reasons we saw him deem the project of philosophical epistemology as impossible. Such 
attempts often lead to the logic of essentialism and legitimation.   
 
As literary scholars we might still not be entirely content with leaving such attempts behind. 
The mechanisms of how poetry works have been at the very heart of our scholarly tradition. In 
his introductory book to literary theory Professor of English at Cornell University Jonathan 
Culler pithily demonstrates the difference form can make to our perception of content when he, 
through a simple reorganisation, turns the opening sentence of W.O. Quine’s From a logical 
point of view into a poem:  
A curious thing 
about the ontological problem is its 
simplicity. 
 
Culler elaborates on what he has done: “Set down in this way on a page, surrounded by 
intimidating margins of silence, this sentence can attract a certain kind of attention we might 
call literary: an interest in the words, their relation to one another, and their implications, and 
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particularly an interest in how what is said relates to the way it is said.”140 As a result, the 
questions we ask about the words on the page changes. We could still be concerned with what 
the sentence means in a logical sense, but might also start to pay attention to why the sentence is 
split on several lines, and how the language of the poem makes us linger on its content. That, to 
Culler, is literature: this kind of attention to language itself. Would formulating objectives that 
would belong to this category of activities be precluded by pragmatism? 
There seems to be nothing inherent in pragmatism that stops literary scholars from 
undertaking investigations into the mechanisms of narration in fables, describing the effects of 
encountering aesthetic form in novels with objectionable content such as Lolita, or performing 
an analysis of the dominant themes of imagist poetry. If our needs and goals as scholars include 
saying something coherent about these topics there is no pragmatist reason why this should not 
be done. Confronted with the effects of Cullers reorganising above Rorty would presumably 
accept that it can have the effect of “defamiliarising” us, that it has a has a “strangeness” about 
it, that form can make us linger more on the content and experience the words differently, and 
that poetry can focus our attention on aesthetic form. 
The problem again arises when Culler wants to say that this example demonstrates what 
literature is, and when he attempts to separate considerations of form from considerations of 
content. Culler is making the same move as the formalists, the structuralists, the new Critics and 
as Nussbaum above - focusing on form, on what is perceived as inherently necessary qualities, 
and attempting to use observations of the effects literature have on us to define literature: it is a 
move from accidence to essence. Rorty is moving in the opposite direction and would like us to 
abandon such projects and find new ways of talking: ways that do not ignore aesthetic form but 
that do not uphold the form-content distinction. As a discipline we might, then, still feel the 
need to investigate matters of form, but a consequence of pragmatism would be that we would 
take care when working on such matters to not hypostatise our findings as representing a 
defining difference between the literary and the non-literary.  
 
                                                 
 
 
140
 Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory, A very short introduction  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 2011). 
25. 
 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
62 
 
Ultimately, this is, again, a demonstration of the problem application of predetermined criteria. 
Defining criteria quickly leads to the logic of essentialism. “The temptation to look for criteria 
is a species of the more general temptation to think of the world, or the human self, as 
possessing an intrinsic nature, an essence.”141 This applies to texts as well. Believing that we 
are able to formulate general or universal criteria for either defining literature or the 
sub-category of “good literature” amounts to thinking that literature is something beyond a 
mere contextually defined concept, or that there is something text is “really” about and that it is 
telling us. We should instead perhaps start to think about criteria as something which does come 
after the fact:  
So is [Derrida’s Glas or “Envois”] to be judged by “literary” rather than “philosophical” criteria? 
No, because, as in the cases of the Phenomenology of Sprit, Remembrance of Things Past, and 
Finnegans Wake, there are no antecedently available criteria of either sort. The more original a book 
or a kind of writing is, the more unprecedented, the less likely we are to have criteria in hand, and the 
less point there is in trying to assign it to a genre. We have to see whether we can find a use for it. If 
we can, then there will be time enough to stretch the borders of some genre or other far enough to slip 
it in, and to draw up criteria according to which it is a good kind of writing to have invented. Only 
metaphysicians think that our present genres and criteria exhaust the realm of possibility. Ironists 
continue to expand that realm.
142
  
 
From a pragmatist point of view the idea that literature has an overall purpose cannot be 
sustained. It is clearly not possible to construct general criteria for what will sweep us off our 
feet, or what will alter what we perceive as possible. It is not common to us all what we consider 
to be true or relevant, beautiful or emotionally powerful. As Leypoldt puts it, this is a matter of 
“…noncompetitive goods that should not be ranked within a single hierarchy of literary or 
narrative functions: some texts produce nondiscursive joy, others change their readers’ views of 
what is possible, yet others extend people’s circles of loyalty.... metaphoric tools are… [not] 
likely to harmonize into a single vision.”143 A consequence of adopting this view does seem to 
be that we would place a significantly smaller importance on approaching a literature from a 
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state of “knowingness”, with predefined purposes and familiar criteria in hand.  
 
Returning to the question of whether we could approach with attention to form primarily in 
mind, a significant objection to not placing great importance on form, and a reason for our 
discipline to still be highly interested in formal properties, could be extracted from the 
aesthetics of Adorno. Adorno might see the work of art as autonomous – and thus in diametrical 
opposition to the basic pragmatist view of art – but despite this he, also, sees form and content 
as inseparable. In fact, Adorno even places the utmost importance on form because aesthetic 
form can reveal something about life – about ours, or past, societies. He warns us against being 
only aware of obvious political points, and urges us to see form as representative of 
socio-historical conditions. Modernism, for instance, takes on a fragmented form because the 
human experience of society itself is fragmented. Pragmatism would see this not as a function 
of “art itself” but as saying something about our use of art: a sociological and anthropological 
matter. Nevertheless, this still seems like a good reason for literary scholars to include such 
topics as considerations of form, or perceptions of beauty, as part of our primary objectives.  
Does the pragmatist inseparability of life and art imply a preference for realism?  
Attempts at encircling literary qualities are, however, not usually seen only as a matter of 
aesthetic form. Haugom Olsen and Lamarque talk about “humanly interesting content”: it has to 
matter to us.
144
 F.R. Levis talks about “reality” as a literary quality, attaching it to a certain 
level of concrete detailing, specificity, and complexity. This he sees as being related to the 
voice in the text, its manner and tone, and if it is perceived as authentic and sincere: the voice 
should possess a certain presence and integrity.
145
 We already know that pragmatism sees life 
and art as inseparable, and it seems natural to ask if that leads to a preference for the kind of 
“reality” Leavis appreciates. We also know that Rorty points out that if a work of art does not 
chime with the current, greater human need it will just remain a private obsession: that great art, 
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art as a form of communication and as part of our collective experience, has to be felt to be 
relevant to our lives. Does this mean that on pragmatist terms art should imitate life or at least 
be realistic? 
We might attempt to answer this by first noting that Rorty does not see prose as a more 
suitable medium than poetry. It is simply a matter of how good a reader of poetry (or prose) one 
is – as long as it works for the individual in question (he points to Harold Bloom as someone 
who can just as easily find truth and relevance in poetry as in prose).
146
 Secondly we should 
also note that Rorty explicitly states that literature is not required to be mimetic:  
Redescriptions which change our minds… are not much like window panes. On the contrary, they 
are the sort of thing which only writers with very special talents, writing at just the right moment in 
just the right way, are able to bring off. […] That was why Animal Farm was able to turn liberal 
opinion around. It was not its relation to reality, but its relation to the most popular alternative 
description of recent events, that gave it its power. It was a strategically placed lever, not a mirror.
147
 
 
We might also make a third point, which requires a little more subtle analysis of the very 
notion of fiction versus Rorty’s pragmatist views of language. The question of whether art 
ought to be realistic or perhaps sheer fantasy; whether we should favour autobiographical prose 
or so called “magic realism”, simply seems to dissolve. 
Rorty does not distinguish between two distinct language-games – one for “fictional 
discourse” and one for “real world talk”.148 It all takes place within the same language-game. 
On his view, philosophers of language who do not want to let go of this distinction want “an 
account of our representations of the world which guarantees that we have not lost touch with 
it…”, ultimately an answer to the sceptic who asks “how does having knowledge differ from 
making poems and telling stories?”149 Rorty’s answer is that there is no difference. Normally, 
philosophers of language want to reserve mere “talking about”, as opposed to “referring to”, for 
fictional discourse: Within any Russelian type reference system we can refer to Japan but only 
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talk about Brobdingnag. On the Rortian account, instead of such systems of word-to-world 
correspondences, all we do is “talk about” and the understanding of what we are talking about is 
simply constituted by the discourse as it unfolds.
150
  
If there are no descriptions that correspond to “the real”; no words that are closer to the 
“true voice of nature itself”, then all modes of expression are as fictional or non-fictional as 
each other. Descriptions can only be closer or further away from our current ways of stating our 
beliefs – either be familiar and true to how we normally describe events and express ourselves, 
or unfamiliar and strange to us. The distinction between fiction and non-fiction collapses on a 
basic level. However, deliberately using vocabularies and constructions that are unfamiliar to 
us will open up that vital room for introducing new metaphors. This is why Rorty describes the 
class of challenging books, the most valuable and smallest class of books, as constituted by 
books that do not speak in a familiar language and cannot be evaluated by familiar criteria. 
Instead of a distinction between fiction and non-fiction, and between the mimetic and the 
fantastic, we get a distinction between the familiar and the unfamiliar. 
Rorty does agree with “…Barthes and his fellow textualists that the point of novels or 
plays or poems is not to represent human emotion or situations ‘correctly’”, instead, “[l]iterary 
art, the nonstandard, nonpredictable use of words, cannot, indeed, be gauged in terms of 
accuracy of representation.”151 Challenging our current linguistic practices, exploring new 
ways of communication, creating new ways of seeing the world and ourselves, inventing new 
vocabularies, and letting us see our own reflections in fictional worlds – all of this is 
encouraged by pragmatism.  
It appears then, that another consequence of taking a pragmatist stance would be that we 
would see the distinction between realism and fantasy as nothing more than labels for that 
which is more or less familiar, and not as a distinction between that which is true to the world 
and that which is not. It would not, however, appear that a consequence of pragmatism is a 
preference for the realistic and familiar.   
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The purpose of purposes 
We asked what the needs and purposes it literary studies were, and what literature could be to 
us. The pragmatist answer is that it can be what we need it to be: literature is whatever the critics 
criticise. It also answers that our purposes should not be aimed at establishing a more specific 
definition of a literary object. We might investigate matters of form but we would be best 
served with finding ways of talking about this that did not put up an opposition between form 
and content and adhered to the pragmatist and nominalist attention to the details of specific 
circumstances. We also saw that adopting a pragmatist point of view does not put limits on the 
kinds of literary works we would investigate or enjoy.  
 Describing our purposes identifies what we see as possible and important. It is to define 
our “bundle of beliefs”: to shape our identity as a discipline. At the same time, if we return to 
the pragmatist method as James launched it, we learned that we should assess whether an 
attempt at problem solving is worth undertaking by the practical effects a solution for the 
problem would have. Hence, in order to define our objectives along pragmatist lines we would 
let this maxim guide us. It is not for us here to fill the portfolio of purposes for literary studies as 
a discipline, and from a pragmatist point of view each scholar would preferably add and 
subtract to their individual bundle of objectives and beliefs and the discipline as a whole would 
be content with being constituted by these individual sets: be content with a holistic interest in 
multiple vocabularies. The result of this exercise is instead that it points to the fact that 
pragmatism makes us highly aware of our use of texts, our needs and objectives, and the fact 
that we, as a discipline, perhaps should talk more about which purposes should define us, why 
these objectives are chosen, and the practical effects of choosing them.   
 
Some of the issues from our discussion of purposes will re-emerge when we turn to theory next. 
Before we make a start on this, however, let us attempt to conclude the matter of a pragmatism 
means for the conception of literature. We start by looking at what Shklovsky has in common 
with Rorty.  
Consequences of pragmatism on the conception of literature 
Shklovsky and the formalists shared a concern with Rorty: an interest in the functions of 
literature. The formalists observed the effects of literature – its ability to make us capable of 
seeing the world anew – and turned to the text and to poetic language itself in order to find the 
causes for these phenomena. It was an attempt at finding origins and discovering foundations. 
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Rorty makes very similar observations but he follows James in seeing this as a departure point. 
He turns from observation of phenomena to the uses we have for them and the practical 
consequences they have on us. The study of literature is moved from metaphysical 
investigations of essences to social and anthropological studies of human conventions, needs 
and desires: it shifts from a matter of aesthetics to a matter of hermeneutics.  
 What we need to pay attention to in order to understand more fully how the pragmatist 
conception of literature is different from the norm, is that this divergence in strategies 
represents a more thoroughgoing split than it might first appear to. At the start of our discussion 
of what literature is we observed that both the formalists and Adorno were concerned with 
social issues, and we spent some time explicating how Adorno sees the work of art as both 
being an aesthetic entity on its own terms and as having a social function through this very fact. 
We noted that he seemingly demonstrates a way to be both essentialistic and anti-essentialistic 
at the same time: to see the work of art as both self-contained and contextual; to call for what 
Adorno calls hermeneutical readings and empirical readings simultaneously. Adorno represents 
a tempting position, but a highly problematic one from a pragmatist position: if a pragmatist 
attitude is adopted, this kind of dualistic view is no longer possible.  
Simply saying, as in our introductory quote, that “pragmatism is anti-essentialistic” or 
that “pragmatism renders the concept of literature as thoroughly contextual” does not seem like 
an adequate explanation for why such a position, seemingly representing a compromise, is not 
possible. It is not adequate because fully comprehending the consequences of adopting the 
pragmatist stance is not a trivial matter: the discussions in this chapter and their attempts at 
contrasting pragmatism with other views on the ontological status of literature have hopefully 
elucidated the issue to a large extent. However, in order to fully clarify the matter we need to 
make one, final, though perhaps very obvious sounding, point: pragmatism implies a complete 
break with any idea of literature which still carries a residue of essentialistic thinking. This is 
not a matter of two ends of a spectrum of colours – it is a matter of black and white.  
Consider for a moment the view from a position that still believes that there is 
“something more” to literature. We might again use Culler as our case in point. In his before 
mentioned introductory book to literary theory, Culler goes quite far in seeing literature as 
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largely defined by institutional context and use. He quotes Rorty when he defines theory as 
“accounts others can use”.152 Nevertheless, his updated, contextually aware, highly 
sophisticated and nuanced structuralist views – views that even include an affirmation that there 
is no such thing as literariness in the sense of a metaphysical essence of literature – still sees a 
problem in the fact that he still talks about the literary versus the non-literary.
153
 He places 
himself at a distance from the views he perceives as being essentialistic, but he does not want to 
go as far as over to the Rortian point of view. He can inhabit such a position because, seen from 
Culler’s perspective, the relation between an aesthetics of pure essentialism and autonomy and 
pragmatism is one of gradual shifts – of a decent from sovereign autonomy to complete 
heteronomy on a continuous scale. 
Consider, then, how this looks from a pragmatist perspective. Even though Culler 
declares that he does not believe in a metaphysical essence of literature, the fact that he feels the 
need to keep talking about a distinction between the literary and the non-literary demonstrates a 
desire to distinguish between two such entities on an ontological level. Rorty would see that as 
a sign that he should stop talking the way he talks – shift his vocabulary, drop or invent new 
metaphors, but Culler sees it as a sign that there is “something more” at stake between his two 
categories of texts. On the pragmatist view it does not matter how small a difference one 
believes there is between the literary and the non-literary in these terms. If an ontological 
difference is perceived to exist at all it implies the same break with pragmatist thought as if 
literature was perceived as pure essence of the literary and entirely autonomous. It can never be 
a matter of inhibiting positions along a continuous scale.  
This issue often seems to be confused with matters of method. It might be an important 
point to note that from the first point of view it is possible to see the work of art as having some 
degree of ontological independence from its context and still place it in a context: still do, for 
instance, historical or biographical readings. From the pragmatist point of view you can, of 
course, also do such contextual studies. The approaches can be identical in practical terms – the 
difference is perceptional: a matter of attitude, but from the pragmatist point of view neither 
Adorno’s more clearly essentialist nor Culler’s more subtle position is tenable.   
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For the reasons we have explored pragmatism will perceive “literature” simply as a label for a 
continuously moving web of texts. As a consequence of pragmatism it no longer becomes 
possible to separate literary art from experience and real life considerations, and so literature 
becomes inseparable from the task of describing and redescribing our selves and our 
experiences: it becomes a tool for identity creation. The main consequence of adopting a 
pragmatist position is, however, ultimately a change in attitude. This attitude implies an 
awareness of the fact that what we do is to use texts for our purposes as well as a heightened 
sensitivity to the question of how we use texts. It makes us articulate what our purposes, needs 
and requirements are, as well appreciation how our choices of objectives and approaches define 
our identity as scholars and as a discipline. What we turn to next is how a pragmatist attitude 
influences our perception of theory.  
 
THEORY 
“A practice presupposes a belief only if dropping the belief constitutes a good reason for 
altering the practice.”154 If we drop the belief that there is such a thing as literature, above and 
beyond mere social and linguistic practices – what changes? Jonathan Culler points to two 
reasons why this might not change anything. The first is that the distinction between literary and 
non-literary works does not seem to make any real methodological difference to literary studies. 
The second reason is that “qualities often thought to be literary turn out to be crucial to 
non-literary discourses and practices as well”, for instance historical intelligibility as a literary 
narrative: as a story of how something came to happen.
155
 The methods and theories normally 
associated with literary studies hence find their uses sometimes far afield from their core 
discipline: in areas that make no attempt at defining a specific literary object. Whereas Culler, 
as we have seen, still sees it as a task of literary studies to attempt to encircle the difference 
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between the literary and the non-literary,
 Rorty simply recommends that we “…say little about 
these topics, and see how we get on.”156 Let us attempt to look a little closer at “how we get 
on”.  
 
The change in perspective that follows from stopping to ask what literature is and starting to ask 
what it does is the driving force behind the consequences of pragmatism for literary theory. The 
anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism of pragmatism means that it no longer becomes 
relevant to write theory with universalist ambitions for defining what literature is. Instead, 
theory, like everything else, is seen in direct relation to practice. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, pragmatism is sometimes suspected of 
being anti-theoretical, and even anti-intellectual. This made us ask where that would leave the 
works we refer to as literary theory: ask if they were not to be read, or included in our 
discussions concerning literature, and if they did not still offer us some great insights in general. 
We also asked if, even given an anti-foundationalist view of theory, we could not formulate 
theories to guide our work as scholars and ensure that we do in fact engage in “best practices”, 
for instance if we could not sustain a theory of interpretation on such grounds. 
In this section we will attempt to outline some answers to these questions. We will 
follow the same approach as in the previous chapter: Rorty’s views on theory will be used to 
illustrate a pragmatist take on these questions, and we will venture to make some general 
observations about the consequences of pragmatism for literary studies based on this.  
Towards narrative: the Rortian account of theory 
In Rorty’s “fully literary culture”, we would, as we have previously noted, view creative visions 
and telling stories about better worlds and other lives as our new “sermon” – a vehicle of moral 
change and progress. The recognition of this fact would “…be part of a general turn against 
theory and toward narrative.”157 Instead of theory, in the sense of a philosophical attempt at 
finding structurally unifying principles for ways of thinking or living, we would have 
“narratives which connect the present with the past, on the one hand, and with utopian futures, 
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on the other.”158 Theory, at least as we know it, is firmly rejected. Even though we touched 
upon this fact in the previous chapter it might still not be completely clear why this is so. 
The aimlessness of theorising 
Discussing the relative merits of Nabokov and Orwell Rorty talks about the nature of art and the 
aim of the writer, or, more precisely, the impossibility of such notions: 
There is no such thing as ‘the writer’, and no reason to believe that everybody who writes a book 
should have the same aims or be measured by the same standards. If we firmly reject questions about 
the ‘aim of the writer’ or the ‘nature of literature’, as well as the idea that literary criticism requires 
taking such gawky topics seriously, we can reconcile Orwell and Nabokov…
159
 
 
Rorty construes these topics as “gawky”- ungainly and awkward – because they attempt 
to formulate unifying concepts for diverging objectives. Rorty sees Nabokov as someone in 
search of “private perfection” and Orwell as working in the service of human liberty. These 
pursuits are incommensurable – the two writers cannot fit in the same mould and cannot be 
judged by the same criteria. He sees theorising on this level as pointless: “There is no point in 
trying to grade these different pursuits on a single scale by setting up factitious kinds called 
‘literature’ or ‘art’ or ‘writing’; nor is there any point in trying to synthesize them. There is 
nothing called ‘the aim of writing’ any more than there is something called ‘the aim of 
theorizing.’160  
This does seem counterintuitive. Does “theory” not have a legitimate objective? We are 
not asking if theory has an “essence” or about “the nature of theory itself”, but about its 
purposes. Does writing theory serve no purpose? When we considered the concept of literature 
above, the pragmatist view was centred on such considerations. Would we, on a pragmatist 
view, have no use for theory?  
 
Defining what is meant by literary “theory” can be a somewhat difficult task. The Oxford 
dictionary of literary terms defines it as referring to “a miscellaneous body of intellectual 
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approaches that had increasingly become interlinked and mutually reinforcing in their 
repudiation of humanist… traditions…”. This included for instance psychoanalysis, Marxist 
theories, as well as formalist and structuralist schools of thought. Later it also came to include 
deconstruction, variants of reader-response criticism, postcolonial theory and new historicism. 
The entry on “theory” further points out that “[in] the cases of psychoanalysis, Marxism, 
Russian Formalism, and structuralism, a shared distinctive feature was their claim to ‘scientific’ 
understanding of psychology, history, poetry, and culture as a whole, which justified their 
various elaborate conceptual systems and specialized terminologies…”161 This claim, and the 
conceptual systems it justified, is what pragmatism rejects. 
Rorty does not believe that we can get a “scientific” understanding of these things. He 
sees these philosophical structures as founded on a misguided logic of essentialism; as built on 
metaphysical grounds. This kind of theory wants to “stand outside of practice in order to govern 
practice from without” as two other pragmatists, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels puts 
it in their well-known essay “Against theory”.162 As we know, Rorty generally rejects the idea 
of there being any word-world correspondence as well, so he does not believe that what we 
normally refer to as science is getting any closer to the “real” foundational origins and 
structures of things either. He would rather see everyone give up their attempts to write “theory” 
with these kind of universalist ambitions to found, ground, justify and delimit, and views this as 
constructs made for the purpose of legitimating our opinions and our actions. Instead we should 
justify our practices in the manner Leypoldt points out that Rorty himself always choses 
“...pragmatically and politically, without recourse to the epistemological arguments that 
underlie traditional [distinctions]”163 
In regards to literary studies this means that pragmatism rejects the idea that we can 
theoretically define and delimitate what literature is, a problem we should be well acquainted 
with from the previous chapter. In addition, pragmatism also rejects the idea of theoretical 
foundations that would legitimate our readings of works we consider to be literature: a theory 
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of interpretation. Rorty dismisses the idea that we can verify our interpretations against a text, 
and believes that our readings will be rejected or accepted based on a pragmatist, self-correcting 
process of inquiry, rather than on theoretical grounds. 
To illustrate the pragmatist quarrel with this kind of literary theory, and to explicate 
what theory cannot do, we will discuss the arguments put forth by Umberto Eco and Rorty in 
the course of the debate contained in Interpretation and Overinterpretation.
164
 Eco argues that 
there are grounds for formulating a general theory of interpretation, and Rorty explains why he 
does not agree. Throughout this exchange we will draw on our knowledge of pragmatism from 
part two of this thesis in order to explain the pragmatist reasoning behind rejecting any 
theoretical and foundationalist attempt at legitimating practice from a position outside of 
practice and experience. 
 
The issue at stake in Interpretation and Overinterpretation is the age old hermeneutical 
question of how we arrive at interpretations: on what grounds can we claim to have correctly 
interpreted a text? Asking this question within the framework of modern literary theory, brings, 
as we know, a lot of complex connotations with it. These stem from ancient and medieval 
hermeneutical practices to the array of theoretical approaches developed in the twentieth 
century alike: from philosopher such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, or Habermas, to the 
views on interpretation developed by theoretical schools such as structuralism, New Criticism, 
deconstruction, New Historicism and more. 
For our purposes, however, we might simply return to New Criticism and compare their 
view of interpretation with deconstructive approaches. The New Critics generated their “own 
set of justifying doctrines, …at the heart of which was a conception of the work of literature as 
an aesthetic object – free-standing, autotelic, the dynamics of whose self-sufficient meaning it 
was the task of the critic to elucidate”.165 They legitimated their close readings on the presumed 
self-referential nature of the literary work: a validation through comparison and correspondence 
between interpretation and the autonomous textual object. As we know, various 
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poststructuralist schools of thought, and in particular Derrida and the deconstructive approach, 
moves towards the very other end of the scale. The kind of close readings Derrida and the 
deconstructionists engaged in had the opposite goal to New Critical containment and 
stabilisation of meaning. Through interpretations which demonstrated internal contradictions 
and paradoxes they undermined binary and hierarchical oppositions within a text, with the aim 
of destabilising meaning: of showing how there never was, and could never be, a definitive 
interpretation of a literary work. In the aftermath of deconstruction, and within any 
post-structuralist paradigm in general, establishing an interpretation as theoretically valid and 
legitimate became a very difficult task.  
 
Eco’s solution is to argue that the text legitimates our interpretations up to a certain level. He 
believes that we intuitively recognise “overinterpretations”, and based on this he concludes that 
“there are somewhere criteria for limiting interpretation”166 Eco is not advocating a set of 
ultimate and definitive conditions for determining the correct interpretation, but is after the 
upper and lower limits of the range of what we can accept as valid interpretations. He believes 
that “the internal textual coherence” of a text can control “the otherwise uncontrollable drives 
of the reader”. Eco stresses the difference between interpreting and using a text. And also points 
out that while an interpretation should respects the author’s cultural and linguistic background 
the author cannot be used to validate an interpretation: only to show the “discrepancies between 
the author’s intentions and the intentions of the text.” Hence Eco is arguing that the text has an 
intention of its own, or at least that the grounds for supporting a claim of a particular intent can 
be found in the text itself. The text, he believes, has “rights” of its own.167 
Rorty bases his counterargument on Eco’s dualistic thinking: a “middle-ground 
position” we have already addressed in our previous chapter as problematic from a pragmatist 
point of view. Here Rorty employs a deconstruction-like move when he points to Eco’s attempt 
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at distinguishing between interpreting and using a text, and proceeds to undermine this 
hierarchical opposition. The same problem is outlined by Knapp and Michaels in “Against 
Theory”:  
By “theory” we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern particular 
interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general. […] Theory 
attempts to solve – or celebrate the impossibility of solving – a set of familiar problems: the function 
of authorial intention, the status of literary language, the role of interpretive assumptions, and so on. 
[…] the mistake on which all critical theory rests has been to imagine that these problems are real [… 
and to] fail to recognize the fundamental inseparability of the elements involved.”
168
  
 
On Rorty’s view “all anybody ever does with anything is use it”, and this extends to poetry and 
user manuals alike: “Interpreting something, knowing it, penetrating to its essence, and so on 
are all just various ways of describing some process of putting it to work.”169 
The distinction Eco wants to make is similar to E.D. Hirsch’s distinction between 
“meaning” and “significance”. Rorty elaborates on this in another essay, “Texts and Lumps”:  
Hirsch defines these terms in the following passage: “‘Meaning’ refers to the whole verbal meaning 
of a text, and ‘significance’ to textual meaning in relation to another context, i.e., another mind, 
another era, a wider subject matter, an alien system of values, and so on. In other words, 
‘significance’ is textual meaning as related to some context…” These definitions permit him to say 
that “…valid criticism is dependent on valid interpretation,” where “criticism” means the discovery 
of significance and “interpretation” the discovery of meaning.”
170
  
 
Rorty sees this as an attempt to separate “getting inside the text itself and relating the text to 
something else”, which is exactly the type of distinction anti-essentialists try to show as false: 
“For on our view, there is no such thing as an intrinsic, non-relational property.”171 On 
pragmatist terms meaning and significance, or interpretation and use, is identical and always 
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relational and contextual. Hence, Eco’s distinction, his basis for selecting the candidates for a 
class of valid interpretations, collapses. 
 
Rorty’s next question is why we would need this kind of strategy to legitimate our 
interpretations. He agrees with Eco, and every other literary critic or scholar, that for your 
interpretation of a text to be taken seriously “…you cannot just gloss over one or two lines of 
scenes. You have to say something about what most of the other lines or scenes are doing 
there.”172 Rorty also points to the fact that Eco himself admits that he is defending “the old and 
still valid ‘hermeneutic circle’” when he says that “more than a parameter to use in order to 
validate the interpretation, the text is an object that the interpretation builds up in the course of 
the circular effort of validating itself on the basis of what it makes up as its result.”173 Given 
this picture of texts being made as they are interpreted, Rorty does not see the metaphor of a 
text’s “internal coherence” as being preservable.174 This metaphor is neither necessary nor 
useful, but is instead a source of confusion on the matter. 
If we simply settled on seeing interpretation is a hermeneutic process and seeing 
coherence as representing nothing more fundamental than a way of describing “those marks 
and noises which relates them to some of the other things we are interested in talking about” – if 
we start to see coherence as a function of what has been said so far about those marks – then it 
follows that: “there is no point at which we can draw a line between what we are talking about 
and what we are saying about it, except by reference to some particular purpose… which we 
happen, at the moment, to have.”175 We recognise this as the same argument we outlined in our 
previous chapter, and the same reason Rorty cannot see a way of studying epistemology as a 
whole. Interpretation, like any other objective we pursue in literary studies, is always 
contingent, contextual and undertaken in the service of a given purpose, and agreement upon 
the things we would like to say about it can never be governed by a general and overarching 
theory of interpretation – only be determined through a social process of justification. 
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Considering how central the debate on interpretative validity is to literary studies it seems of 
interest to detail the specific pragmatist reasons for Rorty’s views on interpretation a little 
further. Even though we might agree to disregard the notion of a word-to-world correspondence 
it might appear as if texts and interpretations of them should constitute a word-to-word 
correspondence. There seems to be a larger difference between the word “stone” and the stone 
on the ground than between the word “tree” in a poem and the word “tree” in an interpretive text 
about that very poem. 
On the Rortian view, however, poems, metaphors, marks on pages, as well as rocks and 
quarks are all “more grist for the hermeneutic process of making objects by talking about 
them.” 176 Neither “making” nor “finding” is the right word to describe what happens when we 
encounter such entities:  
What we do is react to stimuli by emitting sentences containing marks and noises such as ‘rock’, 
‘quark’, ‘mark’, ‘noise’, ‘sentence’, ‘text’, ‘metaphor’, and so on. We then infer other sentences 
from these, and others from these, and so on – building up a potentially infinite labyrinthine 
encyclopedia of assertions. These assertions are always at the mercy of being changed by fresh 
stimuli, but they are never capable of being checked against those stimuli, much less against the 
internal coherence of something outside the encyclopedia [i.e. the “internal coherence of the text” or 
its “meaning”]… You cannot check a sentence against an object, although an object can cause you to 
stop asserting a sentence.
177
  
 
In the essay “Texts and lumps” Rorty tackles the problem above by outlining the 
sameness of texts and “lumps”. As we know, pragmatism is anti-sceptical about the world we 
live in: it absolutely admits that we are subject to causal mechanisms and the forces of the 
physical world. Rorty does not, however, see a way of transferring this nonlinguistic brutality to 
facts, to the truth of sentences. He uses Davidson to say that causation is not under a 
description, but explanation is: causes happen, but only explanations can be true or false.
178
 
“The causal independence of the gold or the text from the inquiring chemist or critic does not 
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mean that either can or should perform the impossible feat of stripping his chosen object bare of 
human concerns, seeing it as it is in itself, and then seeing how our beliefs measure up to it.”179 
In other words: we can never get to the “essence” of an atom nor to what a text “really is about”. 
This line of argument combines and displays the pragmatist convictions of 
anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism, anti-scepticism and anti-correspondence. It explains 
how, even though a text cannot tell you what it wants it can, however “provide stimuli which 
make it relatively hard or relatively easy to convince yourself or others of what you were 
initially inclined to say about it.”180 The marks on the page are the same for all of us, but the 
word “tree” in a poem, those particular marks on a page, only provides physical stimuli for 
making us hold a belief. We might both return to those marks and quickly agree that they make 
us hold the same belief, but that does not make them any different from other sources of belief, 
like stones or quarks.  
 A more wide reaching consequence of this, Rorty points out, is that the difference in 
evaluating propositions within the sciences and the humanities is not that of “facts” able to be 
checked against “reality” on the one hand and “opinion” on the other: there is only a difference 
in what it takes to convince our peers; in how we justify our propositions. “Objective” truth is, 
regardless of discipline, simply “a matter of ability to achieve agreement on whether a 
particular set of desiderata have or have not been satisfied”181, and “objectivity” becomes as 
matter of articulating shared beliefs: “…access to common reality does not require access to 
something preconceptual. It requires that we are able to form shared conceptions.”182 If texts 
are no different than lumps and all we can do in either case is to talk about our beliefs about 
them, the difference lies in the process of justification: “If truth is simply ‘warranted 
assertibility’ … we need merely distinguish the situation, or conventions, or presuppositions, 
relevant to asserting each of the sentences.”183 Rorty is not denying that there will be a large 
difference between what counts as “proven fact” between chemistry and the study of literature, 
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he just points out that the difference is in our practices and not in the “objects of study”. 
 
Regardless of academic discipline, any formal study will have to adhere to certain institutional 
requirements, whether explicit or implicit, be will balanced, well argued, take a broad spectrum 
of previous knowledge and ideas into account et cetera. It cannot and would never exist or occur 
in a vacuum. The more an argument takes a broad scope of already existing knowledge into 
account, the greater its persuasive force and the greater common agreement it will accrue. It is 
thus not the case that pragmatists “revert into mere subjective opinion making” – a common 
misunderstanding and attempted criticism – on the contrary: shared conceptions can by 
definition not be held by an individual. This is why Rorty not only rejects the possibility of a 
general theory of interpretation, but also the need for one. 
 
In his response to the debate between Eco and Rorty in Interpretation and Overinterpretation, 
Jonathan Culler makes some interesting observations about what kind of questions we can ask, 
or ought to ask, about a text. Culler advocates asking the “paranoid questions”, the ones that 
would probably be deemed to be outré. He believes Rorty is missing the vital point of how a 
text can challenge its interpretive framework, and that “interpretation is only interesting when it 
is extreme.”184 He does not believe that Eco, “deep down, in his hermetical soul”, genuinely 
wants to out-define these questions from our repertoire, and sees it as “an admirable traditional 
exercise of literary sensibility to identify ‘suggestions’ lurking in and behind the language of 
the poem.”185 The questions Eco wishes to define as “overinterpretations”, Culler points out, 
are those that are not necessary for normal communication but which enable us to reflect on its 
functioning: 
If interpretation if reconstruction of the intention of the text, then these are the question that don’t 
lead that way; they ask about what the text does and how: how it relates to other texts and other 
practices; what it conceals or represses; what it advances or is complicitous with. Many of the most 
interesting forms of modern criticism ask not what the work has in mind but what it forgets, not what 
                                                 
 
 
184
 Jonathan Culler, "In defence of overinterpretation," in Interpretation and overinterpretation, ed. Stefan Collini 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 110. 
185
 Ibid., 113. 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
80 
 
it says but what it takes for granted.
186
  
 
These questions include attempts to relate a text to the general mechanisms of narrative, of 
figuration, of ideology: attempts at identifying the codes and mechanisms through which 
meaning is produced.  
 What troubles Culler the most about Rorty’s reply to Eco is not his collapse of the 
distinction between using and interpreting texts. It is “his claim that we should abandon our 
search for codes, our attempt to identify structural mechanisms… that there is no need for us to 
bother trying to find out how texts work…”.187 Culler wants Rorty to recognise that attempting 
to understand how literature works is a valid intellectual pursuit. Even if everything is use 
Culler wants recognition of the fact that there are many different ways, and many different 
levels of using a text – that we can also use a text in order to understand how literature operates. 
“What is missing, therefore, is any sense that literary studies might consist of more than loving 
and responding to characters and themes in literary works.”188 
 We briefly surveyed a similar set of objections when we discussed the topic of literature 
and the application of theoretical paradigms as an objective for literary studies. We also 
touched upon Cullers objections when we asked if it should be a purpose for literary studies to 
explicate the relation between form and content. Even though we concluded that literary studies 
still would have a good case for caring about matters of form, we also saw why we should be 
wary of separating such considerations from matters of content because it easily led to a logic of 
essentialism. Culler’s objections here, however, appear to be more far-reaching, and relate 
these issues to the question of interpretive validity. Before we conclude our deliberation on this 
matter it would be interesting to attempt to address his concerns. 
 
To address his objections we need to split them into their constituent parts. Firstly, Culler 
clearly believes that some interpretations are more “sound” than others. That constraint is 
presumably taken to be found in the text, or we would not be able to ask those questions the text 
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does not. Secondly, he wants us to ask those “paranoid questions”, and to recognise that a text 
can challenge its interpretive framework through this. Thirdly he wants us to keep on 
investigating the structures we find in literary works, and care about the codes which determine 
how it works; how it produces meaning. 
His first concern is hopefully adequately addressed in our discussion of the Eco-Rorty 
debate above. Rorty would say that any constraints are social, conventional and contingent, and 
any questions the text either remembers or “forgets” he would see as being our questions and 
part of our endeavour to say something coherent about it. Rorty would not, however, any more 
than Culler does, want to limit the kind of questions we could ask: what we could say about a 
text. A consequence of not distinguishing between interpretation and use, between “subjective 
truths” and “objective truths” – of not being limited by a theory of interpretation – is that the 
limits on what type of questions we can pose to a text also disappear. Rorty does not want us to 
approach a work of literature with theoretical limitations in mind, from a stance of 
“knowingness” as we previously explained. Nor does he want us to allow a perception of the 
“objective” character of theory to rule out the “subjective”, humanistic, moral or existentialist 
types of questions like “is this poem true?”, “does it say something we need to hear?”, “how 
does the grief in this poem relate to mine?”, or “how does the cruelty of this character show the 
cruelty we are capable of?”.  
Normally the distinction between use and legitimated interpretation upholds the split 
between the subjective and the objective. It separates the sphere of morality, experience and 
lived life from the plane of the disinterested autonomy of the artwork; it distinguished between 
criticism and evaluation on the one hand, and theory on the other, and keeps mere opinion apart 
from scholarly studies. On the pragmatist view all these distinctions evaporate, and we are left 
with, as our first introductory quote says, a holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. If 
something seems like an “overinterpretation” or as a “paranoid question” it does not matter, as 
long as it is justified pragmatically and used it to say something Rorty encourages it. We saw in 
the chapter on literature that Rorty actually favours that which is unfamiliar because it can 
dislodge our beliefs, challenge us and what we see as possible and important. On the 
desirability of asking “paranoid questions” Culler and Rorty (and according to Culler Eco too) 
seem to be very much in agreement.  
 Culler’s third concern we need to address in a little more detail, because it is a concern 
about pragmatism put forth on behalf of the entire discipline of literary studies. Culler is 
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defending our right to spend our time investigating structural elements and the mechanisms and 
codes which “produce meaning”. Eco also criticises Rorty along the same lines for not being 
interested in how language works, and says we should take an interest “…not only because 
writers study language in order to write better…, but also because marvelling (and therefor 
curiosity) is the source of all knowledge, knowledge is a source of pleasure and it is simply 
beautiful to discover why and how a given text can produce so many good interpretations.”189 
To reply to this criticism we need to piece together two bits of information. They relate to the 
pragmatist view of epistemology and to the thoroughgoing nature of the pragmatist primacy of 
practice: that “using” really is all there is. 
Culler is, like Eco, after knowledge about the structures and mechanisms at work in the 
text. However, their conception of knowledge is the view we saw Rorty as rejecting in part two. 
Where Rorty holds an antirepresentative view of knowledge and a behaviouralist interest in 
how we deem propositions to have warranted assertibility, Culler and Eco believes it to be a 
matter of world-to-word correspondence, verification, and a continual approximation towards 
the real-world counterpart of propositions. This, as we know, breaks with pragmatism’s 
anti-essentialism and anti-correspondence view of truth and knowledge.  
Rorty is not arguing against accruing knowledge in the pragmatic sense of a web of 
beliefs: a set of our most useful propositions. The reason Rorty is distrustful of ventures 
proposing to describe how codes and mechanisms produce meaning is that such endeavours 
usually are motivated by the seemingly “scientific nature” of the task at hand, making it likely 
that they will end in a logic of essentialism and a belief that we have arrived at a better 
understanding of what is “really” going on in the text. The part of Culler and Eco’s argument 
against Rorty which casts him as not being “curious” and being against the human endeavour to 
map out the world accrue knowledge appears to be misguided. Their difference does not lie 
there but in their perception of what knowledge is. 
The second point relates to what “using” implies. When Rorty says that “all” we ever do 
is “use” texts he truly does mean all. When we attempt to map out the structures in a text we 
believe we have reason to argue that those structures and mechanisms are there, and we would 
like to share this knowledge. Rorty would presumably describe such a purpose in terms similar 
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to these: “my purpose is to say something about the beliefs I have come to hold about how this 
text is structured, and in order to be able to say something persuasive about this I will use the 
text in question to support my argument and demonstrate how I arrived at this belief.” The point 
of note is that a pragmatist would always talk about what we are doing and why we are doing 
this. When we undertake inquiries we can present our rationale for doing so in the hope that 
others will come to share the beliefs our inquiry led us to hold. If all we ever do is use, and no 
such use brings us closer to the true nature of anything, then all uses are equal: no use, no way of 
talking, has a greater claim to truth; a higher ranking in a hierarchy of true knowledge. Using an 
idea of textual mechanisms to say something interesting and coherent the production of 
meaning is no closer to true “knowledge” than using the ideas of Paglia to say something 
interesting and coherent about gender. But from a non-pragmatist point of view it easily appears 
so. This is why Rorty says that he distrusts 
…both the structuralist idea that knowing more about ‘textual mechanisms’ is essential for literary 
criticism and the post-structuralist idea that detecting the presence , or the subversion, of 
metaphysical hierarchies is essential. [It can] sometimes be useful. Having read Eco, or having read 
Derrida, will often give you something interesting to say about a text which you could not otherwise 
have said. But it brings you no closer to what is really going on in the text than having read Marx, 
Freud, Matthew Arnold or F.R. Leavis. Each of these supplementary readings simply gives you one 
more context in which you can place the text – one more grid you can place on top of it or one more 
paradigm to which to juxtapose it.
190
 
 
As we noted in the literature chapter there is nothing inherent in pragmatism that will stop from 
mapping out what we believe to be the basic structures and mechanisms of fables or poetry. We 
just have to not believe that applying the theories of Bakthin or Jacobson, Shklovsky or Propp, 
is doing anything different from saying something interesting and coherent about Karl Ove 
Knausgård by using the writings of Freud, or something insightful about Homeric quests and 
coming of age in relation to Watership Down.  
 
What we are left with, in the end, is a de-divinised conception of the poem, which Rorty enlists 
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Bloom to describe:  
“The sad truth is that poems don’t have presence, unity, form or meaning… What then does a poem 
possess or create? Alas, a poem has nothing, and creates nothing. Its presence is a promise, part of 
the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. Its unity is in the good will of the 
reader… its meaning is just that there is, or rather was, another poem.”
191
 
 
Instead of theories of interpretations, theories which explicate and determine how texts “work”, 
and theories which attempt to legitimate our approaches, Rorty urges us to focus on criticism 
“…defined as ‘the art of knowing the hidden roads that go from poem to poem.’ ”192  
Theory as practice 
If theory cannot provide us with foundations and the means of legitimating our activities, and is, 
in that sense, aimless, it might still seem that we would be giving up something important by 
giving up all “theory”. Our question from the introduction still appears to stands: what is the use 
of those texts we normally do refer to as “theory” and which we believe to have given us some 
great insights? The visions and systems of the likes of Plato, Kant, Marx and Freud? Can we 
find a way to keep the elements that seem useful and insightful to us: work out, as Rorty sees 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger as doing “honourable terms for the surrender of philosophy to 
poetry”?193 If we leave behind the concept of “theory” in the sense that we began this chapter 
by defining, we can start to outline what theory means on pragmatist terms.  
 
Pragmatism challenges the dichotomy between theory and practice; between thinking and 
doing. Inquiry can never start from a blank slate and the inquirer is always an active agent, there 
is no thinking that is not always also doing, and no theory without practice. This view of theory 
was already part of classical pragmatism: “James and Dewey tried to put it in perspective by 
insisting… that theory follows after, rather than being presupposed by, concrete 
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accomplishment.”194 This is a form of anti-idealism: an insistence on the primacy of the 
practical realities and consequences and then on describing, refining and explaining, instead of 
the other way around. Dewey saw theory as informing practice: as the difference being between 
intelligent and uninformed practice, and James expresses the same view of theory, as well as a 
rejection of closing, totalising solutions and deduction of final principles when he says that 
theories “…thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don’t 
lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their 
aid.”195 
An important point to note in this matter is that pragmatism does not attempt to 
formulate a systematic description of how we should go about doing things: James launches 
pragmatism as a method, but not a methodology (as we will return to in our next chapter). 
Pragmatism has no theory of practice. Rorty also points out that “[it] isn’t as though you can 
appeal to utility as though it were a criterion. Utility is just a blanket label for whatever rationale 
you have for doing what you’re currently doing.”196 Following this theory becomes a 
description of your rationale in a particular situation; of the logical process applied to a 
particular problem. If our purpose was to present a persuasive interpretation of a specific work 
we would give an informed account of how we had arrived at our understand of it. This account 
might include descriptions of anything that has informed us on this matter, anything we have 
found useful, whether it be the writing of other critics, other texts, novels, poems, history books, 
biographies, newspaper articles or letters – it all contributes on an equal footing if it illustrates 
and explains our reasons for thinking and arguing the way we do. 
Despite, as we have seen, having distinct arguments against the pragmatist view, Culler 
offers us a description of theory we might use: “Works that become ‘theory’ offer accounts 
others can use about meaning, nature, and culture, the functioning of the psyche, the relations 
of public to private experience and of larger historical forces to individual experience.”197 
Culler goes on to explain in more detail how theory is defined by its practical effects, as what 
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changes people’s views, makes them think differently about their objects of study and their 
activities of studying them. To offer such “accounts others can use” is as close as pragmatism 
could come to a definition of theory: this is the pragmatist aim of theory.  
 
Let us now turn to the Rortian account of this kind of theory, and in particular how he views 
theory in relation to literary studies and criticism. Rorty finds it useful to see culture in terms of 
genres instead of “subject matters” and “methods”:  
The Deweyan pragmatism I am preaching develops this holistic way of seeing things by 
reclassifying culture in terms of genres, as opposed to “subject matters” and “methods.” … Each 
new language creates or modifies a genre – that is, a sequence of texts, the later members of which 
take earlier members into account. These sequences may intertwine – as do, for example, poetry and 
criticism, or science and the history of science, or criticism and philosophy, or criticism and the 
history of criticism. But there are no rules for whether they should or shouldn’t intertwine – no 
necessities lying in the nature of a subject or a method. There is nothing general and epistemological 
to be said about how the contributors to the various genres should conduct themselves. Nor is there 
any ranking of these disciplines according to degrees or kinds of truth.
198
 
  
Rorty’s division of culture into “genres” is equivalent to seeing it as a holistic and 
interpenetrative set of vocabularies. Theory, as we normally think of it can on this ground be 
seen as a way of talking about things: as a vocabulary or a genre adhering to a certain 
conventional manner of presenting arguments, following certain rules both for style and the 
selection of subject matters, and so on. Saying that it does not have any “epistemological 
ground” for “how it should conduct itself” is simply another way of saying that it is “aimless” in 
the sense of our previous section: that it should not be seen as having a higher claim to truth or 
greater closeness to the real. 
Theory seen as support for intelligent practice, as an account of rationale, of utility, 
written in a certain conventional manner considered to communicate our rational intentions 
well, is theory as a familiar genre. Rorty would call it “normal” discourse: “Normal discourse (a 
generalisation of Kuhn’s notion of ‘normal science’) is any discourse (scientific, political, 
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theological, or whatever) which embodies agreed-upon criteria for reaching agreement.”199 
Abnormal discourse is that which lacks such criteria: is unfamiliar. We know from the chapter 
on literature that Rorty would like culture to be “poeticised”. He does not dismiss the usefulness 
of “normal discourse”, or even relaxing, familiar and unchallenging books – the abnormal and 
challenging is always “parasitical” on the normal and familiar. He does, however, urge us to 
leave enough room and have great respect for the “abnormal” – that which has the power to 
“change what we see as possible and important.” 
This, as we know, is also how Rorty describes literature. Literature, great literature, 
inspiring, challenging, stimulating, unfamiliar literature is abnormal in this sense – it resonates 
with the formalist ideas of poetic language as a deviation from normal language. Rorty’s 
inclusive concept of literature also encompasses this kind of “theory”: the powerful political 
writing of Marx, the deeply insightful observations and psychological explanations of Freud, or 
the existential and poetic philosophy of Heidegger and more. These works do change what we 
see as useful, possible and important, and the kind of arguments they offer cannot be stated in 
the language that existed before them. It no longer makes sense to distinguish this kind of 
writing along disciplinary bounds: to distinguish between “theory” or “philosophy” or 
“literature”. Instead Rorty, as we know, simply calls it all literature. 
 
Rorty wants “theory” as literature, as genre and vocabulary, to enter into a play of vocabularies. 
We know that Rorty focuses on the not-normal, the abnormal and unfamiliar, because he sees 
that as having the greatest potential for bringing about progress and change: new, interesting 
truth value candidates, awareness that can remake our world view, can result from such 
accounts. We also know that Rorty does not believe that logical inference is the best way of 
moving from the “old” to the “new” and unfamiliar. Transformative metaphors, those that are 
like grimaces or kisses, are by definition not part of our familiar language and it is impossible to 
argue for their validity within the familiar language and by appealing to familiar criteria. 
Instead of setting out with predefined criteria and ideas Rorty wants us to play vocabularies 
against vocabularies; books against books, and “see what happens”: “…revolutionary 
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achievements in the arts, in the sciences, and in moral and political thought typically occur 
when somebody realizes that two or more of our vocabularies are interfering with each other, 
and proceeds to invent a new vocabulary to replace both.”200  
Rorty uses, amongst others, Hegel and Hölderlin as exemplars: They “…found that the 
vocabulary in which they worshipped Jesus was getting in the way of the vocabulary in which 
they worshipped the Greeks…”201, and their new ways of talking changed our way of thinking. 
Moving on to a new vocabulary is not a step-by-step inferential process – it cannot be aided by 
the kind of theories we saw pragmatism rejecting above – it is a creative process. Rorty calls it 
a dialectic method in the Hegelian tradition: “…[it] is not an argumentative procedure or a way 
of unifying subject and object, but simply a literary skill – skill at producing surprising gestalt 
switches by making smooth, rapid transitions from one terminology to another.”202 He sees it 
as a matter of “changing the subject”, of making languages look obsolete, a dropping of getting 
at truth in favour of “making things new”, and he suggests that a more appropriate word for this 
experimental process is “literary criticism.”203 
 
Rorty does not want us to either stop doing theory in every sense of the word, nor to expand our 
notion of theory in a parallel manner to how he wants to expand our notion of literature. Instead, 
the concept he wants to expand is, precisely, “literary criticism”.  
The practice of literary criticism 
“Literary criticism” is Rorty’s word for this experimental play of books against books; 
vocabularies against vocabularies – for producing narratives that connect the past and the 
future, us and them. It is less a tool than a practice, and more a meeting of minds than a study of 
texts. In the same manner that he wants to change our practice of “doing theory” by making us 
include less he wants us to change our practice of working with texts, of critical activities, to 
include more: to keep a certain space and an openness needed to accommodate his extended 
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concept of literature:  
Beginning in the days of Goethe and Macauley and Carlyle and Emerson, a kind of writing has 
developed which is neither the evaluation of the relative merits of literary productions, nor 
intellectual history, nor social prophecy, but all of these things mingled together into a new genre. 
This genre is still called “literary criticism”, however, for an excellent reason. The reason is that in 
the course of the nineteenth century imaginative literature took the place of both religion and 
philosophy in forming and solacing the agonized consciences of the young. […] The aim is to 
understand not to judge. The hope is that if one understands enough poems, enough religions, 
enough societies, enough philosophies, one will have made oneself into something worth one’s own 
understanding.
204
 
 
This new hybrid genre has not as its aim to judge the relative beauty of lines of poetry, 
but to use the literary imagination and beauty to talk about what is important; to articulate 
morals. Rorty believes that we have arrived at a stage where we express our moral sensitivities 
through our literary sensibilities: that the books, thinkers, films, essays et cetera that we prefer 
are used as our tools to define our web of beliefs and to give us the material we need to describe 
ourselves and create our identity. He further points out that:  
Episodes from the history of religion and from the history of philosophy are seen as instantiating 
literary paradigms, rather than serving as sources of literary inspiration. The creed or the 
philosophical doctrine becomes the emblem of the novelist’s character or the poet’s image, rather 
than conversely. Philosophy is treated as a parallel genre to the drama or the novel or the poem, so 
that we speak of the epistemology common to Vaihinger and Valéry, the rhetoric common to 
Marlowe and Hobbes, the ethics common to E.M. Forster and G.E. Moore.
205
  
 
This is why this genre also includes the discipline of philosophy and the theoretical writings of 
literary studies, religious studies, history, psychology and more. Rorty would like critics of 
various disciplines to explicate, contemplate, experiment and play, and “see what happens”. 
 
Rorty sees his way of extending the term “literary criticism” as following a familiar 
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“stretching” of the term which has been taking place throughout the previous century:  
It originally meant comparison and evaluation of plays, poems and novels – with perhaps an 
occasional glance at the visual arts. Then it got extended to cover past criticism (for example 
Dryden’s, Shelley’s, Arnold’s, and Eliot’s prose, as well as their verse.) Then, quite quickly, it got 
extended to books which had supplied past critics with their critical vocabulary and were supplying 
present critics with theirs. This meant extending it to theology, philosophy, social theory, reformist 
political programs, and revolutionary manifestos. … [I]nstead of changing the term “literary 
criticism” to something like “culture criticism,” we have instead stretched the word “literature” to 
cover whatever the literary critics criticise.”
206
 
 
Note that Rorty is not encouraging a return to “traditional humanistic criticism”: “Although I 
think that this sort of criticism has been treated rather too harshly lately, this is not my intention. 
…[A] lot of humanistic criticism was essentialist – it believed that there were deep permanent 
things embedded in human nature for literature to dig up and exhibit to us.”207 
What he recommends is that the critic proceeds in the same way Rorty wants edifying 
philosophers to proceed – by using a Homeric, narrative style to tell stories:  
His recommendation to the critic is thus not grounded in a theory about literature or about criticism, 
but in a narrative whose details he hopes the literary critic will help him fill in. The pragmatist 
philosopher has a story to tell about his favorite, and least favored, books – the texts of, for example, 
Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Russell. He would like other people to have stories 
to tell about other sequences of texts, other genres-stories which will fit together with his.
208
 
 
Rorty adopts the term “edification” to stand for “this project of finding new, better, more 
interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking”, and explains that the “…attempt to edify 
(ourselves or others) may consist in the hermeneutic activity of making connections between 
our own culture and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and 
another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable 
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vocabulary.” 209 Likewise it might instead consist of the “poetic” activity of thinking up new 
aims, new words, or new disciplines, “…followed by, so to speak, the inverse of hermeneutics: 
the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the unfamiliar terms of our new 
inventions.
210
  
Without having the aim of laying down theoretical foundations literary studies becomes 
synonymous with literary criticism, and any interpretive use of a text becomes as an exercise in 
storytelling – saying something coherent and interesting. The question of whether these stories 
really are appropriate to the “real” or tell a more “true” story is not relevant: “The only issue is 
whether describing… in one language or the other lets us tell stories about them which will fit 
together with all the other stories we want to tell.”211 The reason for the importance of 
narration, of storytelling and other literary techniques – rhetorical moves normally not 
considered permissible within the genre of theory or philosophy – is that the purpose of 
edifying philosophy, as we touched upon above, is to make people drop a vocabulary in favour 
of another, and that this is a matter of persuasion, of putting together a convincing story. You 
need to use a new vocabulary to describe things, over and over again, “…until you have created 
a linguistic behaviour which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to 
look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behaviour, for example, the adoption of new 
scientific equipment or new social institutions. … [This] works holistically and 
pragmatically.”212 
 
Rorty seems to have even a higher purpose than the ones we have discussed previously, and he 
sees literary criticism as embodying this. He believes that we have a moral obligation, as critics 
and edifying philosophers, to “continuing the conversation of the West”.213 The concept of an 
“edifying philosopher” might seem to be a contradiction in terms if you see “edifying” in a 
Rortian sense of de-constructing: of historicising and telling new stories, and “philosophising” 
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as an attempt at solving problems, building systems of solutions and frameworks for thought. 
However, “One way of seeing edifying philosophy as the love of wisdom is to see it as the 
attempt to prevent conversation from degenerating into inquiry, into a research program.”214 
Edifying philosophers can help us avoid becoming as certain in our ways as science, and helps 
us “avoid the self-deception of thinking that we possess a deep, hidden, metaphysically 
significant nature which makes us “irreducibly” different from inkwells and atoms.”215 
Avoiding this kind of certainty keeps us “facing forward” as James put it, and keeps the 
conversation going.  
Rorty privileges literary criticism as this kind of open, hybrid genre because we need 
this type of conversation in order to articulate and change our experience of being human 
beings in the world. The ironist, pragmatist, critic, “the person who has doubts about his own 
sanity” needs to talk to other people with the same urgency as people need to make love:  
He needs to do so because only conversation enables him to handle these doubts, to keep himself 
together, to keep his web of beliefs and desires coherent enough to enable him to act. [… He] has 
Socratic doubts about the final vocabulary he inherited. So, like Socrates and Proust, he is 
continually entering into erotic relationships with conversational interlocutors.
216
 
 
Freedom from limitations, from the closing solutions of foundational theories, is the freedom to 
enter into and keep alive this conversation: “Given leisure and libraries, the conversation which 
Plato began will not end in self-objectivation – not because aspects of the world, or of human 
beings, escape being objects of scientific inquiry, but simply because free and leisured 
conversation generates abnormal discourse as the sparks fly upwards.”217 
 
The ironist critic is cast as our representative in this conversation, and as our moral guide. We 
measure the greatness of a poet by the effects of his metaphors and his ability to give us a richer 
language: to provide our language and us with more resources for inventing and redescribing 
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ourselves, but how do we know which poets we should listen to? Which new vocabularies to 
adopt? The literary critic can help us decide which texts we should label literature, which 
vocabularies can be interesting and useful to try out, which contexts to read in and which books 
to play against which other books. 
The critic aids and influences our ethical thinking by shaping the selections of books we 
choose from. He does, however, not make his recommendations along traditional lines: 
Metaphysicians see libraries as divided according to disciplines, corresponding to different objects 
of knowledge. Ironists see them as divided according to traditions, each member of which partially 
adopts and partially modifies the vocabulary of the writers whom she has read. Ironists take the 
writings of all people with poetic gifts, all of the original minds who had talent for redescription – 
Pythagoras, Plato, Milton, Newton, Goethe, Kant, Kierkegaard, Baudelaire, Darwin, Freud – as grist 
to be put through the same dialectic mill. The metaphysicians, by contrast, want to start by getting 
straight about which of these people were poets, which philosophers, and which scientists. They 
think it essential to get the genres right – to order texts by reference to a previously determined grid, 
a grid which, whatever else it does, will at least make a clear distinction between knowledge claims 
and other claims upon our attention.
218
 
   
Rorty is not interested in having us distinguish between the authors of such books and 
their heroes: to distinguish Marcel Proust from the narrator Marcel, Hegel from Geist or 
Trilling from The Liberal Imagination. He wants us to play these books, these figures, these 
conceptual tools against each other, in order to see if we can arrive at better tools for our ever 
changing purposes. This is why he sees “influential critics, the sort of critics who propose new 
canons – people like Arnold, Pater, Leavis, Eliot, Edmund Wilson, Lionel Trilling, Frank 
Kermode, Harold Bloom” as in the business of placing books in the context of other books, 
figures in the context of other figures, and not in the business of “explaining the real meaning of 
books, nor of evaluating something called their ‘literary merit.’”219 The production of canons 
by such critics serve as a trail we might follow on our quest to create and shape our moral 
identity. 
Note that the critic is not re-cast as our moral guide (just as literature is re-cast as our 
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new “sermon”) because he is any better than us, or has achieved some sort of enlightenment 
that puts him closer to the right and the good and the true, but simply due to the fact that he has 
read more books. He has a “large range of acquaintances” and is less likely to “get trapped in 
the vocabulary of a single book”.220 The critic is not expected to focus on relative literary merit 
but is “…expected to facilitate moral reflection by suggesting revisions in the canon of moral 
exemplars and advisers, and suggesting ways in which the tensions within this canon may be 
eased – or, where necessary, sharpened.”221 
This sort of critic might very well be our guide only within a highly specialised field, or, 
for instance, select “good” books based on an obsession with a particular type of characteristics. 
The individual critic might have his agenda and objectives. This is not a danger in itself, as long 
as we are wary of letting it turn into doctrine: attempts at formulating totalising answers and at 
forming and founding schools of thought. Rorty explains the distinction:  
I have nothing against being obsessively narrow. Dostoevsky was obsessively narrow, but we’re 
grateful for his obsessiveness. I can imagine being grateful for De Man’s obsessiveness, that is, his 
habit of reducing to nothingness any given texts he reads. When De Man does it it’s interesting, but 
when you get thousands… of De Man clones, it’s merely formulaic. […] It just became a joke. 
(Bloom is a far more interesting and important critic than De Man, but it is far from easy to imitate 
Bloom. There are no little Bloomians.) So I don’t want to criticize De Man, I only want to criticize 
De Manianism. We owe everything to individual obsessions on the part of new, creative, 
imaginative people. You don’t want to criticize them as totalizing because if you are obsessive you 
see everything through a very small window, a narrow set of blinkers. I think it becomes criticizable 
only when it becomes received doctrine.
222
 
 
You need a “strong critic” as much as you need the “strong poets” and those two labels quickly 
become interchangeable. In the same way the walls between theory and literature crumbles on 
Rorty’s view the difference between critical and poetic activity subsides. 
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To Rorty, the possibility of ironist theory – theory attempted constructed around and despite of 
an acute awareness of contingency, was shown to fail through Heidegger and Nietzsche. Rorty 
reminds us that “…theoria suggests taking a view of a large stretch of territory from a 
considerable distance”, and explains that a potential ironist theorist would aim to 
“…understand the metaphysical urge, the urge to theorise, so well that one can become entirely 
free of it”: it is an attempt at achieving intellectual autonomy.223 This is a project of 
self-creation; of recreating the past in the theorist’s image, and when this private pursuit of 
attainment of autonomy is taken as a larger and generally applicable view of history it becomes 
problematic. It would in fact imply end of history: “Because the theorist wants to see rather than 
to rearrange, to rise above rather than to manipulate, he has to worry about the so-called 
problem of self-reference – the problem of explaining his own unprecedented success at 
redescription in the terms of his own theory.”224 If his description is correct, then redescription 
ends with him. However, if he is an ironist historicist interested in redescription, he will know 
that his will also be rendered obsolete, and be redescribed in the future: he will be aware the 
contingency of his own project. The problem of the ironist theorist is: how do you overcome 
authority without claiming authority?
225
 
Rorty does not believe that this can be done through theory. Instead, the stories, the 
attention given to experience, to individual people, to time-bound ideas, “embedded in a web of 
contingencies”, that are found in the traditional literary genres, becomes a “safer medium than 
theory for expressing one’s recognition of the relativity and contingency of authority 
figures.”226 He points to the later Derrida as someone who ceased to make attempts at general 
and overarching theories, at “claiming authority”, and settled with idiosyncratic descriptions of 
his perceptions, which, nevertheless, overcame authority: 
[He] privatizes his philosophical thinking, and thereby breaks down the tension between ironism and 
theorizing. He simply drops theory – the attempt to see his predecessors steadily and whole – in 
favour of fantazising about those predecessors, playing with them, giving free rein to the trains of 
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associations they produce. There are no moral to these fantasies, nor any public (pedagogic or 
political) use to be made of them… Such fantasizing is, in my view, the end product of ironist 
theorizing.
227
 
 
Another consequence of Rortian pragmatism on our perception of theory, then, is that if 
we still wish to produce theoretical works that, despite no longer having foundational and 
universalist ambitions, have ambitions of at least taking a view of “a large stretch of territory” 
into account, we need to stop seeing our view of this as being universally applicable . It will first 
and foremost be applicable to our world, and if it should “catch on” with a public need and 
move into the public sphere, if its metaphors would become part of the literalised language of 
tomorrow, that would not be a matter of greater legitimacy, greater degree of truth and greater 
approximation to the real, but a matter of context, contingency, persuasion and justification.  
Consequences of pragmatism on literary theory 
We might conclude our discussion of the pragmatist conception of theory and the Rortian 
account literary criticism by first asking if pragmatism is anti-theoretical and anti-intellectual. 
Are we, as a discipline, not lost – both in the sense of not knowing where to go, but also in the 
sense of being ruled out; of being a lost cause as a discipline – if the act of facing up to the 
contingency of everything we think we know and are brings us to the point where theoretical 
visions become private pursuits, writings like those of the later Derrida? Does the pragmatist 
contentment with a holistic interest in multiple vocabularies, where not one of those can serve 
as our “gold standard” for intellectual exchange, and none has a greater claim to truth than 
others, imply that pragmatism not only is anti-theoretical, but also anti-intellectual?  
 
Few would argue with the importance of the kind of critical practice Rorty is encouraging when 
he talks about playing books against books. This is a paradigmatic description of what we 
normally perceive to be critical activity of the highest level. We write criticism to explain, to 
contemplate and present our thoughts, to educate and contextualise, to guide and encourage 
readers, and Rorty is not trying to stop or redefine this. He is holding it up as the example he 
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would like others to imitate because literary criticism is seen as a discipline which still has 
room for enthusiasm, for other means of persuasion than rational argument, for beauty and for 
wonder. However, placing a preference on criticism, and even combining it with asking us to 
give up universalising theory with foundationalist ambitions, is not tantamount to giving up the 
gift of critical thinking. Theory as description of our rationale for action, as support for 
intelligent practice embodies this kind of thinking. Pragmatism is not opposed to reason, to 
thinking logically and structured, nor to writing this down and making arguments purporting 
these thoughts. Rorty points out that studying philosophy “…helps one see through pretentious, 
fuzzy thinking. …The intellectual moves which the study of analytic philosophy trained me to 
make have proved very useful. Whenever… I hear such words as ‘problematize’ and ‘theorize’ 
I reach for my analytic philosophy.”228 
Education is a necessary pillar for critical thinking, and Rorty, like James and Dewey, is 
a firm believer in education. He tells us that we need to begin with “acculturation and 
conformity” to “provide a cautionary complement to the claim that normal participation in 
normal discourse is merely one project, one way of being in the world” and to make us aware of 
the fact that “abnormal discourse is always parasitic upon normal discourse”.229 Rorty further 
pithily points out that “… [to] attempt abnormal discourse de novo, without being able to 
recognize our own abnormality, is madness in the most literal and terrible sense.” 230 Our 
conceptual and intellectual tools are appropriated through being educated across history and 
disciplines. Even without foundational principles vocabularies do get discarded. This is, 
however, brought about by comparison with other vocabularies, implying that without the 
knowledge of other vocabularies we cannot make these kinds of choices, just like we cannot 
play books against books without reading extensively and broadly. 
 
Pragmatism differs in how it describes “objective” knowledge. It recognises that this is 
constituted by subjective contribution and opinion, that truth is a matter of justification and 
objective knowledge a matter of the largest possible agreement: a formation of shared beliefs. 
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Points of view which openly admit the presence of markers of subjective opinion or individual 
experience are usually criticised for being in danger of ending in mere subjectivity, opinion, and 
expression of feeling. It is often argued that this cuts the individual off from a larger community 
which communicates in objective and neutral terms, limiting, or more or less trapping, the 
thinker in his own thoughts, feelings and desires.  
Rorty would point out that this communal language is a matter of convention, of which 
language we decide should be heard in the grander conversation. As we know, pragmatism sees 
the vocabulary of “reason” or “objective knowledge” not as a matter of being a special 
vocabulary that brings us closer and closer to the true voice of the universe, and Rorty does put 
poetry on an equal footing with rational argumentation. The formation of shared beliefs, 
however, does require conversation about these beliefs. James described it as trading in ideas. If 
these ideas are put forth persuasively enough they could all make us “stretch” to accommodate 
them, regardless of how they are expressed.  
They might, however, be best served by being formulated within the vocabulary 
normally perceived to be that of objective knowledge – the vocabulary that embodies our 
efforts of reaching the larges possible agreement. In addition, if these ideas are simply too outré 
they will not win terrain no matter how “objectively” they are expressed. Expressing outré 
beliefs and doing so in a vocabulary that is perceived to be too idiosyncratic to enter into the 
grander conversation, might, by convention, place these beliefs and the person expressing them 
on the side-line. Pragmatism describes this process, it does not prescribe it, and its admittance 
of the subjective component in all knowledge does not imply that pragmatists cut themselves 
off and revert to mere subjective opinion making. 
  
In the introduction to Interpretation and Overinterpretation Stefan Collini, editor of that 
volume and Professor of English Literature and Intellectual History at the University of 
Cambridge, worries about the consequences of dropping the concept of “theory” that Rorty 
would like us to leave behind: “For all the brilliance of this anti-philosophical polemics and the 
thought-provoking range of his cultural criticism, there is a strain in Rorty’s anti-essentialism 
which may seem to encourage a kind of anti-intellectualism. The range of questions ‘we 
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pragmatists’ would say there is no point in asking threatens to shrink the horizons of intellectual 
inquiry.”231 This, I believe, expresses a worry we should take seriously.  
It might not be very difficult to counter this statement in principle with an account of 
how pragmatism, as we noted in part two, seeks to open up a lot more scope for intellectual 
inquiry by moving from one working definition to the next in a continual search for that which 
will serve our objectives and needs the best, be it explanations with maximum predictive power, 
or be it the arrangement of words on a page that will induce the most intense “Housmanian 
tingles” in us. The very volume Collini is quoted from contains Rorty’s basic, pragmatist case 
for why attempts at placing limits on how we should think ought to be abandoned. The problem 
is that even if this could be argued to imply an opening up on principle, it does not describe the 
situation in practice.  
The problem is further explained by Menand, who points to two problems:  
…turn-of-the-century pragmatism does have two larger deficiencies as a school of thought. One is 
that it takes interests for granted: it doesn’t provide for a way of judging whether they are worth 
pursuing apart from the consequences of acting on them. We form beliefs to get what we want, but 
where do we get our wants? This is a question asked by writers like Veblen and Weber and Freud, 
but it is not a question that figure centrally in the thought of James and Dewey. The second 
deficiency is related to the first. It is that wants and beliefs can lead people to act in ways that are 
distinctly unpragmatic. Sometimes the results are destructive, but sometimes they are not. There is a 
sense in which history is lit by the deeds of men and women for whom ideas were things other than 
instruments of adjustment. Pragmatism explains everything about ideas except why a person would 
be willing to die for one.
232
  
 
The reason this is tied to Collini’s worry that the range of questions we see the point of 
pursing might diminish, is that if everyone dismissed all pursuits and purposes that were not 
concerned with practical effects, and never endeavoured to construct any “overarching 
vocabularies”, then there never would have been any Kant and there never would have been any 
Marx. On the one hand Rorty sees us as completely dependent on such geniuses to overthrow 
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and innovate, and on the other it becomes hard to see how they, if they were pragmatists, would 
every bother with such endeavours.  
Rorty is clearly aware of these issues. He postulates his idea of the ironist as someone 
who is simultaneously aware of the contingency of his central beliefs, yet also dedicated to 
them, even willing to die for them. He also explains how we can still engage in the kind of 
theoretical writings of the later Derrida: not necessarily expressing it the same manner, but 
seeing it as a private pursuit. The difference between genious and fantasy is, as we know, on 
Rorty’s account, only a matter of whether such private projects catch on with a greater public 
need or not. We do not, however, yet live in Rorty’s liberal utopia where everyone is 
“commonsensically” anti-essentialist and anti-metaphysicalist in the way a large portion of the 
population now is commonsensically secularist. A lot of us might not be able to be ironists, the 
kind of people who glare the all-consuming ghost of contingency in the eye and still prevail in 
our dedication to work towards the greater good. We might still need to see some concepts as if 
they had essences because that, in practice, is what can uphold our faith and our commitment to 
keeping the conversation going. Seeing their efforts as private endeavours might not be enough 
for those great minds that would want so much more. Rorty’s solutions to this problem might be 
overestimating our courage.   
 
At the same time, this very argument which represents the core of the anti-metaphysical 
teachings of Rortian pragmatism – a shift towards a faith without absolute reason, a dedication 
without fundamental grounds – is also a case for why pragmatism arguably is not inherently 
anti-intellectual. Instead of relying on foundations outside of ourselves, instead of pursuing 
theory as a “…body of thought which stands outside critical practice and provides it with basic 
principles, methods, and investigative problems”,233 pragmatism places its faith in our 
intellectual capabilities: in our ability to both realise the inevitable contingency of everything 
and also realise that it does not need to matter. It might be an overestimation of our capabilities, 
if not in theory, then, ironically enough, in practical terms. It is not, however, a depreciation of 
intellectual reasoning. 
                                                 
 
 
233
 W. J. T. Mitchell, Against theory: literary studies and the new pragmatism  (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985). 1. 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
101 
 
 
If we return to the distinction between the attitude where we are ready to be inspired and the 
attitude of “knowingness”, the former might seem less intellectually-minded than the latter. We 
know why Rorty sees the former as absolutely necessary: that it opens the space for change and 
progress. Rorty has, in fact, a certain faith in the discipline of literary studies because he 
admires it for not being entirely deprived of romance and inspiration.
234
 He fears that this is 
being as marginalised, however, as he believes it has been within philosophy, and he urges us to 
keep a space open for the inspirational:  
A humanistic discipline is in good shape only when it produces both inspiring works and works 
which contextualize, and thereby deromanticize and debunk, those inspiring works. […] I think that 
literature departments were in better shape when people of Bloom’s and [Dorothy] Allison’s sort had 
a better chance than, I am told, they now have of being allowed to spend their teaching lives 
reiterating their idiosyncratic enthusiasms for their favourite prophets and demiurges… They are 
people whose motto is Wordsworth’s “What we have loved/Others will love, and we will teach them 
how.
235
 
 
The enthusiasts alone will not, however, make an academic discipline: “We shall always need 
people in every discipline whose talents suit them for understanding… for placing a text in a 
context… and for detecting nonsense rather than producing it.”236 Rorty also appreciates the 
poetic achievements of traditional theorists: “the genre we call ‘theory’ has done… a lot of 
good by providing an occasion for us to read a lot of first-rate books we might otherwise have 
missed – books by Heidegger and Derrida, for example.”237 He is just concerned that we are 
moving towards a state of affairs where there is no longer any room for the enthusiasts, and 
where the genre of theory takes precedence over literature. Rorty might move to de-construct 
theory, but he moves to re-construct literary criticism. 
 
We have seen that due to the anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist insights of pragmatism it 
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rejects theoretical efforts towards laying down foundations, formulating overarching 
vocabularies and purporting to be revealing origins and first-principles. As a consequence of 
pragmatism it no longer becomes possible to separate theory from experience, real life 
considerations and practical effects, and so it becomes inseparable from the task of describing 
and redescribing our purposes, our reasons for acting in a certain manner and the consequences 
of doing so. Theory becomes a supporting activity for intelligent practice. This reflects the 
change in attitude the adoption of a pragmatist position implies, and its heightened awareness of 
that all we ever do is to use anything. For literary studies this means that we would abandon any 
efforts at formulating theories for interpretation, and it implies that we would place a greater 
importance on activities that do not have predetermined objectives in mind and lesser 
importance on those that arise from a stance of “knowingness”. It would shifts focus away from 
theoretical endeavours to critical activities: to saying something interesting and coherent by 
playing vocabulary against vocabulary.  
The consequences of pragmatism on the conception of literature and on literary theory 
seem to leave us in a precarious position as an academic discipline. It leaves us without a 
well-defined object of study and without a general theoretical approach to legitimate our 
academic efforts upon. Can we have an academic discipline, a field of study, without an object 
of study? And if we settle with a linguistic plurality – a holistic interest in multiple vocabularies 
– as our only starting point for our critical activities, how do we approach our work as literary 
scholars? This is what we turn to next when we look at pragmatism and method.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
As it turns out, the very idea of a separation between a chapter on theory and a chapter on 
method is paradoxical in pragmatist terms. We saw above that the two cannot be separated. 
Much of what was said above in relation to theory could also have been said about method here. 
We will, however, briefly outline some points pertaining to the issues we “normally” would 
isolate as part of what we are doing when we are studying literature.  
Doing literature: The Rortian account of method 
Doing, acting, practicing is, as we know, at the heart of pragmatism: James defines pragmatism 
as a method for settling metaphysical disputes. This might make us ask what we normally mean 
when we talk about “method”? In general it is associated with approach that can be 
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demonstrated, repeated, and followed according to certain rules: it is rule governed behaviour. 
Methodology is the attempt at seeing methods together, as a whole, creating frameworks of 
methods, studying the processes at work, and so on. Even though pragmatism would see all our 
ways of behaving in relation to each other, any attempt at unifying and grounding our ways of 
acting intelligently regardless of purpose, a universal description of how to act, would be seen 
as impossible, futile, and undesirable, paralleling exactly Rorty’s rejection of the possibility of 
epistemology. Method as behaviour that is “rule governed” from a general perspective would 
also be limiting our possibilities when seeking the best way of doing something for a particular 
purpose, in a specific situation and context. 
What is “method” in literary studies? In either of the senses above we have none. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the only method I can detect is one of reading, and 
reading broadly, thoroughly and with awareness. We could perhaps say that we rely on the 
“method of hermeneutics” – of understanding the whole as constituted by the parts and vice 
versa, of constantly enlarging our scope, widening our horizons, re-reading and 
re-understanding. This is also an accurate description of the approach Rorty recommends as the 
pragmatist method of the edifying philosopher – and what he sees as the literary critic’s method. 
Even if what we are doing remains much the same under a pragmatist paradigm, our 
attitude towards what we are doing might. As we have noted in our conclusions to both our 
chapter on the concept of literature and our chapter on theory a change in attitude seems to be a 
defining consequence of pragmatism. This is what we will take a moment to focus on below.  
A juxtapositioning of “bits of information” 
We already know that pragmatism would reject method as the application of theoretical 
paradigms. It urges us to be content with a practice of arriving at agreed upon desiderata 
through a social process of justification. If you as a scholar would like to consider how the poets 
you study fit into other areas of discourse, we have seen that Rorty does not believe that fitting 
them into a predetermined grid is the best way. Instead, Rorty believes that “[r]eading texts is a 
matter of reading them in the light of other texts, people, obsessions, bits of information, or 
what have you, and then seeing what happens.” The result might be “too weird and 
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idiosyncratic to bother with” or it might be “exiting and convincing”.238 
Where particular theoretical approaches might seek to limit the kinds of “bits of 
information” we can juxtapose, pragmatism wants to remove all such bounds and level the 
playing field completely. Since the pragmatist take on literature is anti-essentialist, “thoroughly 
contextual” and functional, all texts can interpenetrate and inform each other – no text will 
possess an intrinsic value or a special ontological status which allows it to take precedence over 
any other text. The usual approach to interpretation is orientated towards the literary work first 
and foremost. When it is presumed that our task is to find out the real meaning of the text, we 
might use other bits of information: historical, biographical, philosophical or theoretical 
studies, or even letters and journals, in order to inform our interpretation, but this will 
nevertheless be subordinate to the “text itself”. 
When interpretation no longer has this aim the only thing structuring the critic is the 
critic himself. Any text he chooses to study becomes part of a web of interrelated texts, 
vocabularies, and pieces of knowledge which are being played against each other in order to see 
what results: to see if the fall-out from the experiment is usable in order to support the claims 
the critic is making. This value side-ordering does not, however, imply a prescription to always 
include every piece and type of related text or information. The methodological pluralism 
implied in pragmatism also leaves the possibility open for readings where the literary text is the 
only text considered, acting as an object of study alone (for instance a typical “close reading” 
resembling those of the New Critics). A pragmatist stance does not require a contextually 
orientated method any more than a view that holds the literary work to have a privileged 
position based on intrinsic qualities precludes the inclusion of contextual material. 
Another consequence of this methodological pluralism is that choosing an approach one 
time does not imply that the same approach will be chosen the next time. Primacy might be 
placed on a novel one time and on historical information the next. There is a levelling not only 
of texts and information, but also between approaches and between critics: each is encouraged 
to find his or her approach, as they see most fit, and most useful to their purposes. As we noted 
previously, pragmatism is wary of attempts at forming schools of thought; of doctrine. 
Pragmatist methodology is inherently eclectic and idiosyncratic, and prefers to encourage 
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idiosyncrasy – to lift up the individual’s way of coping with the problem at hand as a concrete 
example to learn from.  
Methodical attitudes 
Several times throughout this entire inquiry we have tied the consequences of pragmatism to the 
underlying change in attitude it implies. This attitude is what is summarised very neatly in the 
quote that sparked off our investigation: it is an attitude of anti-essentialism, 
anti-foundationalism and of holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. We might also add the 
components that James pointed out: a facing forward; an openness that sees truth as its 
departure point, and note the pragmatist’s continual focus on practice and experience.  
This pragmatist attitude implies a greater awareness of the actions chosen: of the use of 
texts and how they are used. It is interested in articulating purposes, needs and requirements – 
those of individual scholars and those of literary studies as a discipline alike. It is not interested 
in theoretical pursuits that purport to lay down foundations and reveal first-principles. Even 
though pragmatism does not see it as possible to separate theory from experience and practice, 
it remains interested in using our abilities for critical and logical thinking to support intelligent 
practice. This implies, however, that theory no longer precedes practice, and that methodical 
approaches where we come to a task with criteria, a theory, already in hand do not represent the 
preferred method. This is why Rorty shifts his attention from the “knowingness” of philosophy 
to literary criticism and its interest in what results from a play of books against books.  
 
We have, as mentioned, encountered the distinction between “knowingness” and a hopeful 
openness several times. This divergence in attitude and approach does however emerge in 
various guises throughout Rorty’s writings. Rorty’s terms for it when he is talking about 
literature and interpretive practices are inspired versus methodical readings. This opposition 
overlaps with a lot of others he puts up: open-mindedness and a closed mind, purposes which 
emerge after experience and those that are predefined. This goes hand in hand with the 
distinction between formulating criteria prior to forming beliefs and undergoing experiences 
and formulating them after. It is the difference between edifying versus systematic philosophy, 
between the unfamiliar and the familiar, between being original and unique and being a copy. It 
is also the challenging versus the relaxing and progress versus the status quo. This all seems like 
it would fit under the heading of abnormal versus normal discourse, or under literary criticism 
versus theorising. In short, it appears to be the difference between pragmatism and 
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foundationalist philosophy and that that is a matter of attitude.  
 
The basic method for literary studies that follows from this attitude is simply to read. To read 
extensively and across traditionally upheld lines and divides, but also to read with confidence 
and a Bloomian sense of “healthy disrespect” towards conventions: 
…Just pick up authors and see if they can be of any use, and see if they can be brought into dialogue 
with authors you’ve already read. I like the way Harold Bloom handles philosophers. He’s never 
written extensively about a philosopher, but every once in a while he picks up a book by Derrida, or 
whoever, and says something really acute about it. The same goes for Frank Kermode. Nobody 
would think of either of them as bringing philosophy and literary criticism together. They just read 
philosophers when they feel like reading philosophers. That seems to me just the right way to go 
about it. It’s not a question of mastering a discipline. It’s just being able occasionally to read an 
author who works in an unfamiliar genre. 
ER: So without wanting to fall foul of typifying Bloom in a particular way, you could say that he is 
practicing a pragmatist form of reading? 
RR: Yes, he and Kermode are not buffaloed by philosophy. Consider Kermode’s essay on Heidegger 
and Stevens. Kermode isn’t buffaloed by Heidegger. Kermode doesn’t ask himself, “Do I have a 
proper grasp of Heidegger?” or of philosophy, or whatever it might be.
239
 
  
Following this, the notion of a “pragmatist reading” can be argued to dissolve. Even a 
reading of, for instance, a “difficult” piece of poetry, the epitome of “art for art’s sake”, would 
not in any way that was immediately visible be distinguishable from any other reading of the 
same poem. The difference would lie in the interpreter’s basic attitude. We could perhaps trace 
this shift in perception through some subtle differences in vocabulary choices and an attention 
to use, details and contingency, yet if the critic trusts the power of his reading his arguments 
will nevertheless be put forth with conviction, and defended adequately, as he would use the 
best tools at his disposal in order to persuade his peers of his point of view. Rorty explicates the 
matter: 
ER: […] But this is why I’ve asked you about a pragmatist attitude to literary texts: because if most 
people are metaphysicians in some form, surely this must inform the work they will do on texts? For 
                                                 
 
 
239
 Ragg and Rorty, "Worlds or Words Apart? Interview with Richard Rorty," 393-394. 
Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies – Master’s Thesis – Elin Danielsen – UiB – Spring term 2013 
 
 
107 
 
example, asking questions like: “What is the relation of this poem to ideas of truth?” or reality, or 
morality, or something larger than themselves? 
RR: I’d be inclined to say not so much “inform” or “change the way” they work on texts, but rather 
that a pragmatist view of themselves changes their attitudes towards themselves as readers and as 
other people as readers. It isn’t that they’re going to do anything very different; it’s that they’re 
going to think about what they’re doing differently.
240
 
 
In the introduction to this thesis we asked if taking a pragmatist stance would influence 
the very experience of reading great literature. The simple answer is no, but we might add that if 
pragmatism frees us, as readers, from certain theoretical constraints, the resulting change in 
regards to the experience of reading great literature would be a greater emphasis on the actual 
experience of it.  
Studying literature without an “object” of study 
We asked above if the discipline of literary studies could continue without a definite object of 
study. Now we are at a point where we seemingly have neither object, theories nor methods to 
build a discipline from. Where does this leave us?  
In their introduction to From Text to Literature – New analytic and pragmatic 
approaches Stein Haugom Olsen and Anders Pettersson point out that the success of literary 
studies to establish itself as an academic discipline might have been the very reason for its core 
theoretical problem: It not only required a method of study but also a determinate field of study. 
This meant that academic literary studies would have to transform, for its own specific purposes, 
such concepts as “literary work” and “literary text” as well as the concept of “literature”, from broad, 
vague, non-theoretical, everyday notions into something like well-designed theoretical tools. 
Though it has not always been recognized, this transformation has presented a major theoretical 
problem for literary studies, and it is arguable that to this day no satisfactory solution has been 
found.
241
  
 
It should be clear from our discussion so far why pragmatism would claim that no solution will 
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ever be found beyond Rorty’s suggestion to drop the whole project. 
The only reason Rorty sees to keep up the kind of talk that is needed to legitimate 
literary studies as an academic discipline is to keep it going as a discipline. To gain the 
maximum respect in an academic context it is important for our field of study to be a 
Wissenschaft. The fact that we have to, or see it as desirable to, adhere to this requirement is a 
symptom of the fact that the larger systems and beliefs in society are based on a metaphysical 
understanding of the world. However, being pragmatic about it Rorty still sees talk of methods 
and results as having its uses: 
ER: So do you think academics find themselves in a slightly curious position, particularly 
pragmatists (and maybe those literary critics who have embraced pragmatism) in the sense that they 
find themselves within particular departments and institutional structures that are - what’s the 
evolutionary word – vestigial? … do the very institutions academics work in inscribe the very things 
they want to critique, or do away with? 
RR: Sure. But another way to look at it is: by pretending to do something called research, by 
pretending to have quasi-scientific methods, by pretending to have disciplinary standards, we can get 
ourselves a place at the public trough. We can be supported in doing what we want to do. This 
pretense that philosophy and literary criticism are “disciplines” with “methods” and “research 
techniques” and “results” and the like is one that not many people really take seriously. But it’s a 
pretense that keeps the money coming into the Humanities. I have no better method of financing to 
suggest.
242
 
 
Consequences of pragmatism on the conception of method in literary 
studies 
Rorty’s own method when interpreting works of philosophy is to “…linguisticize as many 
pre-linguistic-turn philosophers as [he] can, in order to read them as prophets of the utopia in 
which all metaphysical problems have been dissolved, and religion and science have yielded 
their place to poetry.”243 This is a method tailored to Rorty’s specific purpose, and that is what 
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he recommends us all to develop for ourselves: our method, our intelligent practice, our 
descriptions for our rationale, for each of our purposes. This implies that one unified 
methodology for this kind of interpretive and descriptive activity cannot be found, and that it 
will always be contingent, historicist, eclectic and contextually open. This does not imply that 
the individual scholar would operate independently and not take the wisdom and learning of his 
tradition and discipline into account. Nor does it mean that he would dismiss approaches which 
have been proven to be useful, intelligent, and interesting in the past. As we know, access to 
common reality does not require access to something preconceptual, but that we are able to 
form shared conceptions.
244
 
For our purposes as academic scholars we need and want to undertake methodical and 
empirical studies. We might let both “knowing” and inspired readings go hand in hand: a study 
of a literary work may mix the two approaches. The main consequence of pragmatism on the 
conception of method seems, once again, to be a matter of a shift in attitude. The pragmatist 
critic would rest content with a methodological pluralism: eclecticism in regards to the range of 
methods “on offer”, and refrain from attempts at instigating or following schools of thought. He 
would have the ironist awareness of contingency while also maintaining the ironist dedication 
to his beliefs. In other words: he would have the attitude of Bloom without becoming “a little 
Bloomian”.   
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PART 4 – CONSEQUENCES 
 
In this last, significantly shorter, part, we will briefly review the findings of this thesis and 
attempt to place them in a larger context. Throughout this inquiry we have examined the 
consequences of adopting a pragmatist position within literary studies, and for each of our areas 
of inquiry we have concluded by summarising the consequences of pragmatism on each. Hence 
our aggregate summary here will be fairly succinct.  
 
In keeping with the pragmatist “idea of ideas” – that our ideas are conceptual tools – literature, 
also, is conceived as such from a pragmatist point of view. This shifts the focus from asking 
what literature is to asking what it does: to practical consequences, experience and real life 
considerations. Because it is not seen as having a defined essence, the word “literature” 
becomes a label for a gradually moving web of texts that we value highly, and because art on 
pragmatist terms cannot be separated from real life, these texts cannot be separated from our 
need to describe our selves and our experiences. As inseparable from our need to express our 
identity and beliefs literature also enters into the role of providing new metaphors that aid 
progress – progress seen precisely as continual redescription through more useful metaphors. 
Due to the anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist insights of pragmatism it rejects 
theoretical efforts towards formulating overarching vocabularies and revelation of origins and 
first-principles. Pragmatism, as James says, turns “…away from abstraction and insufficiency, 
from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and 
pretended absolutes and origins.” 245 Theory cannot, any more than literature, be separated 
from practice, and it becomes identical with the task of describing and redescribing our 
purposes, our reasons for acting in a particular manner and the consequences of doing so. It 
becomes a support for intelligent practice.  
Theory as a familiar genre is on Rorty’s account seen as a vocabulary that enters into the 
literary critic’s play of vocabularies, books, and “bits of information”. This activity is the one 
Rorty would prefer us to spend our time on, and he does have a pragmatist basis for this bias 
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through the fact on pragmatist terms practice comes before theory. Hence approaching texts 
with given and familiar ideas and criteria in mind is less interesting than engaging in the activity 
of reading first and then attempt to explain how we came to understand it as we did.  
This also implies that as a holistic practice such criticism cannot be contained within a 
methodology, defined as a set of rule governed behaviours. As we saw in part two, James 
considers our beliefs as our rules for action – guidelines for how we should undertake a task or 
behave in a certain situation. Hence, instead of describing a fixed set of methods we would 
focus on a continual assessment and re-assessment of our beliefs. This means that our methods 
within literary studies will be eclectic, historicist, proceed from a nominalist attention to the 
particular, be aware of contingency, be wary of schools of thought, be contextually orientated, 
and be interested in multiple vocabularies. 
 
For each of sets of consequences we have examined, our conclusions have always returned to 
the shift in attitude we outlined in more detail towards the end of part three above. It is difficult 
to tell which came first: the pragmatist attitude or the pragmatist insights. Perhaps the most 
important thing we have said about this attitude is that it does not originate from an 
anti-intellectualist position. It wants to put our intellect to practical use, but it does not reject 
using critical or logical thinking: we can invent concepts and ideas, classify and abstract, as 
long as we remain attuned to their nominalist origins. It is closely related, and equally 
important, to point out that this does not imply a regress into mere subjectivism. Moving from 
epistemology to epistemological behaviourism – from believing we can verify our knowledge 
against objects and events in the world to looking at how we come to consider something as 
known – is not the rejection of neither knowledge, nor of “objective” knowledge. It is a 
rejection of a particular way of perceiving knowledge: a different attitude towards knowledge, 
truth and fact.  
 
In the preface to Contingency, irony and solidarity Rorty quotes, at some length, Milan 
Kundera from The Art of the Novel. In fact, this quote stands, uncommented, as the entire 
preface to the work where the mature Rorty tells the story of, and his vision for, pragmatism. It 
seems to me that this Kundera quote serves, not so much as a gateway into Rorty’s work or as a 
comment on it, but that Contingency, irony and solidarity can be seen as a response to or an 
elucidation of the problem and the hope laid out by Kundera.  
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 Kundera is expressing his worry about the threat that hangs over the European idea of 
respect for the individual, for the originality of thought, and the right to a private life. The 
dream of Europe, its image – Europe as an imaginative realm – is strong enough to unite 
humanity, and yet fragile and perishable. But the place it is kept safe is within the novel:  
 
The agélastes, the non-thought of received ideas, and kitsch are one and the same, the three headed 
enemy of the art born as the echo of God’s laughter, the art that created the fascinating imaginative 
realm where no one owns the truth and everyone has the right to be understood. …If European 
culture seems under threat today… that precious essence of the European spirit is being held safe as 
in a treasure chest inside the history of the novel, the wisdom of the novel.
 246
 
 
Rorty’s reconceives and redescribes pragmatism in order to express this “wisdom of the novel”, 
and his utopia is that imaginative realm. Perhaps the pragmatist attitude is best described as the 
point of view from which no one owns the truth and everyone has the right to be understood – 
the attitude of the realm of literature.  
 
 
We started this investigation with a quote from the following exchange, and we might conclude 
by quoting at some length from it:  
ER: …wouldn’t you agree that pragmatism does have certain things to recommend for literary study: 
for example, pointing out that ideas are not separate things to language, that ideas about texts are 
linguistically informed? So that, if pragmatism cannot spawn something called a “pragmatist literary 
theory,” it can nevertheless debunk various metaphysical notions and the tendency to think about 
texts in an essentialist way… Maybe I’m coming out with another banality or platitude, but I would 
say pragmatism is useful because it is antifoundationalist, antiessentialist, and recommends this 
holistic interest in multiple vocabularies. Are there any other ways in which you might conceive 
pragmatism being useful to literary study? 
RR: No. I think that’s it. I think antiessentialism is the heart of the matter. In a culture, either 
religious or scientistic, that says “Yes, but this is appearance, what we want is reality,” or “This is 
accident, what we want is essence,” you get a kind of authoritarian sadomasochism: the wish to 
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 Milan Kundera in The Art of the Novel, quoted in the preface to Rorty, Contingency, irony and solidarity. 
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subordinate oneself to something larger. I think of pragmatism, either when applied to democratic 
practice in politics, or when applied to literary criticism, as precisely debunking the 
appearance-reality, essence-accident distinctions. Pragmatists say, “Look, there isn’t any authority 
that we can appeal to to settle the quarrels between us. We’re going to have to deal with them 
ourselves.” That’s the kind of change in self-description which could in the end make a difference.
247
 
 
James himself said of pragmatism that “we find [it] spoken of, sometimes with respect, 
sometimes with contumely, seldom with clear understanding.”248 Hopefully this account has 
managed to make the matter somewhat clearer. Perhaps it has even shown how the change in 
attitude that pragmatism entails could instigate a kind of change in self-description which could 
make a positive difference to our field of study and our critical activities. This attitude is already 
present in our discipline. That is the reason why Rorty gravitates towards literary studies, and 
why he believes we should nurture its willingness to keep the critical conversation going – its 
desire to talk about what we see as possible and what we see as important.     
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 Ragg and Rorty, "Worlds or Words Apart? Interview with Richard Rorty," 390-391. 
248
 James, Pragmatism : a new name for some old ways of thinking: 47. 
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Recommendations for further study 
There are many further questions relating to the topic of this thesis that would be interesting to 
ask. To mention a few:  
- There was limited scope for direct comparison within the range of pragmatist aesthetic 
philosophies. Rorty’s views on the issue of the definition of literature or art would be very 
interesting to compare in detail with for instance those of Shusterman, Margolis and Nussbaum.  
- The logical steps that lead to and from the break with any idea of art that retains a degree of 
essentialism and, further, those steps that then lead to the inevitability of literature becoming a 
matter of moral development and progress would be interesting to return to. Their outline above 
represents my best understanding of the matter, and it is based, as shown, on my readings of 
Rorty. It has, however, so far not been possible for me to find other studies which address 
particularly the latter part of this line of reasoning in any detail. In fact, other pragmatists, like 
for instance Posner, do not seem to draw this conclusion, which, ultimately and to Rorty, seems 
to be a matter of drawing the ultimate conclusion of key pragmatist tenets, principles which 
usually have a broad agreement amongst pragmatists.  
- Much of the same applies to the pragmatist reasons why Rorty privileges literary criticism.  
- In regards to theory the key insights of the pragmatist view of theory have been explained. It 
would, however, be useful to compare this (as it would in regards to the definition of literature) 
with other views, particularly those that are interested in the necessary conditions for keeping 
the conversation going. Where Rorty believes we simply have to keep it going and the rest, as he 
is famous for saying, will take care of itself, many do not.  
- Lastly, a further comparison of the pragmatist attitude and the kind of attitude we immediately 
assume when we are faced with a work of fiction, a poem, or literature recognised as literature 
in general, would be interesting to detail further. I believe that there are grounds for this 
comparison to be found in Rorty’s writings: what pragmatism does is sometimes compared to 
what literature can do. There also seems to be fundamental similarities between the Rortian 
view of language as a whole and standard views on what fiction is. On the Rortian view fiction, 
as shown in this thesis, becomes that which is more unfamiliar, but everything takes place 
within one language-game. This provides the grounds for the comparison in attitude: the attitude 
we normally assume when we encounter fiction seems closely related to the attitude Rorty 
assumes when encountered with the phenomenon of language as a whole.  
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Recommendations for further reading 
For a general introduction to the history of pragmatism I would highly recommend Menand’s 
The Metaphysical Club. This is an informative and entertaining account of “the history of ideas 
in America” as the sub-title reads.  
 
To embark on readings in pragmatist philosophy, it is advisable to simply begin with the 
writings of James in Pragmatism. His lectures are very accessible and possess a clear and 
distinct voice that will reach the interested reader across a century. Putnam’s Pragmatism as 
well as the introductions to the 30
th
 anniversary edition of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
and to The Rorty Reader are also readable and have been of great help.  
 
The latter three are also informative when it comes to understanding Rorty’s brand of 
pragmatism. I do, however, recommend beginning with Contingency, irony and solidarity. 
Moving on I would recommend The Rorty Reader and its representative cross section of 
Rorty’s writings. Rorty and his Critics provides a wide selection of interesting exchanges. 
 
For details of these recommendations, see the bibliography below.  
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